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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters that contribute to the research
field of monetary macroeconomics. In these three chapters that have a broad range of
research questions on inflation in emerging markets and developing countries, I aim to
better understand the redistributive effects of anticipated inflation on individual be-
haviours together with welfare consequences; proximate, socio-economical and political
drivers of inflation; and the relationship between central bank targets and foreign aid
with a focus on the implications of inflation in foreign aid-recipient countries.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 are based on theoretical models whereas Chapter 3 is an
empirical study. In Chapter 2, a Real Business Cycle model with two types of households
where the impatient faces a borrowing constraint is used. Chapter 4 introduces foreign
aid into a New Keynesian model in which monetary policy is represented by a Taylor
rule. Chapter 3 utilizes a panel vector autoregressive approach incorporating different
theories that explain drivers of inflation. Common to all these three chapters is their
high relevance for monetary policy as they provide normative results for policy planners.
Chapter 2 establishes a model where lenders and borrowers emerge due to the difference
in time preferences. More patient lenders value future more while impatient households
value the consumption of today more than the patient households. Thus, impatient
households derive a higher marginal utility from consuming today, leading to a need for
borrowing in order to increase their current consumption. On the other hand, patient
households engage in consumption smoothing by saving today. In this setting, the
distributional effects of inflation is explored and the non-neutrality of money is assessed
without aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, distortionary taxes and generation differences.
Finally, money demand motive is introduced to this cashless economy where the decisions
regarding to money holding generate another distortion in addition to the borrowing
constraint. The aim in this analysis is to distinguish the effects of inflation under the
1
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presence of money demand motive; and compare the welfare consequences of inflation
tax in this economy with the cashless economy so as to provide a guideline to the policy
planner in setting inflation rate.
In the theoretical setting, bond market can be considered as incomplete with nominally
non-contingent bonds. Bonds are non-contingent in the sense that when the period of
maturity comes for repayment, the amount of repayment is diminished by the inflation
rate at the time of maturity and the time preference of the borrowers due to the period
difference between obtaining the loan and maturity. The term incomplete financial
market is used here in a slightly different terminological way than the literature has
been using. For instance, as in the explanation of Sheedy (2016), the financial markets
are called incomplete when the debt contracts cannot guarantee the debt repayments
for all future event realizations. Contrary to this line of literature, there is no aggregate
and idiosyncratic risk in the framework. However, when the maturity of the debt comes
(i.e future event), the debt repayment is not the same value with the amount of loan
obtained from the lender (i.e realization) due to the period difference between getting
the loan and paying it back. Furthermore, the lender cannot seize the income of the
borrower in the case of this gap in the amount (i.e bad realization of future from the
perspective of lender) as there is no durable goods and future income for pledge as a
collateral for the debt obligations.
Considering a less developed financial market where neither future income nor durable
goods can be pledged for securitization of the debt obligation requires the lending to
be restricted by current income. This, however, results in a nominal friction, as higher
inflation reduces the real value of debt in terms of commodities at maturity, which is
advantageous for borrowers. Therefore, even anticipated inflation becomes non-neutral.
Furthermore, since the debt contracts are predetermined in nominal terms, inflation
influences the net worth of borrowers; thereby redistributing from lenders to borrowers.
The introduction of heterogeneous productivity levels illustrates that the amplification
of the redistributional effects from monetary policy is observed, suggesting that the
different productivity levels between the lenders and the borrowers provide a second
channel for redistribution. In other words, income inequality facilitates the redistribution
of generating inflation as the welfare gain from generating inflation is higher when income
inequality (i.e heterogeneous labor productivities) is present.
The concept that has been investigated in Chapter 2, in essence, can also be related to the
inflation risk of bond. Bonds have nominal face values unless they are inflation-indexed.
Hence, their real values change with inflation. In the case of firms, an increase in real
liabilities might cause them to default when the corporate debt is nominal. The literature
in this line of research prices fluctuations in real firm values into corporate bond spreads;
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and Kang and Pflueger (2015) find that the inflation risk explains a large fraction of
the variation in credit spreads. Specifically, a permanent decrease in log inflation from
three to one percent per annum increases the expected real principal repayment on a
10-year nominal bond by 22 percent. In the case of government, while the prices of
both nominal government and inflation-indexed bonds vary with real interest rate, the
prices of nominal government bonds also change with the expected inflation, leading to
an impact on investors’ risk premia by inflation risk1. Furthermore, the nominal bond
returns respond both to the real interest rates and the expected inflation; and Campbell
et al. (2016) find that high inflation is associated with high bond yields and low bond
returns. For investors (i.e lenders) to avoid the loss that stems from this inflation risk
associated with bonds, hedging is made possible via holding the inflation-indexed bonds
issued by governments or corporate firms. In this chapter, the debt securities (i.e bonds)
are issued by the borrower households; and the results are compatible with the literature,
implying a loss for the lenders (i.e investors) due to the higher expected inflation in the
absence of inflation-indexed bonds.
Augmentation of money demand enables to prescribe on the varying inflation rates
considering the welfare costs of inflation tax. Social planner can set a implausibly
high inflation rate, without accounting for money holding decisions, because doing so
would hurt only one type of household, namely the lender, by redistributing away from
them. The cashless economy suggests that the borrowers always benefit while the lenders
always suffer from higher inflation. In contrast, money-in-utility model demonstrates
that the additional distortion in the form of inflation tax can affect even the constrained
households negatively, resulting in a welfare loss from generating inflation.
The optimal monetary policy in the sense of a specific inflation rate offer is beyond the
scope of Chapter 2. Instead, it is concerned with the long-run role of the monetary
policy, how it influences patient and impatient households; and hence, affects utilitarian
welfare. In turn, it attempts to provide a prescription to a policy planner in setting
inflation rate. In this regard, this chapter shows that the inflation rate has long-run
real impacts, disproportionately affects heterogeneous households by redistributing from
lenders to borrowers with anticipated inflation; and whether the inflation rate can be
used as an instrument to improve utilitarian welfare relies on the presence of money de-
mand in the form of money-in-utility model, the concern with pro-lender/borrower bias,
the relationship between intertemporal elasticity of substitutions and the heterogeneous
productivity levels. In other words, the policy planner should be concerned about these
features when targeting an inflation rate to account for the welfare effects of that policy
implication.
1Campbell and Viceira (2001).
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This chapter can also be considered as a guide for monetary policy makers in a glob-
ally interlinked environment. With an analogy of developing countries as borrowers and
developed countries as lenders, this chapter suggests that an equilibrium inflation initi-
ated for the benefit of the lenders is likely to be harmful for the borrowers and in turn
social welfare worsening. The same proposition can also be applied to the economic
and monetary unions as they are bound by the decisions of the planner institution.
In unions, the member countries, where not all of the economies exhibit the same ad-
vancement in terms of characteristics and the structure with each other, are subject to
non-customized decisions of the policymaker institution. This study suggests that the
actions by the monetary authority can still achieve union-wide welfare gain although the
particular policy benefits only some of the participant countries on the cost of a loss for
some of the countries embodied in the union, accounting for the above stated factors.
Particular example in this case could be European Union where the member countries
are tied by the decisions of the European Central Bank (ECB). Some countries in the
union such as Germany and Sweden are having relatively better economic conditions
than other countries such as Greece and Bulgaria. Among these member countries,
some funds are changing hands in order to sustain the solidarity in Europe. Keeping
in mind that the ECB has a target of %0.2 inflation rate, this chapter place a question
mark on the discussion whether such a target impairs the recipient countries or donor
countries of these funds.
Most central banks share the same aim of achieving price stability although each re-
quires to consider the structure and the characteristics of its own economy. With an
approach taking into account these differences, sources and responses of inflation can
be exhaustively elaborated. In the literature, the empirical strategies for examining the
determinants of inflation, in general, can be classified into two. First, the pattern of
inflation in a single country over a long horizon can be studied. Over 50 or 100 years,
there may be sufficient changes in inflation and institutions so that meaningful tests on
different theories of inflation determinants can be checked. Secondly, the experiences in
several different countries over a shorter time span can be compared as the differences
in economical and political drivers among countries serve for an understanding of the
inflation dynamics. Following the second strategy, in Chapter 3, the determinants of
inflation in emerging market and developing countries are investigated.
Understanding the factors driving inflation changes is vital for several reasons. Inflation
affects economic agents unequally by redistributing from one group to another. In other
words, it shifts the purchasing power of some group to another. Investment decisions
are discouraged by inflation as it engenders uncertainty about future. The attempts of
central banks’ trying to control the inflation rate may provoke revaluation of currencies
hindering foreign demand. Alternatively, in the absence of any reactions by the central
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banks, inflation tends to cause currency devaluation, giving rise to a vicious cycle that
leads to hyperinflation. When the sources that cause fluctuations in inflation expec-
tations are known, the conduct of monetary policy is eased as it improves the ability
of the central bank to evaluate its own credibility and to assess the influence of its
policy actions. To avoid the negative effects of inflation on economy and be able to pin-
point optimal reactions, diagnosing the determinants of inflation and the transmission
of shocks together with interrelationships between inflation and economic factors are
crucial, adding to the understanding of the inflation dynamics.
Chapter 3, first, presents an extensive review of the literature on the determinants
of inflation. Then, it aims to improve the knowledge on inflation dynamics with two
types of annual data by incorporating different theories on the drivers of inflation. The
proximate determinants refer to exchange rate, unemployment rate, money growth, oil
price and public debt. Next, the analysis continues with a focus on institutional factor,
socio-economical and political characteristics of the countries. In particular, central
bank independence index, income inequality and political structure index are considered
as sources of inflation. The findings demonstrate that inflation is mainly driven by
money growth and inflation persistence when only proximate variables are considered.
From the political perspective, greater democratization is found to lead to inflation as
the inequality gap rises. The insignificance of the impact from de juro central bank
independence on inflation is supported. In each specification regardless of the focus
for the determinants of interest, the positive effect of the inflation inertia is shown
to be the greatest in terms of both magnitude and significance, suggesting that the
inflationary expectations and indexations schemes in price and wage are the most critical
determinants of inflation in emerging and developing economies.
The results of this positive analysis give rise to the following policy implications. If the
dominance of inflation inertia is claimed to be backward-looking wage settlements, wage
negotiations should be arranged on productivity instead of past realizations of inflation
in the future. Since the first round effects of adverse supply shocks could be amplified
in a volatile environment affecting inflation expectations and credibility of the monetary
authorities in applying policy regime, structural reforms should be considered. If the
inertia is proven to arise from inflationary expectations with slow adjustment, price
controls, such as controlled levels of exchange rate, wage and prices, may accelerate
the adjustment of the expectations breaking the inflation inertia.2 Inflationary inertia
can also be broken when the monetary authority would be forward-looking and more
responsive to the deviations of expected inflation from the inflation target. It tends to
be reduced with credible disinflationary policies and plans. To maintain the downward
2It is important to note that these choices may lead to unemployment, shortages and speculative
effect on exchange rate.
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pressure on prices considering that inflation persistence is due to staggering of price-
setting and price-indexation especially accompanied by high public sector deficit, control
over the price of consumer goods and public services; and cuts in subsidies can be used.
The novelty of the analysis in Chapter 4 arises from the question that regarding the best
response of the monetary policy authority is in aid recipient developing countries. The
Millennium Development Goals emerged from the September 2000 Millennium Decla-
ration at the United Nations and include measurable targets for halving world poverty
between 1990 and 2015. Especially with these targeted goals, numerous studies on for-
eign aid have been entailed. Considering the fact that foreign aid in some less developed
countries is quite substantial, it is evident that monetary authorities should not neglect
these inflows in setting their monetary policies as the policy regime they follow has an
impact not only on prices but also on the allocation of resources.
The development economists argue that an effective redistribution of resources from
industrialized countries to developing countries is necessary in order for the poor coun-
tries to catch the rich ones. In doing so, foreign aid is suggested to fill up the gap
between these country groups. The underlying assumptions for this growth stimulus
idea are that the additional resources will be used for investments; and the most of the
additional income that is generated from these productive investments will be saved and
used for other productive projects. Hence, many donor countries tie their aids to specific
projects in order to ensure the efficiency of the aid. Alternatively, growth stimulating
effects of foreign aid are conditioned on the environmental, institutional and policy fac-
tors. As it can be observed from the literature, while most of the early contributions are
predominantly empirical and concentrate on the growth effect of foreign aid, the limited
number of theoretical papers that combines monetary policy and foreign aid concen-
trates either on the role of monetary policy in limiting the negative impacts of foreign
aid or in a positive analysis. However, Chapter 4 aims to fulfill the normative analysis
gap on this topic by comparing the optimal monetary policy responses in aid-receiving
countries.
In this vein, in a New Keynesian model augmented with foreign aid, policy parameters of
the Taylor rule, namely interest rate smoothing, inflation targeting and output growth
targeting, are optimized in order to maximize unconditional welfare under three cases:
(i) only cost-push shock (CP ), (ii) only foreign aid shock (FA); and (iii) cost-push
and foreign aid shocks (CP + FA). Initially, a theoretical model where the government
receives the foreign aid and directs it to the representative household as a lump-sum
monetary transfer is constructed. Next, foreign aid is designed to be entirely spent on
consumption goods that the household has no control over the decision on; yet, still
derives utility from.
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The results demonstrate that aid recipient developing countries also face a trade-off
between stabilizing the inflation rate and output growth in the presence of cost push
shock. The reason behind this finding is that cost push shocks directly affect prices
whereas foreign aid has no direct impact on prices, yet influences the allocations through
which affecting prices. Hence, the trade-off between two monetary targets does not
vanish, making the inflation targeting still more desirable compared to output targeting
in these countries. The findings also indicate that central banks exhibit non-desirability
of responding to the output growth in the presence of foreign aid shock. The qualitative
effects of a foreign aid shock are very similar to those of a positive productivity shock and
preference shock in wealth transfer and consumption transfer setting respectively. By
increasing output in the former; and consumption in the latter settings, foreign aid shock
reduces the distortion introduced by cost-push shock; hence, facilitating the stabilization
of the output growth. In other words, as an extra income or consumption, foreign aid
supports the monetary policymakers by eliminating the trade-off that they are facing by
mitigating the effects of the nominal rigidity that exists in the economy. In short, foreign
aid is found to resolve the trade off between inflation and output stabilization faced by
the monetary authority, leading to the conclusion that foreign aid recipient developing
countries should act in favor of the inflation targeting as in industrialized countries.
Chapter 2
Disentangling the Impacts of
Anticipated Inflation
2.1 Introduction
Most of the central banks aim inflation targeting where the positive rate of inflation
target has a range between 1 percent and 3 percent (Bernanke and Mishkin (1997)).
However, the welfare effects of such a policy implication are still debatable. Since many
assets and liabilities are fixed in nominal terms, rather than being inflation-indexed,
unanticipated inflation lowers the real value of nominal assets and liabilities, thereby
redistributes wealth from lenders to borrowers. Hence, any elaborate analysis on re-
distribution of inflation necessitates abstaining from representative-agent models and
focusing on heterogeneous agent models. Although superneutrality of money implies
that the real economy is independent of the rate of money supply growth in the long
run; and inflation has no real effects in the long run with lump-sum taxes, dynastic
households and complete capital markets (Lucas (2000)), there are empirical studies
that suggests otherwise, such as Bullard and Keating (1995)1 and Kahn et al. (2006)2
to name a few; and non-neutrality of inflation has also been theoretically demonstrated
to be present when inflation has redistribution across generations (Weil (1991)) and
when inflation has an impact on distortionary taxes (Chari et al. (1996)).
This chapter proposes a theoretical model with two types of households to explore the
distributional effects of inflation and assess the non-neutrality of money without aggre-
gate and idiosyncratic risks, distortionary taxes or generational gap. The differences
1They show that changes in money growth rate affect output level.
2They find that a small rise in money growth rate in economies which have a low inflation rate
increases the long-run capital stock level.
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in time preference of households define their types as lenders or borrowers. When in-
troduced, different labor productivity levels create income inequality among the types
per se. Both type of households optimize intertemporally while impatient borrowers are
subject to the borrowing constraint; and the equilibrium level of lending and borrowing
is endogenized. Although there is no risk in this setting, bond market can be considered
as incomplete with nominally non-contingent bonds. Bonds are non-contingent in the
sense that when the period of maturity comes for repayment, the amount of repayment
is diminished by the inflation rate at the time of maturity and the time preference of
the borrowers due to the period difference between obtaining the loan and maturity.3
Moreover, a less developed financial market where neither future income nor durable
goods can be pledged for securitization of the debt obligation is considered such that
lending is restricted by current income.4 This, however, results in a nominal friction, as
higher inflation reduces the real value of debt in terms of commodities at maturity, which
tends to benefit borrowers. Therefore, even anticipated inflation becomes non-neutral
where the borrowing constraint causes non-neutral effects in employing monetary policy.
Additionally, since the debt contracts are predetermined in nominal terms, inflation can
influence the net worth of borrowers. In particular, an increase in inflation rate lowers
the real debt repayments for given outstanding debt; thereby redistributing from lenders
to borrowers.
In order to depict the non-neutrality of inflation and to gauge the redistributional ef-
fects, simulation exercises are conducted. They demonstrate that there is a conflict of
interest on inflation between the borrowers and the lenders as the welfare of borrowers
rises with inflation whereas that of lenders decays in all parameterizations, revealing
the redistributional effect of inflation. Due to the welfare gain that the borrowers could
attain by having high inflation, they would always prefer higher inflation rates than the
lenders. Hence, this would cause a corner solution at either of the extremes in determina-
tion of inflation rate unless there is a social planner. A simple calculation of utilitarian
welfare with different weights attached to two types shows that the importance that
is given to the borrower in the utilitarian welfare by the hypothetical social planner
matters. Specifically, utilitarian welfare can be decreasing in inflation with low weights
(i.e s < 0.5) attached to the borrower depending on the parameterizations, thereby re-
vealing that the negative impact of inflation on lenders outweighs the positive impact
on borrowers when the social planner has pro-lender bias. In principle, a benevolent
social planner who aims to maximize utilitarian welfare would act in favor of the con-
strained household. In this vein, since the borrowing constraint is the only distortion
3The term incomplete financial market is used here in a slightly different terminological way than the
literature has been using. For instance, as in the explanation of Sheedy (2016), the financial markets
are called incomplete when the debt contracts cannot guarantee the debt repayments for all future event
realizations.
4See, such as Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2003), Korinek (2009) and Bianchi (2011).
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in the economy, the social planner would set the inflation rate such that this friction
is minimized. However, the utilitarian welfare highlights that even without favoring
the borrowers, increasing welfare is achieved. Since this result is attained regardless
of the assumption on the productivity levels, it can be said that the monetary policy
redistributes resources from lenders to borrowers by generating inflation. Further, the
comparison of changes in the productivity levels reflects that when the heterogeneous
productivity levels are assumed, the utilitarian welfare gain is larger in both magnitude
and level than the gain in the equal productivity case. Specifically, the welfare gain is
larger in between 12.5-31% in heterogeneous productivity case than its homogeneous
counterpart. As a result, the heterogeneous productivity levels form the second channel
for redistribution. Hence, this chapter can be accounted for a further support to the
existing empirical and theoretical literature for the positive relationship between income
inequality and inflation. In particular, Crowe (2006), Dolmas et al. (2000) and Desai,
Olofsgard and Yousef (2005) among many others, identified a positive relationship be-
tween these variables with different theoretical settings and empirical analyses. In this
study, different labor productivity levels also facilitate the income inequality among the
types and the simulation exercises quantify that the welfare gain from generating infla-
tion is higher when income inequality (i.e heterogeneous labor productivities) is present,
thereby suggesting that the policy planner can achieve more welfare gain by generating
higher inflation when there is income inequality.
The money demand motive is introduced to the economy in order to assess the welfare
effects of inflation in a setting where decisions regarding to money holding generate
another distortion in addition to the borrowing constraint. Augmentation of money
demand enables to prescribe on the varying inflation rates considering the welfare costs
of inflation tax. Money in the utility (MIU) models, in principle, necessitates zero
nominal interest rate in order to cancel out the opportunity cost of holding money when
it is the only source of distortion; and by the Fisher relationship, it follows that the
optimal changes in prices requires deflation (i.e Friedman Rule). Hence, in order to
consider these corresponding relationships, investigating the effects of monetary policy
requires a model with cash as the money demand is affected by the changes in inflation.
Without accounting for money holding decisions, social planner can set a implausibly
high inflation rate, because doing so would hurt only one type of household, namely the
lender, by redistributing away from them. However, the introduction of money demand
incurs the same distortion that is generated in the form of inflation tax on both types,
preventing the social planner from choosing such a high inflation rate. Hence, the aim
in this analysis is to distinguish the effects of inflation under the presence of money
demand motive and compare the welfare consequences of inflation tax in this economy
with the cashless economy so as to provide a guideline to the policy planner in setting
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inflation rate. The results from the simulations imply that the additional distortion in
the form of inflation tax can affect even the constrained households negatively, resulting
in a loss in the utilitarian welfare from generating inflation. When borrowers are worse
off because of the higher inflation, this renders a welfare loss as the lenders are always
hurt by higher inflation. Nevertheless, the cases where the borrowers are better off due
to higher inflation do not translate into welfare gain when the types are equally treated
in the utilitarian welfare function, suggesting that the loss of the lenders are larger than
the gain of borrowers from higher inflation. Furthermore, when the households take
multiple decisions in addition to money holding, the relative magnitudes of intertemporal
elasticity of substitutions (IES) of these choices have to be taken into account when
setting inflation rate. In particular, when both inverse IES of labor and consumption
are higher/lower than that of real money balances, the combination of effects from
labor and consumption decisions is mirrored on the utility of borrowers. On the other
hand, when only one of the inverse IESs is higher than that of the real money balances
together with the smaller one being the inverse IES of consumption, the effect of real
money balances designates the outcome on the utility of the borrowers. These results
follow from the fact that the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption
has the largest impact on the utility of borrowers even when it is lower than real money
balances and labor supply as there is no scale parameter that restricts its effect on the
utility.
From the theoretical perspective, redistributional effects of monetary policy in the liter-
ature are generally attributed to unanticipated inflation changes and exogenous hetero-
geneity between households. In their paper, Beetsma and Van Der Ploeg (1996) define
the inequality in a society where larger part of the government debt is held by the smaller
group of individuals and heterogeneity arises when agents have different productivity of
labour, thereby building up different stocks of assets. When the wealth is unfairly dis-
tributed, the median voter is more likely to be the poor. Hence, it is in the interest
of the government to favor the poor; and in return, they levy unanticipated inflation
taxes to erode the real value of debt, in an attempt to redistribute from rich to poor
as this would hurt the rich more than the poor. Albanesi (2006) designs a bargaining
game for the determination of the inflation between heterogeneous agents where they
differ in their labor productivities and access to various payment methods, in which low
income households hold more cash and hence, are more vulnerable to inflation. A large
gap in labor productivities translates into larger inequality which generates a weaken-
ing in the bargaining position of the poor and, in turn, causes higher inflation as it is
desired by the rich. Hence, the redistributional effect of inflation relies on the equilib-
rium differences in transaction patterns across households which depends on the labor
productivity differences. Pescatori (2007) investigates optimal monetary policy in an
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environment where rich and poor households are categorized according to an exogenous
distribution of assets; and the inflation is found to have redistributional effects on rich
and poor. The redistributional consequences of inflation in this chapter, however, are
based neither on different productivity levels nor unexpected inflation changes. Inflation
has a direct impact on household’s net worth by reducing the maximum amount of debt
that can be issued as the debt contracts are agreed in nominal terms. Due to the lowered
real value of debt repayment received by the lender from the borrower, even expected
inflation has redistributive effects from lenders to borrowers. In order to disentangle the
effects of heterogeneous productivity levels, different productivity levels are introduced
in the simulation exercise. Although the amplification of the redistributional effects
from monetary policy is observed, redistribution is found to be still present even with
homogeneous productivities.
Non-neutrality of monetary policy is in general investigated in theoretical frameworks
where models have aggregate or idiosyncratic risks, capital market imperfections, capital
tax distortions, labor supply distortions or distortionary redistribution of seigniorage.
Algan and Ragot (2010) analyze the long-run effect of monetary policy where hetero-
geneous households face credit constraint and can partially insure themselves against
idiosyncratic income shocks by using capital holdings and real balances. They show
that the inflation has real effects as long as the financial borrowing constraint is bind-
ing as it would induce endogenous decision making in money demand. Sheedy (2016)
studies the monetary policy targeting in an incomplete financial market setting where
aggregate uncertainty in output results in non-contingent debt contracts as not all the
future events are guaranteed for repayment. He shows that in the case where there is
no uncertainty about the growth of real output and no unexpected changes in inflation,
the equilibrium steady state is independent of monetary policy. Doepke and Schneider
(2005) provide a calibrated OLG model to assess the inflation-induced redistribution
under different fiscal policy rules. In their paper, there is no idiosyncratic labor income
risk, yet, the heterogeneity in earnings is generated by the differences in skill profiles;
and they are concerned with unanticipated inflation shocks on nominal asset holdings as
these shocks would urge different positioning in portfolios of the households. They find
that the redistribution caused by inflation has a negative effect on output. In this regard,
the real effect of inflation rests on the choice of model setting. Specifically, OLG model
gives rise to life-cycle effects in which the borrowers are the winners and the lenders are
the losers. Since the borrowers tend to be younger than the lenders, the net effect is ob-
served in aggregates. However, the theoretical model in this chapter is populated by two
types of households, namely patient and impatient, generated by heterogeneity in time
preferences and it is the same assumption that assures the binding borrowing constraint,
which is the essence of this analysis as the otherwise would imply representative-agent
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model. Therefore, the contribution of this chapter to the literature is that even in the
absence of idiosyncratic income shock, of market incompleteness stemming from aggre-
gate risk, of utilization of OLG model and of money demand together with anticipated
inflation, changes in inflation has real effects.
There are only few papers which study the impact of anticipated inflation in hetero-
geneous agent economies. The existing heterogeneous-agent monetary economy studies
examine the settings where money is valued, at least partly, as it grants the agents with
self-insurance against idiosyncratic shocks (such as Molico (2006), Chiu and Molico
(2010)). The motivation for holding money in these papers is derived from market tim-
ing frictions, cash-in-advance constraints, precautionary role of money and so on. They
differ in whether the money is the only available asset for agents’ portfolio decisions
and also in their results. Akyol (2004) considers a pure exchange, incomplete market
economy in which agents hold bonds and money for precautionary purposes against id-
iosyncratic productivity shocks. A market-timing friction ensures that in equilibrium
only the high-endowment agents hold money as it allows for consumption smoothing.
While bonds and money pay the same return at zero nominal interest rate, bonds allow
for borrowing. Hence, positive inflation induces the bond demand while reducing the
money demand of high-income agents by improving risk sharing. In turn, this effect
redistributes income from the high- to low-income agents. The key finding of the paper
is that 10% inflation is necessary in order to maximize social welfare. Molico (2006)
introduces a random matching model where agents are hit by i.i.d shocks that restrict
them to be a buyer or a seller and suggests that if inflation is low, higher inflation can
enhance social welfare as it decreases price dispersion and wealth.
On the contrary, Wen (2010) reports that 10% inflation costs at least 8% of per-capita
consumption. This paper is built up on a production economy where agents hold capital
and precautionary money and inflation eliminates the self-insurance of money. In their
matching model, Boel and Camera (2009) address that inflation does not cause large
losses in social welfare; yet, the consequences on distribution can be immense, depending
on the financial structure of the economy. Specifically, mostly the wealthier is hurt by
inflation if the money is the only asset; and if assets other than money are available,
inflation can harm the poorer households while benefiting the wealthier. Camera and
Chien (2014) examine an economy where ex-post heterogeneity is formed with labour
productivity shocks that follow a Markow process, agents are allowed to hold money
and bond considering cash-in-advance constraint and the money supply evolves deter-
ministically. They show that the inflation non-linearly affects the distribution of income
with the strongest impact when small deviations from zero inflation occur; and suggest
that the financial structure, the labor supply elasticity and the shock persistence al-
ter how distributions and welfare are influenced by inflation. In particular, when only
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money is available in self-insurance, inflation alleviates wealth disparities; otherwise, it
may rise wealth inequality. In contrast, this chapter does not incorporate money into
the framework to ensure self-insurance in the form of precautionary money demand. In
other words, rather than substituting as a tool for guarantee, attaching value to money
introduces an additional friction to the economy in the form of inflation tax. Addition-
ally, this study endogenizes the labor supply decision and money creation5 which some
papers (e.g. Akyol (2004) and Camera and Chien (2014) respectively) in the literature
lack; and attempts to reconcile the divergent results in this line of literature.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 lays out the model environment.
Section 2.2.1 defines the equilibrium of the cashless economy, Section 2.2.2 discusses the
steady state of the cashless economy and Section 2.2.3 contains the simulation exercises
of the cashless economy. In Section 2.3, MIU model is introduced and the equilibrium
together with simulation results of this environment are presented. Finally, Section 2.4
concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Model: Cashless Economy
The discrete time, infinite horizon model is populated by two types of households, patient
and impatient. The heterogeneity in households stems from the difference between their
time preference in addition to labor productivity. Both types of households decide
on how much to consume, work and hold assets in the form of bonds. Additionally,
impatient households are allowed to accumulate debt funded by patient households.
Competitive firms produce the final good by utilizing the labor supplies from both types
of households. Monetary policy is assumed to control the inflation rate.
The patient households differ from the impatient ones as they exhibit higher patience
rate. This, in return, defines their position towards bond holding, which identify them as
lenders or borrowers. The interaction between the borrowers and the lenders, therefore,
occurs in the bond market. Lenders hold the bonds issued by borrowers in the sense that
what is defined as inflow for one type means outflow for the other type of household.
There is no explicit default and aggregate uncertainty in the economy. Yet, bond market
can be considered as incomplete with nominally non-contingent bonds. Bonds are non-
contingent in the sense that when the period of maturity comes for repayment, the
amount of repayment is diminished by the inflation rate at the time of maturity and
the time preference of the borrowers due to the period difference between obtaining the
loan and maturity. In addition to this, a less developed financial market where neither
5How the real money balances grow root in the decisions of the two types of households instead of
exogenously given rate. See equations (2.34), (2.35) and (2.22), (2.27).
Chapter 2: Disentangling the Impacts of Anticipated Inflation 15
future income nor durable goods can be pledged for securitization of the debt obligation
is considered such that lending is restricted by current income. Monetary policy has
direct impact on household’s net worth by diminishing the real value of outstanding
debt by determining a path for the price level.
The borrowers maximize a lifetime utility function given by
max
{cbt ,bbt ,nbt}
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(cbt)
1−φ
1− φ − ν
(nbt)
1+σ
1 + σ
)
where the discount rate is β ∈ (0, 1), φ and σ denote the inverse elasticity of substitution
for consumption and labor supply respectively; ν weighs the disutility from working, ct
is the consumption, nt are working time.
The budget constraint is
Ptc
b
t +B
b
t−1 ≤ ebPtwtnbt +
Bbt
Rt
where Bt represents the nominal debt, Rt denotes the nominal interest rate on debt; so
that,
Bbt
Rt
is the current nominal value of debt issued (i.e discount bond) while Bbt−1 is
the debt repayment. The left-hand side of the budget constraint indicates the uses of
funds (i.e. consumption spending plus nominal debt service) while the right-hand side
denotes the available resources (i.e new debt plus nominal labor income).
In addition to the budget constraint, the borrowers face a borrowing constraint in which
the maximum amount Bbt is bounded by:
Bbt ≤ γebPtwtnbt
where γ ∈ (0, 1) represents propensity to raise debt, eb denotes the productivity level
and wt is the real wage. In general, γ can be broadly thought of as an indirect measure
of the tightness of the borrowing constraint. Notice that the decision towards labor
supply endogenously affects the borrowing limit and the debt obligation is bound by the
current income.
Household debt, in general, can be categorized into two groups, namely non-collateralized
debt and collateralized debt. At the theoretical level, alternatives to this type of credit
constraints are given in terms of durable goods, such as land and housing, in the case of
collateralized debt (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005) among many others),
of exogenous net indebtedness limit (such as Zeldes (1989)) and of tradable goods in an
open economy context (see, Monacelli (2006)). However, this is a closed economy model
and there is no durable goods market in order to be attached to the loan as collateral.
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In his paper, Korinek (2009) models the borrowing on the current income in which the
borrowers are able to engage in fraud at the contract period and if the lenders disclose
the fraud, they could seize the current income of the borrowers. Although this type of
contract enforcement scheme is not explicitly addressed here, it is accounted for that
the debt repayment cannot always be guaranteed due to the lack of securitization of
the debt obligation. Bianchi (2011) also designs the credit constraint such that loans
amount to a debt that is a fraction of tradable and nontradable current income. Such
modelling can be attributed to less developed financial markets where sophisticated fi-
nancial instruments, compared to income, such as collateralized debt obligations are
not available. Hence, the lenders can only guarantee the repayment of the borrowers,
similar to Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2003)6, by evaluating the borrowers accord-
ing to their current income. In turn, loans provided by the lenders are assumed to be
conditioned on the current income of the borrowers. In his paper, Fafchamps (2014)
also emphasizes that granting the poor in developing countries with credit depends on
whether they have regular income rather than collateral.
At the empirical level, there are studies supporting the assumption that the borrowing
constraint is given by the current income. For instance, Japelli (1990) shows that the
current income is a major determinant of the credit market access. Del-Rio and Young
(2005) examine the determinants of participation in the unsecured loan market for 1995
and 2000 in the U.K and find that the main determinant is the individual income level.
Additionally, Mishkin (1996) notifies that the legal system in developing countries makes
securing the credits with collateral a time-consuming and costly process. Hence, attach-
ing income for securitization of the debt obligation can be referred to both developing
and developed country contexts.
The lender households maximize the following utility function subject to a budget con-
straint
max
{clt,blt,nlt}
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
(clt)
1−φ
1− φ − ν
(nlt)
1+σ
1 + σ
)
subject to Ptc
l
t +
Blt
Rt
≤ elPtwtnlt +Blt−1
where δ > β and el > eb.
The constraints of the households can be rewritten in real terms. For the borrowers, the
budget and the borrowing constraints follow cbt +
bbt−1
pit
≤ ebwtnbt + b
b
t
Rt
and bbt ≤ γebwtnbt
respectively where pit =
Pt
Pt−1 is the gross inflation rate. The important feature of the
budget constraint roots in the debt contracts’ being predetermined in nominal terms;
6In their paper, they have two types of debt, collateralized and non-collateralized. To model non-
collateralized borrowing, they introduce a loan limit which is proportional to current income.
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so that, the inflation rate can influence the net worth of the borrowers. In other words,
an increase in inflation rate lowers the real debt repayments for given outstanding debt.
For the lenders, the budget constraint reads clt +
blt
Rt
≤ elwtnlt + b
l
t−1
pit
. It is important
to differentiate between the available debt services to the borrowers and the amount of
debt obligations for repayment. The maximum amount of real (nominal) debt that the
lenders provide the borrowers is bbt (B
b
t ). They limit this amount, in order to secure the
debt services they can offer to the borrowers, to the income of borrowers, rather than
the debt repayment. In this vein, when they lend, the lenders hold the discount bonds
issued by borrowers with a face value of
blt
Rt
, and in return, receive back the amount of
blt−1
pit
from the borrowers when the period of maturity comes. Therefore, the value of
borrowing limit, Bbt , is not affected by the inflation rate while the real debt repayment
(i.e real value of outstanding debt),
blt−1
pit
, decreases with the inflation rate.
The first-order conditions for the borrowers require the marginal rate of substitution
between labor supply and consumption and Euler Equation for labor supply respectively:
ν(nt
b)σ
ebwt
= (ct
b)−φ + γϕt(
ν(nt
b)σ
ebwt
− γϕt
)
1
Rt
= βEt
(
ν(nbt+1)
σ
ebwt+1
− γϕt+1
)(
1
pit+1
)
+ ϕt
where ϕ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint that takes
positive values whenever the constraint is binding. Specifically, the borrowing constraint
is binding at the steady state due to the assumption on time preferences.7 Notice that,
in the absence of borrowing constraint (i.e., ϕt = 0), the terms with ϕt drop out. In-
tuitively, if ϕt increases, the borrowing constraint binds more tightly; in other words,
the marginal gain from relaxing the constraint is larger. Therefore, the marginal gain
from supplying an additional unit of labor is higher as it allows to increase borrowing.
Furthermore, as it can be seen from the first equation, the higher the marginal value
of an additional borrowing, (i.e ϕt), the higher the benefit of providing an additional
unit of working time (i.e (nt
b)σ
ebwt
> (ct
b)−φ), which will be used to purchase an additional
current consumption. Due to the binding borrowing constraint (i.e ϕt > 0), the bor-
rower’s marginal utility of current consumption exceeds the marginal utility of savings
(i.e (ct
b)−φ
Rt
> βEt
(cbt+1)
−φ
pit+1
). Consequently, they would like to increase the consumption
spending more than the lender who acts as a consumption-smoother. In order to obtain
that amount, the borrower has to optimally choose how much to borrow as it will depend
on the increase in working time considering that would also cause disutility to them.
7See equation (2.13) for proof.
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The solution to the lender’s problem requires:
ν(nlt)
σ
elwt
= (clt)
−φ
(nt
l)σ
wt
1
Rt
= δEt
(
(nlt+1)
σ
wt+1
1
pit+1
)
the substitution between consumption and labor choices and Euler Equation for labor
supply respectively.
The comparison between the first-order conditions of both types of household yields the
differences in their decision making due to the borrowing constraint faced only by the
borrower. In particular, in the absence of the borrowing constraint (i.e. ϕ = 0), ϕ drops
out both sides of the labor Euler equation of the borrowers and the equation reduces
to a standard intertemporal condition which would prevail for the lenders except the
discount factor.
Competitive firms produce the final goods according to the following linear production
function utilizing total labor supply nt:
yt = e
ztnt
and zt is the technology that follows an AR(1) process
zt = ρzt−1 + et
where et is the independent, serially uncorrelated innovation and normally distributed
with zero-mean and standard deviation σz.
This is a cashless economy where money is not needed for any transactions. Since there
is no cash, the monetary authority is only responsible for determining the inflation rate,
pit.
2.2.1 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences {cbt , clt, nbt , nlt, bbt , blt, yt, nt, wt, Rt, ϕt, zt}
satisfying
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For households:
ν(nt
b)σ
ebwt
= (ct
b)−φ + γϕt (2.1)(
ν(nt
b)σ
ebwt
− γϕt
)
1
Rt
= βEt
(
ν(nbt+1)
σ
ebwt+1
− γϕt+1
)(
1
pit+1
)
+ ϕt (2.2)
bbt = γe
bwtn
b
t (2.3)
cbt +
bbt−1
pit
= ebwtn
b
t +
bbt
Rt
(2.4)
ν(nlt)
σ
elwt
= (clt)
−φ (2.5)
(nt
l)σ
wt
1
Rt
= δEt
(
(nlt+1)
σ
wt+1
1
pit+1
)
(2.6)
(2.1), (2.2) and (2.5), (2.6) are the first-order conditions for the borrowers and the lenders
respectively. 8 (2.3) and (2.4) are the constraints for the borrowers.
Market clearing conditions:
cbt + c
l
t = yt (2.7)
ebnbt + e
lnlt = nt (2.8)
bbt + b
l
t = 0 (2.9)
(2.7) for goods market, (2.8) for labor market and (2.9) for bond market.
The production follows:
yt = e
ztnt (2.10)
zt = ρzt−1 + et (2.11)
wt =
yt
nt
(2.12)
where (2.12) is the solution to the firm’s maximization problem.
8Alternative to equations (2.2) and (2.6), would be respectively:
(ct
b)−φ
Rt
= βEt(cbt+1)−φ
(
1
pit+1
)
+ ϕt
(ct
l)−φ
Rt
= δEt(clt+1)−φ
(
1
pit+1
)
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2.2.2 Steady State of the Competitive Equilibrium
This section analyses the features of the steady state of the competitive equilibrium.
In the deterministic steady state, the constraints are always binding. Starting with the
first order condition with respect to consumption for the borrowers would reveal that
the budget constraint has to bind:
c = λ−
1
σ
where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. The similar calcula-
tion also holds for the lenders. The borrowing constraint is binding
ϕ = λ
(
δ − β
pi
)
(2.13)
due to the the assumption that the lenders are more patient than the borrowers. There-
fore, the shadow value of borrowing is always positive. In other words, the borrower will
always choose to hold a positive amount of debt.
The steady state consumption Euler equation of the lenders, (2.6), implies:
R =
pi
δ
Due to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rate, the following restriction entails
pi ≥ δ.
Combining the result of R with the labor Euler equation of the borrowers (2.2) yields:
ϕ =
ν(nb)σ
ebw
(
δ − β
pi + γ(δ − β)
)
> 0 (2.14)
Notice that, β = δ (i.e. no heterogeneity in discount rates) implies that the borrowing
constraint does not bind. Furthermore, this hypothetical assumption would correspond
to a representative agent economy. In order to facilitate the understanding of how
the borrowing constraint alters the equilibrium, consider a model without a borrowing
constraint, yet, with heterogeneous patience rates. No borrowing constraint implies
that the impatient household trades her future working time with current consumption
by borrowing against her future income, causing her consumption to approach to zero
asymptotically. However, with a borrowing constraint, there is a limit on how much the
impatient households can borrow, which will lead to a stable steady state with positive
consumption for both types.
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By rearranging the terms in (2.14), the labor supply decision of the borrowers is obtained:
nb =
(
ϕebw[pi + γ(δ − β)]
ν(δ − β)
) 1
σ
(2.15)
The unit of labor supply for borrowers increases with the shadow value of borrowing.
Intuitively, devoting more time to work enables marginally relaxing the borrowing con-
straint. Additionally, notice that the steady state is indeterminate when β = δ. It
is crucial to understand the role of the heterogeneous patience rates for two reasons.
First, assuming away the heterogeneous patience rate implies no borrowing constraint.
Secondly, it is due to the different time preferences that the impatient (borrower) and
the patient (lender) households emerge as two types in equilibrium in the economy.
With homogeneous patience rates, the economy comes down to a representative agent
economy model where the agents are free to borrow and lend. In this environment, the
borrowers would accumulate debt indefinitely causing an indeterminate steady state.
The positive amount of debt holding can be found by evaluating the borrowing constraint
together with (2.15):
bb = γebw
(
ϕebw[pi + γ(δ − β)]
ν(δ − β)
) 1
σ
> 0
It is also increasing in the shadow value of borrowing since the additional unit of labor
supply accelerates the accumulation of debt.
Similarly, cb can be obtained by replacing nb in the marginal rate of substitution between
labor supply and consumption, (2.1):
cb =
(
piϕ
δ − β
)− 1
φ
(2.16)
As the shadow value of the resources within the period, i.e λ, increases, the marginal
utility of consumption increases as well, resulting in less consumption. Since the shadow
value of borrowing is positively affected by λ 9, the consumption of the borrowers is
decreasing in ϕ.
Equations (2.15) and (2.16) are not closed form solutions as they are defined in terms
of ϕ which is expressed by nb. To get rid of this recursion, replace ϕ in (2.16) with
(2.14) and substitute the borrowing constraint into the budget constraint. Equating the
9See equation (2.13).
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resulting two equations of cb gives the closed form solution of nb 10:
nb =
(
ebw
pi
) 1−φ
σ+φ
(
pi + γ(δ − β)
ν
) 1
σ+φ
[pi − γ(1− δ)]− φσ+φ (2.17)
Now, cb can be obtained by substituting nb into the budget constraint explained above:
cb =
(
ebw
pi
) 1+σ
σ+φ
(
pi + γ(δ − β)
ν
) 1
σ+φ
[pi − γ(1− δ)] σσ+φ (2.18)
Similarly, for cl, first nl should be solved as the equation (2.5) includes nl. By using
(2.5), (2.7), (2.8) and (2.10), one would get the following expression:
el(nl)
σ+φ
φ − (elw) 1φ
(nl)
σ
φ
=
(
ebw
pi
) 1−φ
σ+φ
(
pi + γ(δ − β)
ν[pi − γ(1− δ)]φ
) 1
σ+φ
eb
(
w[pi − γ(1− δ)]− pi
pi
)
(2.19)
Although nl does not have a closed-form solution, it can be traced that it and, in return,
cl, are affected by the inflation rate. The analytic solutions of the economy, therefore,
show that the monetary policy is non-neutral. This implies that the monetary policy-
maker can affect the real variables and thereby the utilitarian welfare of the economy by
changing the inflation rate. Notice that, it is the steady state inflation rate that generates
this impact on the economy rather than the unanticipated inflation rate as in Beetsma
and Van Der Ploeg (1996) and Doepke and Schneider (2006), among many others. The
underlying reason behind the monetary non-neutrality is the structure of the borrowing
constraint. Specifically, in less developed financial markets where neither future income
nor durable goods can be pledged for securitization of the debt obligation, lending is
more likely to be restricted by current income. This, however, results in a nominal
friction; as higher inflation reduces the real value of debt in terms of commodities at the
maturity; hence benefiting borrowers. Therefore, even expected inflation is non-neutral.
On the other hand, an alternative to the given borrowing constrained in a well-established
financial market would be a rational borrowing constraint where the lenders limit the
borrowing of the impatient households to an amount of income earned in the period
of maturity, i.e Bbt ≤ γebEtPt+1wtnbt . Then, the borrowing constraint in real terms
is bbt ≤ γebEtpit+1wtnbt ; and the characterization of the maximization problem for the
10Then, the shadow value of borrowing can also be found from (2.14):
ϕ =
(
ν(δ − β)
ebw[pi + γ(δ − β)]
)(
ebw
pi
) (1−φ)σ
σ+φ
(
pi + γ(δ − β)
ν
) σ
σ+φ
[pi − γ(1− δ)]−φσσ+φ
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borrowers requires:
ν(nt
b)σ
ebwt
= (ct
b)−φ + γϕtpit+1(
ν(nt
b)σ
ebwt
− γϕtpit+1
)
1
Rt
= βEt
(
ν(nbt+1)
σ
ebwt+1
− γϕt+1pit+2
)(
1
pit+1
)
+ ϕt
bbt = γe
bEtpit+1wtnbt
At the steady state, one would get the following allocations for borrowers:
nb =
(
(ebw)1−φ[1 + γ(δ − β)]
ν[1− γ(1− δ)]φ
) 1
σ+φ
cb =
(
ν(nb)σ
ebw[1 + γ(δ − β)]
)− 1
φ
The closed-form equations suggest that the rational borrowing constraint would impose
monetary neutrality. The comparison of the Euler equations from the rational and
the nominally non-contingent debt contracts indicates that when there is both inflation
and interest rate on two sides of the equation at the same time, monetary neutrality is
sustained, as the changes in inflation rate translate into the changes in the interest rate.
Intuitively, the lag difference in time between obtaining the loan and paying it back
is compensated by receiving back an amount that is inflation-indexed at the time of
maturity. Therefore, departing from the rational borrowing constraint entails nominal
friction which, in particular, stems from the bond market incompleteness that manifests
itself in the form of nominal non-contingent debt contracts. In this regard, borrowing
constraint in the nominally non-contingent debt contracts causes non-neutral effects in
employing monetary policy.
2.2.3 Simulation
Monetary non-neutrality and redistributional effects of inflation are tractable via utiliza-
tion of a simulation exercise. In the simulations below, the inflation rate varies between
[1;4]; and under this variation, the behavior of the variables are plotted. In other words,
the interest variables are calculated at the steady state for given inflation rates and
those points are interpolated to be able to evaluate the trends of the these variables. In
order to avoid any results that are dependent on some specific parameters, alternative
parameter values are also checked (see, Table 2.1). The figures are organized according
to the associated comparisons regarding to equal and different productivity levels in
Chapter 2: Disentangling the Impacts of Anticipated Inflation 24
order to identify the redistribution channels via the inflation rate and the heterogeneous
productivity levels separately.
Table 2.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value Source
β Discount rate of borrower 0.98 Monacelli (2006)
eb Labor productivity of borrower 1 Albanesi (2006)
γ Securitization requirement 0.32 Bianchi (2011)
δ Discount rate of lender 0.99 Monacelli (2006)
el Labor productivity of lender 2 Albanesi (2006)
φ Inverse IES consumption {23 ,2} Standart RBC
σ Inverse IES labor supply {12 ,32} Standart RBC
ν Weight of disutility from working Respective values First best calibration11
ρ TFP AR(1) persistence 0.53 Bianchi, Mendoza (2011)
e TFP standart deviation of innovation 0.014 Bianchi, Mendoza (2011)
When two types of households are homogeneous in terms of their productivity levels,
their steady state labour supplies start at a similar level (i.e nb ≈ nl ≈ 0.33) when
there is positive inflation. However, it increases for lenders while it decreases for bor-
rowers with rising inflation rates. The same trends hold for the case where both types
of households have different productivity levels. Since the differences in steady state
levels of the choices are initiated by heterogeneous productivity levels, focusing on the
comparison for the lenders between the two cases yields the following; when the inverse
of intertemporal elasticity of substitution12 of consumption is equal to 2, regardless of
the value of inverse of elasticity of labor supply, the working time of lenders, when they
have higher productivity than the borrowers, is less than they would supply in the case
where the two types have the same productivity levels. On the other hand, it is vice
versa when φ = 23 , the reason being that the higher productivity level would compensate
for the reduced working time when φ = 2 whereas it is not sufficient when φ = 23 as
higher IES implies greater substitutability of consumption between the periods which
can be achieved by raising the labour supply. The working time of borrowers indirectly
affects the debt repayment as the borrowing limit is bound by the labor supply decision;
and the debt repayment depends on how much debt is issued via the borrowing limit.
Furthermore, the amount of real debt repayment is lowered with an increased inflation
by the time of maturity. Therefore, the substitution of inflation against labor supply
implies a negative relationship between the two.
11Values are based on the social planner problem where nb = nl = 1
3
is aimed to achieve. They
differ with respect to φ and σ and whether there is homogeneity in productivity levels, which are either
eb = el = 1 or eb = 1 < el = 2.
12Remember that, IES= 1
φ
.
Chapter 2: Disentangling the Impacts of Anticipated Inflation 25
Figure 2.1: Cashless Economy with eb = el: c and n
Figure 2.2: Cashless Economy with eb 6= el: n
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Figure 2.3: Cashless Economy with eb 6= el: c
The consumption for lenders is a decreasing function of the inflation rate in both ho-
mogeneous and heterogeneous productivity levels. In the case of equal productivity, the
steady state level of consumption for lenders is always less than the one in a different
productivity level as the higher productivity level provides more resources available for
consumption spending. For the borrowers, the consumption is increasing in inflation rate
when σ = 32 and decreasing when σ =
1
2 . More specifically, the closed-form equation of
the borrower’s consumption stresses the following rule; when σ+ β ≥ δ(1 + σ), ∂cb∂pi > 0.
Since the simulations are based upon different values of σ and φ, this rule, in turn, boils
down to rising consumption for borrowers with higher inflation when σ ≥ 1. Intuitively,
lower σ (i.e the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labour supply) entails more volatile working
time compared to the lower Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Since the borrowers do not
have the compensation opportunity attained by higher productivity level as the lenders
have, they need to adjust their consumption accordingly. Hence, when σ = 12 , they
respond to the supply of less working time by reducing their consumption.
The real borrowing limit reduces with increasing inflation rate in all cases implying that
the additional resources that could be accommodated by issuing more debt is substituted
away by higher inflation rate as the higher inflation cheapens the real repayment of debt
burden13. The magnitude of direct effect of inflation on cheapening the real value of
outstanding debt and the spending on consumption is larger than the indirect effect
through slackening the borrowing constraint. Therefore, the borrowers would not need
13This effect, in turn, reduces the need for relaxed borrowing constraint. Therefore, the value of
relaxing the borrowing constraint is decreasing in inflation.
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Figure 2.4: Cashless Economy with eb = el: b and ϕ
to accumulate more debt. Additionally, increasing inflation rate loosens the borrowing
constraint and the shadow value of the constraint (i.e multiplier; ϕ) converges to zero
when the inflation rate gets sufficiently large.14 In other words, the marginal benefit
of supplying an additional unit of working time that allows to expand borrowing gets
lower as the inflation rate rises. This is also the complementary reason for decreasing
real borrowing as less labor supply translates into less borrowing. Since there is not
much to gain by relaxing the constraint as the inflation rate rises, the working time of
borrowers decreases with inflation. On the other hand, since the labour income is the
resource that is available to the lenders for consumption spending, they increase their
working time with inflation. However, this does not manifest itself as rising consumption
levels with inflation rate since the amount of debt they agreed to provide the borrowers
values less with the increasing inflation rate at the time of repayment.15 Therefore, the
monetary authority can redistribute the resources from lenders to borrowers via debt
by generating inflation, the reason being that the debt contracts are predetermined in
nominal terms in the budget constraint.
The individual behaviours of the two types give rise to the depicted utility trends towards
increasing inflation rates as in Figure 2.6 and 2.7. The utility of borrowers rises whereas
that of lenders decays in all cases revealing that the inflation has differing impacts on
the utilities of the two types. Thereby, the borrower prefers higher inflation rates than
the lender as they benefit from inflation contrary to the lenders, rendering a conflict of
14It gets below 0.001 from pi = 10 onward in general.
15Remember that, the amount they receive back from the borrowers is
blt−1
pit
.
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Figure 2.5: Cashless Economy with eb 6= el: b and ϕ
interests between the types. Hence, this would cause a corner solution at either of the
extremes in determination of inflation rate unless there is a social planner.
Figure 2.6: Cashless Economy with eb = el: U
A simple calculation of utilitarian welfare16 with different weights attached to two types
16Utilitarian welfare functions are computed with different weights on the two types of households
for comparison. For the scope of the analysis, the ones that are decreasing and increasing with their
associated weights are depicted. Specifically, s is the preference weight associated with the borrower.
For instance, for s = 0.4, utilitarian welfare is as follows: UW = [ 1
1−(β0.5)(δ0.5) ][(0.4u
b) + (0.6ul)] .
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Figure 2.7: Cashless Economy with eb 6= el: U
shows that the importance that is given to the borrower in the utilitarian welfare function
by the hypothetical social planner matters. In particular, utilitarian welfare can be
decreasing with low weights (i.e s < 0.5) attached to the borrower depending on the
parameterizations, which reveals that the negative impact of inflation on the lenders
outweighs the positive impact on the borrowers when the social planner has the pro-
lender bias. In principle, a benevolent social planner would who aims to maximize
utilitarian welfare would act in favor of the constrained household as more gain can be
obtained by balancing the constrained household with the unconstrained one. In this
vein, since the borrowing constraint is the only distortion in the economy, the social
planner would set the inflation rate such that this friction is minimized. However, the
utilitarian welfare highlights that even without favoring the borrowers (i.e s = 0.5),
increasing welfare is achieved. Since this result is attained regardless of the assumption
on the productivity levels, it can be said that the monetary policy redistributes resources
from lenders to borrowers by generating inflation.
Finally, the comparison regarding the productivity levels reflects that, when hetero-
geneous productivity levels are assumed, the utilitarian welfare gain is larger in both
magnitude and level than the gain in the equal productivity case. For instance, when
φ = 23 and σ = 1.5, the utilitarian welfare under heterogeneous productivity levels fosters
around 12.5% higher welfare than homogeneous case; and when φ = 23 and σ = 0.5, the
welfare gain is 31% more in heterogeneous case than its homogeneous counterpart. As
a result, it can be concluded that the heterogeneous productivity levels are the second
channel for redistribution. In this regard, this finding can also be accounted for a further
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Figure 2.8: Cashless Economy with eb = el: W
support to the existing empirical and theoretical literature for the positive relationship
between the income inequality and the inflation rate. In particular, the different labor
productivity levels here, creates income inequality among the types and the welfare gain
from generating inflation is higher when heterogeneous labor productivities (i.e income
inequality) are present, thereby suggesting that the policy planner can achieve more
welfare gain by generating higher inflation when there is income inequality.
Figure 2.9: Cashless Economy with eb 6= el: W
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2.3 Theoretical Model: Money-in-Utility Setting
Investigating the effects of monetary policy requires a model with cash as the money
demand is affected by the changes in inflation as well. Without accounting for money
holding decisions, benevolent social planner can set an implausibly high inflation rate,
because doing so would hurt only one type of household, namely the lender, by redis-
tributing away from them. However, the introduction of money demand incurs the same
distortion that is generated in the form of inflation tax on both types, preventing the
social planner from choosing a high inflation rate. Hence, the aim in this analysis is
to distinguish the effects of inflation under the presence of money demand motive and
compare the welfare consequences of inflation tax in this economy with the cashless
economy so as to provide a guideline to the policy planner in setting the inflation rate.
In order to facilitate the comparison with the cashless economy, additive separable utility
is assumed and the maximization problems are expressed in real terms. The borrowers
maximize a lifetime utility subject to a budget and a borrowing constraint while the
lenders are subject to only a budget constraint respectively:
max
{cbt ,bbt ,nbt ,mbt}
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(cbt)
1−φ
1− φ − ν
(nbt)
1+σ
1 + σ
+ ω
(mbt)
1−α
1− α
)
subject to cbt +
bbt−1
pit
+mbt ≤ ebwtnbt +
bbt
Rt
+
Tt
2
+
mbt−1
pit
bbt ≤ γebwtnbt
max
{clt,blt,nlt,mlt}
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
(clt)
1−φ
1− φ − ν
(nlt)
1+σ
1 + σ
+ ω
(mlt)
1−α
1− α
)
subject to clt +
blt
Rt
+mlt ≤ elwtnlt +
blt−1
pit
+
Tt
2
+
mlt−1
pit
where ω assigns the weight attached to money holdings (i.e a positive scale parameter)
and α is the inverse of the elasticity of money holdings. mit =
M it
P it
denotes real money
balances for i = {b, l}; and the seignorage revenue is redistributed equally to both types
of households as lump-sum transfers, Tt.
The competitive equilibrium of this economy is described by the following set of equa-
tions:
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l
t = yt (2.28)
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l
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ztnt (2.31)
zt = ρzt−1 + et (2.32)
wt =
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(2.33)
mbt +m
l
t = mt (2.34)
Tt = mt − mt−1
pit
(2.35)
The simulation exercise of MIU model depends on the previous parameter values together
with the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of real money balances,
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α = 0.83 following Kremer et al. (2003)17 and ω = 0.006.18 Throughout the analysis,
homogeneous productivity levels (i.e eb = el = 1) are assumed among the household
types in order to isolate the presented second redistributional channel of heterogeneous
productivities in the cashless economy; and focus on the consequences of the changes
in inflation when it has distortionary effects via money demand motive. Inflation varies
between [1.3;4] due to the fact that at the steady state, when there is zero inflation, there
is no transfers whereas transfers are positive when there is positive inflation. Transfers
are important tools for alleviating the negative effect of inflation tax through money
holding in the budget constraint. Hence, the simulation, here, starts with the case
where the transfers have impact on the budget constraint.
Comparison of MIU model with the cashless setting demonstrates that the trends of
the labor, consumption, borrowing, shadow value of the borrowing constraint and the
utility of lenders are the same. The decisions are made almost at the same level as the
cashless economy except the utilities; and this difference stems from the augmentation
of the real money balances into the utility. Although households derive utility from
real money balances, since its value diminishes with rising inflation, both the borrowers
and the lenders mitigate their money holdings which approaches to zero with increasing
inflation.
Both types hold almost the same amount of real money balances with respect to changes
in inflation19. Transfers amount to a negligible value and are decreasing in inflation.
Disentangling the effects of inflation on transfers entails the comparison between the
direct and the indirect effects of inflation. The direct effect of inflation on transfers is
positive, while the indirect effect (i.e ∂T∂m
∂m
∂pi ) is negative, as the first term is positive by
nature whenever there is positive inflation and the second one is negative. Figure 2.11
depicts that the indirect effect dominates the direct one, resulting descending transfers
when positive inflation is present. Notice that the transfers are endogenous in the sense
that it does not follow an exogenously given growth path via money growth; instead, it
arises from the decisions of the households towards real money balances. In other words,
its trend is generated by the downward trend of the real money holdings.
17One of the widely used value of IES of money balances is from Chari et al. (2000) where the
calibration is based on the U.S data. Other papers which study the calibrated values in Europe are in
the range between 1 and 1.5. To the best of my knowledge, there is no paper that suggests a calibrated
value for developing countries. Therefore, abstaining from its developed country counterparts, the
simulations in this chapter rely on α = 0.83 with the aim to shed light on the effects of inflation in
developing country economies.
18The scale parameter is calibrated from the steady state money demand equation by using the value of
α and velocity data of low&middle income country averages taken from IMF data for the years between
1985-2015. Yet, other parameter values are also checked and the results are found to be insensitive to
the changes in the value.
19The holdings of real money balances by the lenders are negligibly more than the borrowers which
differ in the fourth or fifth decimal.
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Figure 2.10: MIU with eb = el: c and n
As Figure 2.13 illustrates, the utility for borrowers rises with inflation for the following
parameterizations; φ = 2 and σ = 0.5, φ = 2 and σ = 1.5; and φ = 23 and σ = 0.5;
and that of lenders always decreases. Due to the utility gain from holding real money
balances, the levels of the utilities of both types for given inflation rates are slightly higher
than the cashless economy. The cashless economy states that the utility for borrowers
are increasing in inflation in all parametrizations as either, both decisions are in favor
of the utility (i.e φ = 23 and σ = 1.5; and φ = 2 and σ = 1.5) or the positive effect of
declining working time in utility overweighs the negative effect of decaying consumption
(i.e φ = 23 and σ = 0.5; and φ = 2 and σ = 0.5). However, a contrary result occurs
in MIU model compared to the cashless economy due to the utility of borrowers being
decreasing in inflation when φ = 23 and σ = 1.5. From the point of view of the borrowers,
this can only occur because of the downward trend of money holding by alleviating the
intensifier effects of decreasing labour supply and increasing consumption on the utility,
which gives way to the explanation that the different responses of the utility of borrowers
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Figure 2.11: MIU with eb = el: m and T
Figure 2.12: MIU with eb = el: b and ϕ
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are generated by the IESs20. In particular, the utility of borrowers is increasing when
φ = 2 regardless of the value for the inverse of IES for labour supply; and vice versa when
φ = 23 and σ = 1.5. In Figure 2.13, top left panel demonstrates the parametrizations
to facilitate the comparison where only the inverse of IES in consumption (φ) differs
ceteris paribus in order to understand the different behaviours of borrower utility. The
lower the φ is, the easier the substitutability of consumption over time which translates
into less need for the allocation of resources that can be used for consumption spending.
At the same time, lower φ (i.e φ = 23 and σ = 1.5 case) leads to having relatively
easier substitutability of consumption than money demand compared to the case where
φ = 2 and σ = 1.5, making it relatively more important to smooth money holdings over
time. Therefore, the shift from the desire to smooth consumption towards money holding
smoothing engenders worsening off of borrowers, imitating the effect of inflation on their
real money holdings. Therefore, the key finding here is that the trend of the utility of the
borrowers is responsive to the parameterization. In cashless setting, there are two IESs
that require to be accounted for; however, in MIU model, there are three IESs. When
φ and σ are both higher/lower than α, the combination of the effects from labor and
consumption decisions of the cashless economy is mirrored on the utility of borrowers21.
On the other hand, when only one is lower than α and if it is the case for φ < α, the
effect of real money balances designates the outcome on the utility of the borrowers22.
Elasticity of marginal utility (i.e inverse of IES) allows for a comparison of marginal
utilities. For instance, the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption
being equal to 2 means that the utility changes 2 percent when consumption changes
1 percent. Intuitively, these results follow from the fact that the elasticity of marginal
utility with respect to consumption has the largest impact on the utility of borrowers
even when it is lower than real money balances and labor supply as there is no scale
parameter that restricts its effect on the utility.
When the social planner treats the types equally, as in Figure 2.14, the positive effect
of inflation on constrained households projects itself on the utilitarian welfare, fostering
welfare gain when φ = 2 and σ = 0.5. On the other hand, with equal weighing, the
utilitarian welfare reduces with inflation when φ = 2 and σ = 1.5; and φ = 23 and
σ = 0.5, which stresses that the introduction of money demand into the setting accounts
for the domination of the negative effect of inflation rate. When φ = 23 and σ =
1.5, since both types of households suffer from higher inflation in this parametrization,
generating inflation yields welfare loss. If equal treatments are considered, even though
the borrowers are gaining from higher inflation, the utilitarian welfare is decreasing when
20Remember that the money demand-consumption optimality conditions (i.e equations (2.22) and
(2.27)) indicate that the marginal utility from current consumption exceeds the marginal utility from
holding money.
21In other words, the utility of the borrowers will be increasing in inflation rate.
22In other words, the utility of the borrowers will be decreasing in inflation rate.
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Figure 2.13: MIU with eb = el: U
φ = 23 and σ = 0.5; and it necessitates pro-borrower bias (i.e, s = 0.8) in order to achieve
welfare gain from generating inflation.
Figure 2.14: MIU with eb = el: W
It is important to note that both types of households hold almost the same amount of
money. This would justify the choice of equally distributed transfers. If there were to be
uneven or various trends of money holding decisions by heterogeneous households, this
would have brought about a distortion among types per se, requiring a correction via
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uneven transfers. In general, the borrowers are still better off in most cases even under
the presence of an additional distortion, in the form of inflation tax; and the lenders are
always loosing due to higher inflation. Yet, the augmentation of money demand motive
into the economy requires favoring the borrowers to be able to achieve welfare gains. On
the other hand, the social planner is able to mute the welfare loss by generating inflation
without caring for one type more than the other in the cashless economy.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a theoretical model with heterogeneous households who differ in
their time preferences. Lenders are more patient; hence value future more while im-
patient households value the consumption of today more than the patient households.
Thus, impatient households derive a higher marginal utility from consuming today, lead-
ing to borrowing in order to increase their current consumption. On the other hand,
patient households indulge in consumption smoothing by saving today. In this setting,
the distributional effects of inflation is explored and the non-neutrality of money is
assessed without aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, distortionary taxes and generation
differences. Finally, money demand motive is introduced to the cashless economy where
the decisions regarding to money holding generate another distortion in addition to the
borrowing constraint. The aim in this analysis is to distinguish the effects of inflation
under the presence of money demand motive; and compare the welfare consequences of
inflation tax in this economy with the cashless economy so as to provide a guideline to
the policy planner in setting inflation rate.
The cashless economy argues that the structure of the borrowing constraint results in a
nominal friction, as higher inflation reduces the real value of debt in terms of commodi-
ties at maturity, which tends to benefit borrowers. Therefore, even anticipated inflation
becomes non-neutral where the borrowing constraint causes non-neutral effects in em-
ploying monetary policy. Additionally, since the debt contracts are predetermined in
nominal terms, inflation has an impact on the net worth of borrowers. In other words,
an increase in inflation rate lowers the real debt repayments for given outstanding debt;
thereby redistributing resources from lenders to borrowers. The introduction of het-
erogeneous productivity levels illustrates that the amplification of the redistributional
effects from monetary policy is observed, suggesting that the different productivity lev-
els between the lenders and the borrowers provides a second channel for redistribution
brought by higher inflation. In other words, income inequality facilitates the redistribu-
tion of generating inflation as the welfare gain from generating inflation is higher when
income inequality (i.e heterogeneous labor productivities) is present.
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The cashless economy suggests that the borrowers always benefit while the lenders al-
ways suffer from higher inflation. Nevertheless, the utilitarian welfare can be decreasing
in inflation when pro-lender bias is assumed. On the other hand, the utilitarian welfare
also highlights that even without favoring the borrowers, welfare gain is achieved by
generating inflation. In contrast, MIU model demonstrates that the additional distor-
tion in the form of inflation tax can affect even the constrained households negatively,
resulting in a welfare loss from generating inflation. Nevertheless, the cases where the
borrowers are better off due to higher inflation do not translate into welfare gain when
the types are equally treated in the utilitarian welfare function, suggesting that the loss
of the lenders are larger than the gain of borrowers from higher inflation. Furthermore,
when the households take multiple decisions in addition to money holding, the relative
magnitudes of IESs of these choices have to be taken into account when setting inflation
rate. In particular, when both inverse IES of labor and consumption are higher/lower
than that of real money balances, the combination of effects from labor and consumption
decisions is pictured in the utility of borrowers. On the other hand, when only one of
them is higher than real money balances together with the smaller one being inverse IES
of consumption, the effect of real money balances designates the outcome on the utility
of the borrowers.
The optimal monetary policy in the sense of a specific inflation rate offer is beyond the
scope of this analysis. Instead, this chapter is concerned with the long-run role of the
monetary policy, how it influences patient and impatient households; and hence, affects
utilitarian welfare. In turn, it attempts to provide a prescription to a policy planner in
setting inflation rates. In this regard, this study shows that the inflation rate has long-
run real impacts, it disproportionately affects heterogeneous households by redistributing
from lenders to borrowers with anticipated inflation; and whether the inflation rate can
be used as an instrument to improve utilitarian welfare relies on the presence of money
demand in the form of the MIU model, the concern with pro-lender/borrower bias, the
relationship between IESs and the heterogeneous productivity levels. In other words,
the policy planner should be concerned about these features when targeting an inflation
rate to account for the welfare effects of that policy implication. This is especially the
case for the policy planners in developing countries as the calibration for the MIU model
is calculated by taking into consideration the low and middle income countries.
Chapter 3
The Determinants of Inflation in
Emerging Markets and
Developing Countries: Survey
and Empirical Analysis
3.1 Introduction
Achieving price stability is the main objective of most central banks. Although they
share the same aim, each central bank requires to consider the structure and the charac-
teristics of the economy of the relevant country, yielding a unique optimal inflation rate
for each. Hence, to be able to better pin point the optimal inflation rate, it is important
to take into account these differences and investigate the determinants of inflation. In
this chapter, the sources of inflation in emerging and developing countries are studied fo-
cusing particularly first on proximate determinants of inflation that attract attention via
the suggestion of popular theories; and next, augmenting the political and institutional
features of the countries.
This chapter incorporates different theories to facilitate explaining, first, the proximate
determinants of inflation in emerging and developing countries. The widely accepted
school of thought on inflation is the monetarist argument which relies on the quantity
theory of money. In this school of thought, inflation is treated as a monetary phe-
nomenon where it is determined by the changes in money supply. This view has found
immense support from the existing literature1. In addition to the monetarist view, a role
1See, such as Grauwe and Polan (2005).
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for exploring inflation has been given to the exchange rate, output gap, budget balance
and so on. Montiel (1989) suggests that inflation is often associated with budget deficit
in developing countries. It is argued that when governments have large fiscal deficits,
they may need to finance it via money creation (i.e seigniorage). In this case, as in
Sargent and Wallace (1981), budget deficit causes an increase in inflation due to higher
money growth. The relationship between the inflation and exchange rate originates from
the countries’ with higher productivity having higher exchange rates. Through Balassa-
Samuelson effect, the rise in productivity pushes up the wages, which in turn will raise
costs and prices, thereby leading to an increase in inflation. Coe and McDermott (1997)
find that the output gap affects inflation in developing countries. A negative output
gap occurs when actual GDP is less than potential GDP and is initiated by a fall in
aggregate demand. In response to a lower aggregate demand, the good prices and labor
costs fall; and in turn inflationary pressures decrease. Hence, a positive output gap
impacts the inflation. Another determinant of inflation reveals from the supply-side as
examined by Ball and Mankiw (1995). The changes in oil prices (i.e cost shocks) spur
the movements in inflation. Finally, inflation may have been influenced by its past real-
izations (i.e inertial component) due to the staggered wage contracts or the adjustment
process of inflation expectations.
Following the literature, this chapter, also, introduces the political and institutional
features of the economies in an attempt to have a better understanding of inflation
in emerging and developing countries. The empirical papers do not solved the debate
on the determinants of inflation in emerging and developing countries, in-particular
when the inflation is low. The controversial results from monetary causes of inflation
have led to the search for other sources of inflation, revealing the idea that inflation is
also influenced by non-monetary factors. In this line of research, studies indicate that
the non-monetary factors tend to complicate the monetary transmission mechanism by
interacting with the demand side factors so that they introduce uncertainty regarding
the impacts of monetary determinants on inflation. Hence, they suggest that to have a
more transparent understanding of inflation, non-monetary factors should be considered
as well. For instance, the idea that the government authorities plan to implement less-
restrictive policies in order to make use of short-run output increase via inflationary bias
roots the presumption that the central bank is relatively not independent. The central
bank independence is determined by several factors; and indices of it is formed on the
basis of political and economic independence by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991),
goal and instrument independence by Debelle and Fischer (1994), legal independence as
turnover of central bank governors by Cukierman (1992). For industrialized countries,
average inflation is found to be negatively correlated with the degree of central bank
independence while little correlation is found for developing countries in the existing
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literature2. Several empirical papers have found a positive correlation between inflation
and income inequality (such as Beetsma and Van Der Ploeg (1996), Al-Marhubi (1997))
that is attributed to the distributional conflicts, political instability and inequality on
populist ideologies. Recent evidence reveals that the positive correlation persists in more
democratic political systems whereas opposite correlation prevails in non-democratic
systems3.
The empirical strategies for examining the determinants of inflation can be divided into
two. First, the pattern of inflation in a single country over a long period of time can be
studied. Over time periods, such as 50 or 100 years, there may be sufficient changes in
inflation and institutions so that meaningful tests on different theories of inflation deter-
minants can be checked; and robust results can be claimed. Secondly, the experiences in
several different countries over a shorter time span can be compared since the differences
in economical and political drivers among countries serve for understanding the inflation
dynamics. The literature review of this chapter presents both strands of the empirical
strategies. Yet, in the empirical analysis section, it follows the second strategy where
the empirical methodology utilizes the panel vector-autoregression (PVAR) estimation.
Focusing on the emerging and developing countries, the analysis regarding the proximate
determinants of inflation suggests that inflation is mainly driven by money growth and
inflation persistence. Specifically, money growth accounts for more than one-third of
the variance of inflation both in the short and long run; and the inertial component of
inflation explains over 40% of the variation in inflation. The unemployment rate and the
changes in oil price are the next important sources of inflation with the government debt
and the exchange rate movements playing a relatively small role in explaining inflation.
The analysis concentrating on the socio-economical and political determinants of infla-
tion argues that the relationship between inflation and income inequality is contingent
on the political structure where the positive relationship prevails in democracies; and
de jure central bank independence has no explanatory power on inflation. Finally, the
positive impact of the inflation inertia on inflation, in terms of both magnitude and
significance, in each specification regardless of the focus for the determinants of interest
suggest that inflationary expectations and indexations schemes in price and wage are
the most critical determinants of inflation dynamics in emerging markets and developing
economies.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 presents the survey for the
determinants of inflation in emerging and developing countries. Section 3.3 introduces
PVAR estimations for the proximate; and socio-economical and political determinants
of inflation. Finally, Section 3.4 concludes with suggestions.
2See Fischer(1995).
3See Desai, Olofsgard and Yousef (2005).
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3.2 Literature Review
Throughout their history, many emerging markets and developing countries have ex-
perienced a moderate to high inflation. Inflation began to increase in the 1950s and
accelerated immensely in the 1970s and early 1980s; and hyperinflations were experi-
enced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the second half of the 1990s, most of these
countries managed to lower their inflation rates; and at the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury, reduced inflation is sustained. However, since mid-2000s, the inflation pressures
rose again, mostly because of food and energy prices4. Inflation had been reduced to
double-figure levels in the mid-1990s and by 2000 to single figure levels. This disinfla-
tion performance of the 1990s is generally attributed to fiscal consolidation. External
developments such as the decline in global inflation and oil prices contributed to de-
scending inflation, as well as the institutional reforms in the form of improved central
bank independence, access to global capital markets; and structural reforms in product,
trade and labor markets provided the support to lower rates of inflation5.
Inflation rates in these countries have been responsive to various external and internal
shocks. In order to explain the effects of these shocks on inflation, many approaches have
been developed. In Phillips-curve approach, the reasonings behind the inflation are the
real factors, shocks to aggregate supply and demand. The negative relationship between
unemployment rate and inflation rate claimed by this approach requires an accurate
measurement for the unemployment rate. However, pursuing Phillips-curve approach in
analyzing inflation dynamics may not be an adequate approach for countries with large
informal economy or highly populated by self-employed people6.7 Hence, the focus of
the existing literature on explaining inflation for emerging markets has turned to the
nominal factors. To this end, many studies, for instance, concentrate on the explanation
brought by the quantity theory of money suggesting a significant positive relationship
between money growth and inflation. The classical view suggested by Sargent and
Wallace (1981) which is based on the quantity theory of money implies that fiscal deficit
causes inflation because governments with large fiscal deficits tend to resort to money
creation to finance its debt. This monetization of debt makes inflation a monetary
phenomenon. In contrast, inflation becomes a fiscal phenomenon when fiscal theory
of price level prevails, where the increase in nominal public debt to finance persistent
4IMF (2008), European Central Bank (2008).
5IMF (2001).
6To overcome this inadequacy or due to limited availability of unemployment data, some studies
constructed output gap data as a proxy for unemployment.
7In the analysis of inflation dynamics in both industrial and developing countries between 1960
and 1995, IMF (1996) finds that the output gap is the major factor for the changes in inflation in the
medium- and long-run for industrial countries while it is found to explain little of the changes in inflation
for developing countries. The difference in the results, for instance, may be attributed to the degree of
informality in the economy, quality of the data or the number of self-employed.
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budget deficits will be perceived as an increase in nominal wealth as the government
bonds are considered as net wealth, when fiscal policy is not sustainable (see, Woodford
(1998)). With this debt deflation, increases in price will, in turn, reduce the real value of
financial wealth until demand and supply equalize, leading to fiscally driven explanation
for inflation.
While monetarists focus on the demand-side factors led by expansionary fiscal and mon-
etary policies, in the structuralist approach, supply-side sources of inflation stemming
from rising production costs, such as rising labour cost and input prices (see Bernanke
(2005)), are emphasized. Some studies also incorporated exchange rates and global
prices in order to account for exchange rate regimes and imported inflation as the food
and energy prices have large shares in the inflation baskets of these countries. With the
globally interlinked economies, such variables have increasingly attracted more attention
as important determinants of inflation. In short, the existing literature incorporates var-
ious numbers of variables in order to foster a better understanding of inflation dynamics
regarding their approaches. Below is a survey of inflation determinants for panel data
analysis of a group of countries; as well as a time-series analysis of individual countries
in emerging markets and developing countries is presented.
The causes of inflation in transition economies have been explored with a cross-section
and panel data analysis. Koen and Marrese (1995) identify whether inflation is a mon-
etary phenomenon for Russia with the monthly data from January 1992 till November
1994 and claim that contemporaneous money is weak in determining inflation while
money growth has the largest impact on inflation two to four lags (i.e months) later.
The similar analysis is conducted by Hoggarth (1996) and Korhonen (1998), concluding
that inflation in Russia is a monetary phenomenon. Corey, Mecagni and Offerdal (1996)
estimate an equation for inflation from an analytic model for the pool of 21 countries
and focus on the effects of the relative price changes. They suggest that money and
wage growth have a substantial impact in explaining inflation while real appreciation
does not have a significant impact on inflation. The effect of relative price variability
is found to be sensitive to the region and sample period with a sizable effect during
high inflation and a small impact during modest inflation. Inertia and downward price
rigidity are argued to be important in explaining inflation when it is at moderate lev-
els. Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (1998) undertake a panel data analysis with 25 transition
countries with the sample period of 1992-1996. They use exchange rate regime in the
form of dummy variable for flexible and floating regime, fiscal balance, structural re-
forms measured as economic liberalization index for trade and foreign exchange regime;
for price and competition; for privatization and baking reform as explanatory variables.
They find that lower fiscal deficit, fixed exchange rate regime and structural reforms
help stabilizing high inflation in these countries.
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Kutan and Brada (1999) explore the moderation of inflation in the Czech Republic,
Poland and Hungary at the end of the 1990s. As determinants of inflation, they gather
data on money supply, nominal wages, past inflation behavior and import prices for
the years between 1990 and 1998. Their results indicate that past inflation and import
price movements are dominant contributors to inflation in these countries while the
money supply and wage growth are unimportant contributors in the short run. The
role of foreign prices demonstrate that the moderation of inflation in these countries
are driven exogenously, stemming from a general global deflation and from a decline
in both global energy and commodity prices. Nikolic (2000) quantifies the impact of
changes in growth of money on the response of prices with the data from January 1992
till August 1998. In his time series analysis with an inclusion of lagged dependent
variable, his results support the existing literature, claiming that the money growth
is a strong determinant explaining inflation in post-communist Russia and suggest the
considerable influence of inflation inertia. Lissovolik (2003) captures the sources of
inflation in Ukraine during 1993-2002 relying on a markup and a money market model
in a cointegrating setting. Exchange rate and wages are found to be the strong long-
term determinants of inflation while money has a short-term link with inflation; and
the role of relative price variability in inflation processes is supported. Siliverstovs and
Bilan (2005) explore the interrelationship among inflation, wage growth, money growth
and devaluation expectation by means of variance decompositions and impulse response
functions for Ukraine. Using monthly data spanning from January 1996 to November
2003, they show that the changes in devaluation expectations are the main driving
source of price changes while money supply has negligible effects on inflation; and find
an evidence for substantial inflation inertia.
There are several studies that investigate the drivers of inflation in Asian economies.
Lim and Papi (1997) model multi-sector macroeconomic model containing the goods,
labor, money and external sectors to analyze the determinants of inflation in Turkey
during 1970-1995. In their analysis, the goods market inclines the equilibrium condi-
tion for the prices in the long-run while short-run dynamics of prices are affected by
the disequilibria in labor, money and external markets. Turkish inflation is found to
be driven by monetary variables, namely money and exchange rate; inertial factors are
quantitatively significant and public deficit has an important effect on inflation. Cheng
and Tan (2002) identify the factors that contribute to inflation for Malaysia applying
VECM analysis with a quarterly data covering 1973-1997. They consider eleven vari-
ables, such as money supply, interest rate, exchange rate, trade balance, capital inflows,
external prices and so on and conclude that external causes have predominant effects on
inflation in Malaysia, highlighting the strong effect of the rest of the ASEAN’s inflation
and exchange rate. Among the domestic factors, private consumption and government
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expenditure are found to be the most important determinants of inflation with a less
significant impact than that of external causes. Grigorian et al. (2004) explore the pres-
ence and the relative importance of monetary transmission channels in Armenia under
three interrelated markets; particularly money, labor and foreign exchange, where infla-
tion is assumed to be caused by imported inflation (i.e inflation in trading partners),
excessive money growth and wage pressures. Covering the period from January 1996
to June 2003 and using the equilibrium conditions from three markets, cointegration
relationships are checked for long-run implications; and ECM framework is utilized for
short-run dynamics. Prices are found to respond strongly to the disequilibria in the
exchange rate market while the pass-through of excess money and wage pressures in
excess of labor productivity are found to be insignificant.
Khan and Schimmelpfennig (2006) evaluate the relative contributions of structuralist
and monetarist factors of inflation in Pakistan over the period January 1998 to June
2005. They consider money supply, credit to the private sector, exchange rate and wheat
support price as the determinants under investigation, focusing on the claim that the
recent increase in inflation is due to the increases in the wheat support price, leading to a
monetarist against structuralist-driven inflation explanation for Pakistan. Incorporating
the wheat support price into the general open-economy monetary model, the estimation
of VECM suggests that the monetary factors, namely broad money growth and private
sector credit growth, determine inflation while the wheat support price impacts inflation
in the short run, not in the long run. Bonato (2007) studies the determinants of infla-
tion in Islamic Republic of Iran concentrating on the relationship between inflation and
nominal variables. Estimated error correction model, based on a small open economy
IS-LM model for the quarterly period of 1988-2006, indicates that money growth has
a predominant role in determining inflation both in the short- and long-run; and there
exists a long-run relationship between the price level and money, its rate of return, the
exchange rate and the real output.
Duma (2008) investigates the sources of inflation in Sri Lanka concentrating on the ef-
fects of external shocks, i.e exchange rate, oil and import prices. In order to estimate the
pass through of these shocks, VAR approach is used including output gap for demand
shock; oil price inflation to proxy international supply shocks; and change in the nominal
exchange rate as an exchange rate shock. Using monthly data covering 2003-2007, the
results suggest that while depreciation of the local currency and import price shocks
affect inflation immediately and positively, oil price shocks have an immediate but nega-
tive effect on inflation. Additionally, pass-through from exchange rate and import price
shocks to prices are found to be positive whereas that of oil price shocks are found to be
negative and small. Since the analysis checks for both consumer and wholesale prices,
the comparison of the resulting effects on these indices implies that the pass-through of
Chapter 3: The Determinants of Inflation in Emerging Markets and Developing
Countries: Survey and Empirical Analysis 47
external shocks to wholesale prices is more severe compared to that of consumer prices.
Using annual time series data covering 1971-2006, Pavlavani and Rahimi (2009) study
the domestic and external determinants of inflation in Iran. They assume that inflation
is determined by endogenous factors such as expected inflation, imported inflation, liq-
uidity, GDP and exchange rate. Their estimations, relying on ARDL approach, suggest
that inflation expectation is the most significant determinant of inflation, with exchange
rate, imported inflation and liquidity being other effective factors both in the short- and
long-run. Jongwanich and Park (2009) examine the importance of the determinants of
inflation for 9 Asian countries covering the quarterly period of 1996-2009 with a VAR
model. They conclude that excess aggregate demand with the proxy of output gap and
inflation expectations account for 15%-30% and 30%-60% of the variability in inflation
respectively. External food and oil price shocks are found to explain less than 30% of
CPI inflation in these countries.
In their analysis, Khan and Gill (2010) identify the sources of inflation in Pakistan focus-
ing on four different price indicators, namely CPI, WPI, SPI and GDP Deflator. Their
study covers the period of 1971-2006 and investigates money supply, budget deficit, ex-
change rate, inflationary expectations, interest rate, value of imports, wheat support
price; and support prices of sugarcane, cotton, rice and wheat together as causes of
inflation. Inflation is found to be not affected by fiscal deficit, money supply and wheat
support price while exchange rate depreciation, increase in the value of imports and
inflation expectations surge inflation in the long run with inflation inertia being the
strongest contributor. The impact of interest rate on inflation is negative, yet insignif-
icant whereas that of support prices of sugarcane, rice, wheat and cotton together is
positive and significant. In a VAR framework with quarterly data spanning 1991-2008,
Patnaik (2010) utilizes impulse response functions and variance decomposition meth-
ods to study the causes of inflation in India. This paper indicates that the drivers of
inflation is a mix of demand and supply side factors for India. Specifically, volume of
demand, money supply and external influences on domestic prices are showed to be the
main drivers of inflation with the last two determinants having short run impact; and
aggregate demand having the most significant effect on inflation.
Osorio and Unsal (2011) present an analysis of drivers of inflation for Asia8 using Global
VAR (GVAR) model. In order to disentangle the contributions of domestic, regional,
and global factors to inflation, they first estimate a GVAR model for 33 countries from
Asia and Pacific region covering the years from 1986 to 2010. To see how the inflationary
processes of Asia have altered, they estimate SVAR model for each country in two sub-
samples, in particular, 1986-99 and 2000-09. They indicate that supply (i.e commodity
8This paper incorporates the countries such as New Zealand, Australia with the countries, for instance
Malaysia and Thailand in the analysis.
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prices) and monetary shocks have been the main sources of inflation in Asia for the
last two decades. Specifically, changes in exchange rates explain about 15 percent of
fluctuations of inflation in Asia and changes in money supply and interest rates explain
about 25 percent. However, the impact of these shocks has faded away, particularly in
economies that have flexible exchange rate regimes and relatively clear monetary aims.
The role of supply shocks are found to diminish slightly in recent years whereas the
role of output gap has risen. Finally, they claim that inflation fluctuations are driven
predominantly by domestic factors accounting more than 60 percent while global factors
account for about 30 percent.
Bhattacharya (2013) overviews the main causes of inflation in Vietnam focusing on
the monetary policy transmission mechanisms in order to provide explanations for the
experienced higher inflation compared to other Asian emerging markets. The empirical
analysis in this paper follows a price-taking small open economy model where inflation
is a weighted average of changes in tradable and non-tradable good prices so that with
augmentation of monetary policy transmission mechanism, inflation becomes a function
of movements in the key economic variables, namely aggregate demand/real output,
money supply, nominal effective exchange rate and nominal interest rate; and of foreign
price inflation. Over the period 2004Q1 to 2012Q2, VAR is estimated; and the results
suggest that in the short-run, movements in the nominal effective exchange rate are the
key factors of inflation whereas over the medium-run, GDP growth and growth in credit
to the economy are main drivers of inflation. In order to compare the causes of inflation
in Vietnam with other EMEs (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka
and Thailand), a cross-country dynamic panel model is applied covering the period
2004Q1-2012Q2 where lagged inflation, lagged growth rates of GDP, lagged growth of
the money supply, contemporaneous movements in import price deflator, world food
and commodity prices and so on are used as determinants of inflation. The results
from GMM estimation indicate that contemporaneous movements in import prices and
past inflation are important determinants of inflation for all these countries whereas
lagged growth rates of GDP or of money supply, lagged nominal interest rates and
lagged movements in the nominal effective exchange rate are found to play no role in
explaining inflation.
Mohanty and John (2015) identify the determinants of inflation in India using a time
varying parameter SVAR model covering the data from Q1: 1996-1997 to Q3: 2013-2014.
They conclude that the determinants of inflation, namely crude oil prices, output gap,
fiscal policy and monetary policy (i.e call money rate), exhibit significant time variation.
Crude oil prices and exchange rate are found to be important in explaining inflation while
on average the output gap is showed to be insignificant with an asymmetric effect on
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inflation. The fiscal deficit contributes to inflation in 2011-2012 while the monetary
policy impacts inflation only after 2005-2006.
African economies are also examined to shed light on the contributors of inflation pres-
sure in these counties. Moser (1995) investigates the main factors influencing inflation
in Nigeria with ECM model covering the period of 1962-1993. The results show that
money growth that is brought about by fiscal deficit is the main driving force of infla-
tion; and devaluation of the currency together with agroclimatic conditions are the other
important determinants of inflationary pressure in Nigeria. In an attempt for explaining
inflation in Mozambique, Ubide (1997) decomposes inflation into components, estimates
an inflation equation using open economy definition of inflation and explores the tran-
sition mechanisms via ARIMA model during 1990-1996. In the long-run, inflation in
Mozambique is shown to be driven by monetary expansion, depreciation of exchange
rate and unforeseen events in agricultural sectors while inflation inertia is found to be
insignificant. Blavy (2004) analyzes the inflation developments for the period September
1991-March 2003 in Guinea. The results, based on quarterly data and applying cointe-
gration and error-correction modeling where inflation is assumed to be determined by
the equilibrium in the money market, show that the significant long-run relationship be-
tween inflation and money growth has been boosted in recent years; and inflation is found
to persist over time in the short-run. Nassar (2005) tries to model the determinants of
inflation in Madagascar using quarterly data over the period 1982-2004. Based on a
two-sector model (i.e monetary disequilibrium model with an open economy) to explore
the relationship between prices, exchange rate and money, the estimated model finds
a long-run relationship between domestic prices, real income, broad money and foreign
interest rates. However, foreign interest rates are found to be statistically insignificant
in long-run while exchange rate movements have significant effects; and inflation inertia
is also concluded to be important.
Barnichon and Peiris (2007) examine the causes of inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
particularly exploring the relationship among output gap, real money gap and inflation.
In order to estimate the expectation-augmented Phillips curve, they first build up mea-
sures of ouput gap and real money gap via panel cointegration regressions. With panel
GMM estimation of an augmented (closed economy) Phillips curve of seventeen African
countries covering the years from 1960 to 2003, they claim that both output gap and real
money gap have an important role in inflation with the real money gap having larger
impact than the output gap on inflation; and excess money is found to have a larger
role than excess output in explaining inflation. Diouf (2007) investigates the drivers of
inflation in Mali focusing on monetarist theories, structuralist hypothesis and external
theories. The estimation of EC modeling with quarterly time series data over 1979-2006
shows that supply-side constraints proxied by average national rainfall have large and
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significant effects on inflation by decreasing it. Since the rainfall represents the cereal
production, this result implies that it has a large impact on inflation. Real apprecia-
tion of the domestic currency decreases inflation in the long run more significantly than
the increasing effect of excess money supply on inflation suggesting the monetary and
imported long-run drivers as the main sources of inflation in Mali. Finally, real income
growth is suggested to be the short-run determinant of inflation. Thorton (2008) inves-
tigates the long-run money-inflation relationship for 36 African countries over 1960-2007
using cross section and panel data analysis based on the quantity theory of money rela-
tionship. He demonstrates that there exists a weak (strong) long-run relation between
money growth and inflation for the countries with money growth and inflation below 10%
(much higher than 10%). The determinants of inflation in Sierra Leone is investigated
by Gottschalk et al. (2008). Their structural VAR approach is based on a monthly data
from 2001 to 2006 and includes international oil prices, reserve money as a measure for
monetary policy and exchange rate as determinants of inflation. Oil prices are found to
be the key factor for inflation variation and food-supply shocks are found to dominate
price variations in the short run. It is concluded that increasing money growth, higher
oil prices and nominal exchange rate depreciation cause an increase in inflation in Sierra
Leone9. Wolde-Rufael (2008) investigates the causal link among budget deficit, money
supply and inflation for the period of 1964-2003 in Ethiopia conducting cointegration
tests and variance decomposition. The results indicate that fiscal deficit and money
supply contribute to inflation without money supply being interfered by budget deficit.
Evaluating the movements in prices from a quarterly data between 1997 and 2007, Klein
and Kyei (2009) identify the factors that contribute to the sharp decline in inflation in the
recent years of the analysis in Angola. The estimated results from VECM indicate that
there is a significant long run relation between inflation and exchange rate; money growth
affects inflation with a lag as it first triggers demand pressure and indirectly affects
inflation. Since the large share in inflation basket is devoted to imported food items,
international non-fuel commodity prices have a strong impact on inflation in Angola.
Baldini and Poplawski-Ribeiro (2011) investigate the importance of fiscal and monetary
determinants of inflation in 22 Sub-Saharan countries from 1980 through 2005 with
VAR estimation. They find that the nominal public debt, as proxied by money growth
or in nominal public debt, plays an important role in inflation and fixed exchange rate is
showed to be related with lower inflation. Simpasa et al. (2011) elaborate the underlying
reasons of recent high inflation rates in four East African economies (Ethiopia, Kenya,
Tanzania and Uganda) spanning 1961-2010 by taking into account the characteristics
9They address a problem about an important omitted variable, specifically government financing.
Their concern refers to the fact that fiscal policy and monetary policy intervene and sometimes constrain
each other. Yet, due to the data limitations, they regard this incompleteness in the effects from monetary
policy shocks as a shortcoming, but not crucial.
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of each country. The the main source of short-run inflation in Ethiopia and Uganda is
found to be money growth while in Kenya and Tanzania, oil prices seem to be the main
driver of inflation with an increasing impact coming from money supply in recent years.
In general, money supply, world food and oil prices are claimed to be the significant
factors in explaining inflation rates in these countries.
Caceres et al. (2011) use VAR model for analyzing the inflation dynamics in four
CEMAC members (Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Gabon, the Republic of
Congo) and in the CEMAC-4 region from 1996 to 2010. Their analysis argues that
inflation is driven mainly by government policies, namely controlled prices which direct
the spillover from international market prices into domestic prices, government expen-
diture and global food and energy commodity prices. Money supply is found to have
insignificant effects on inflation in the region; and exchange rate movements are found
to have indirect effects on inflation through import prices. With ARDL approach, Adu
and Marbuah (2011) identify the main sources of inflation in Ghana from 1960 to 2009,
where small open economy definition for inflation is employed as a quantitative model.
Their results show that without a shift of the importance of the determinants during the
sample period, real output, broad money supply, fiscal deficit, nominal exchange rate
and nominal interest rate are the important factors in explaining inflation with output
growth having the strongest impact. Using quarterly data over 1983-2009, Kinda (2011)
identifies the factors that drive inflation in Chad. The findings from a VECM that relies
on a small open economy IS-LM model indicate that the supply-side constraints (i.e
rainfall), public spending and external factors (i.e changes in trading partner prices and
in exchange rate) are the main causes of inflation. Conducting SVAR approach confirms
the effects of rainfall, foreign prices, exchange rate and public spending with an addition
of persistence of inflation.
Durevall and Sjo¨ (2012) assess the main determinants of inflation in Ethiopia and Kenya.
In order to understand the recent upright trend of inflation, they evaluate excess money
supply, domestic agricultural supply shocks, exchange rates, world food, non-food and
energy prices using ECM with a monthly data over 1999-2011 for each country. Their
results show that while exchange rates and world food prices have a long run impact,
agricultural supply shocks and money growth have short and medium run effects on
inflation; and inflation is driven substantially by its past realizations. Using a monthly
data over 2000-2012, Durevall, Loening, and Birru (2013) explore the inflation dynam-
ics in Ethiopia focusing on the changes in food prices. Their main finding is that the
international food and goods prices determine the long-run inflation. Food inflation is
affected by agricultural supply shocks in the short run, deviating from long run price
trends; and money supply plays a role in driving short run non-food inflation. Alkoum
and Agil (2013) trace the main drivers of inflation in the Libya using ARDL approach.
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With the data from 1980 to 2011, they consider money supply, real income, exchange
rate, output gap, expected inflation and imported inflation as determinants of inflation.
Money supply, real income and imported inflation are suggested to be the most signif-
icant drivers of inflation rate both in the short- and long-run. Exchange rate, output
gap and inflation expectation are also found to contribute to inflation with descending
impact on it. Oladipo et al. (2013) examine the sources of inflation for West African
countries, namely Guinea Bissau, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
Using the equation for overall price levels as a weighted average of tradable and non-
tradable goods and incorporating money market equilibrium to this, they estimate VAR
and VECM covering the period between 1970q1 and 2010q4 in order to account for
both short- and long-run dynamics. Their results suggest that money supply, income,
exchange rate movements and foreign prices play significant role on the inflation rate in
the long-run; and except foreign prices, other drivers remain as significant determinants
of inflation in the short-run.
Nguyen et al. (2015) explore the dynamics of inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa considering
the fact that policy shifts, the integration with the global world may have changed the
presumption that the inflation in these countries are led by supply shocks. Their quan-
titative analysis accounts for global and regional demand pressure, inflation spillovers
together with trade and financial links between these countries. They first estimate
Global VAR model for 65 countries, including 33 SSA countries, covering quarterly data
from 1988 to 2013 in order to investigate the reasons of inflationary pressure. Sec-
ondly, they search for an evidence of structural break of how the inflationary process
has changed over time in two sub-samples, 1988-98 and 1999-2013. Their results indicate
that over the last 25 years, shocks to exchange rate, monetary variables and domestic
supply shocks have been the most important determinants of inflation in SSA. Country
characteristics, such as vulnerability to weather shocks, economic importance of agri-
culture, oil and food imports, trade openness and policy regime are also highlighted for
driving inflation. However, over the last decade, the shift on the sources of inflation
in the area is observed. In particular, the role for global oil and foods shocks, domes-
tic demand shocks, shocks to output as well as inflation spillovers from other countries
have increased whereas the role of exchange rate shocks, domestic supply shocks and
monetary variables have decreased.
Latin American economies have attracted some attention for analyzing the inflation
dynamics reigned in the region. Williams and Adedeji (2004) explore the inflation dy-
namics in Dominican Republic by jointly investigating the effects of the money market
and traded-goods market disequilibria. The results from quarterly observations during
the period 1991-2002 indicate that the disequilibrium in the money market plays a sig-
nificant role on inflation while the disequilibrium in the traded goods market does not.
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Furthermore, ECM shows that changes in real output, exchange rate, monetary aggre-
gates and foreign prices drive inflation in the short-run. In their quarterly observation
analysis over the period 1983Q1 to 2001Q4, Bailliu et al. (2003) apply three models,
namely a mark-up model, a money-gap model and a Phillips curve, to explain the major
determinants of inflation in Mexico. A mark-up model treats inflation as a cost-push
phenomenon where the price level is determined by a long-term constant mark-up over
costs. A money-gap model views inflation as a monetary phenomenon where changes in
the aggregate price level occurs due to the attempt for correcting monetary disequilibria.
Money gap is defined as the difference between the actual money supply and the esti-
mated long-run money demand; and a positive money gap, in which the stock of money
is above the long-run demand for money, suggests rising inflationary pressures. Phillips
curve approach claims that inflation arises from real factors, in particular imbalances
between aggregate demand and supply where a decrease in unemployment rate suggests
a boost in excess demand, which causes an upward pressure on nominal wages affecting
inflation expectations; and in turn inflation. Among all, the mark-up model turns out to
perform the best for explaining the dynamics of inflation in Mexico and the the exchange
rate is found to be the predominant driver of inflation.
Capistra´n and Ramos-Francia (2006) gauge the degree of persistence of inflation for the
ten largest Latin American economies10 covering the period 1980-2006. With varying
estimated degree of inflation persistence across countries, the region as a whole is found
to have very high persistence in inflation. Using mark-up and monetary theory models,
Monfort and Pen˜a (2008) study the inflation dynamics of Paraguay. In their mark-up
model, prices are modeled as a function of imported prices and domestic costs. More
specifically, prices are calculated some weighted average of unit labor cost, other domes-
tic inputs, and foreign prices. In the monetary theory model, they consider currency
in circulation and broad money as monetary aggregate explanatory variables. Using
quarterly data for 1991-2007 and cointegrated VAR together with VEC model, oil and
administered prices are found to be insignificant while the exchange rates of the main
trading partners as a proxy for imported inflation and unit labor costs are found to be
significant in explaining inflation. Imported inflation, especially the exchange rate with
Brazil, is found to matter also in the short-run. Currency in circulation appears to be
the predominant monetary aggregate for inflation movements in the long-run; and infla-
tion inertia, either stemming from inflation expectations or wage indexation, is showed
to be strong in inflation dynamics in Paraguay. D’Amato and Garegnani (2009) study
the short-run dynamics of inflation in Argentina by estimating a hybrid New-Keynesian
Phillips curve where both backward- and forward-looking rules of price setting together
10The countries under consideration are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico,
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
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with more realistic measure of marginal cost (i.e aggregate labor income share), instead
of output gap, are considered. They extend the model by augmenting nominal devalua-
tion and foreign inflation in order to account for small open economy dynamics. Covering
the years between 1993 and 2007 and using GMM estimation, their results demonstrate
that nominal devaluation and foreign inflation have a significant effect on inflation, with
the latter accounting for more impact. Both backward- and forward-looking compo-
nents are found to be important in determining inflation dynamics in Argentina, with
the backward-looking component having larger effects.
The determinants of inflation are studied under specific categorizations of countries as
well. Using pooled data VAR estimations for 53 developing countries from Africa, Asia,
Mediterranean and South America over the period 1964-1998, Loungani and Swagel
(2001) find that inflation persistence plays a predominant role, accounting about 50,
50, 70 percent of variation in inflation in Mediterranean, Asia and Africa respectively.
However, its role is smaller for South America (5 percent) and when all the countries are
included in the analysis (10 percent). Differences have been made in the inflation inertia
between fixed and floating exchange rate regimes, having the coefficient greater for fixed
rate countries than for floating rate countries11. Money growth is found to be the second
most important determinant of inflation in these countries when inflation inertia is the
dominant factor. Its contribution to inflation is stressed to be less important in fixed
exchange rate regimes than in non-fixed regimes. They find that the variation of inflation
explained by the exchange rate changes depends on the order of the shocks, specifically
whether it is given before or after the shock of money growth. Both fuel and non-fuel
commodity prices are found to have significant impacts on inflation in fixed exchange
rate regimes among developing countries.
Mohanty and Klau (2001) study the trends and determinants of inflation in 14 EMEs12 in
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Their empirical analysis comprises both demand and supply
side factors combining a wage and a mark-up price equation together with Phillips curve,
concentrating 1990s because of the data limitations. They find that exogenous supply
shocks, especially shocks to food prices, are the most common driver of inflation in all
these countries, with exchange rate being the next. Food prices are also suggested to be
significant in variability of inflation. The demand factors, represented by output gap and
excess money; and wage growth as supply side factor play significant role in affecting
inflation, though they argue that it is hard to grasp the precise impact. Other supply side
factors, however, namely the exchange rate or import prices and agriculture shocks, are
presented as the significant main drivers of price movements in EMEs whereas oil price
11Contrary to the result of Crowley (2010), see below.
12The countries considered by the study: Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Taiwan (China) and Thailand.
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shocks are found to have a weak effect on inflation. Finally, they point that persistence
of inflation explains a large proportion of both the average inflation and the variation
in inflation in all countries.
IMF (2001) finds a significant long-run relationship between the size of government
deficit and inflation in 23 EMEs using dynamic panel regression analysis over 1970-1999,
suggesting that inflation is positively associated with fiscal deficit and negatively with
the size of inflation tax base. This relationship is tested by the inclusion of other drivers
of inflation, namely openness, exchange rate regime, political instability, changes in oil
and non-oil commodity prices and world inflation13, yielding stable results. Specifically,
1 percentage point of reduction in government deficit leads to a decrease in inflation by 2
to 6 percentage points. Additionally, world inflation and changes in oil prices are found
to be significant while no statistical relationship between fixed exchange rate regime
and inflation; and negative relationship between openness and inflation that becomes
insignificant when fiscal imbalance is introduced are presented in the analysis.
In their paper, Cata˜o and Terrones (2001) search for an evidence of Sargent and Wallace’s
(1981) “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” where an increase in public debt is associated
with rising inflation in countries with large public debt for EMEs. For a panel of 23
EMEs during 1970-2000, they focus on the long-run relationship between fiscal deficit
and inflation. Their long-run relationship is brought by a general equilibrium model that
relates fiscal deficit, money demand, money supply and inflation. Nesting the theoretical
model in ARDL approach, they find that 1 percentage point decrease in fiscal deficit to
GDP ratio decreases inflation by 2 to 7 percentage point. They check the robustness
of this result by excluding the countries that experienced very high and hyperinflation
from the sample14 and the result remains the same; thereby concluding that the fiscal
deficit has a positive statistically significant relationship with inflation. Oil price changes
and world inflation are found to be important and significant in determining inflation
while openness to trade and the exchange rate regime movements provide no evidence
for affecting inflation.
Domac¸ and Yu¨cel (2005) investigate the factors contributing to the starts of inflation-
ary episodes in 15 EMEs15 covering 1980-2001 and employing pooled probit analysis
to a cross-country data set. In their analysis, they consider the factors that are com-
monly addressed by the existing literature; and also incorporate political determinants of
inflation. From the political perspective, populist view of inflation suggests that polar-
ized and fragmented governments, which have electoral uncertainty and disagreements
13They test their analysis by excluding the countries that experienced hyperinflation episodes
14Fischer, Sahay and V/egh (2002) argue that the relationship is significant for countries which expe-
rience very high inflations.
15The countries covered by the paper: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela.
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between policymakers, are more prone to levy inflation tax. On the other hand, the
state-capture approach argues that wealthy and powerful elite may derive personal ben-
efit from inflation so that the price instability is due to the will of incumbent politicians
or the elite, contrary to the demand by the public for inflationary financing. While this
view suggests that price stability can be achieved by promoting democratic accountabil-
ity, the former conjecture argues that for price stability, autonomous and consolidated
governments are needed. Their results indicate that the inflation episodes are triggered
by output gap, change in food production index and change in oil prices. From the po-
litical stance, institutional democracy and durability of the regime measures are found
to be negatively correlated with inflation starts, supporting state-capture view; yet with
significant impact from the former. Specifically, an increase in GDP growth above trend,
negative agricultural shocks and decrease in budget surplus raise the probability of in-
flation starts while an increase in capital flow relative to GDP and a more democratic
environment decrease the probability of inflation starts in these EMEs.
Fanizza and So¨derling (2006) argue that many MENA countries follow monetary policies
such that fiscal position of a country becomes a key determinant for inflation. Instead
of the prediction based on Fiscal Theory of the Price Level that suggests eliminating
seigniorage revenue is not sufficient to avoid moderate to high inflation, they claim that
a sound fiscal position is a necessary condition for macroeconomic stability. Kwon et al.
(2006) search for an evidence for the implications of “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”
from a large cross-country analysis. To account for this specific focus, their model relies
on forward looking fiscal-monetary models of inflation. They consider particularly the
role of public debt rather than the budget deficit on inflation for two reasons. First,
monetization expectations and wealth effects of public debt can arise regardless of the
size of the budget deficit. Secondly, the size of the budget deficit can be quite differ-
ent from the public debt due to debt-indexation, non-debt financing and exchange rate
movements (see, IMF 2003). Their empirical analysis utilizes GMM estimation over 71
countries including developing and developed countries spanning 1963-2004. They find
a strong and positive impact of debt growth on inflation in developing and non-major
advanced economies, with greater impact for indebted developing countries. Further-
more, the significant link between debt and inflation is found to exist even when money
growth, real output growth, currency depreciation and output gap are controlled. Fi-
nally, exchange rate regime is suggested to contribute to this link. In particular, the
response of inflation to debt is larger and significant under a floating regime than a fixed
exchange rate regime. As an application, they also confirm the significance of public
debt-inflation link in Jamaica with a VAR approach.
Borio and Filardo (2007) put forward a complementary explanation for determinants of
inflation where they pose a more “globe-centric” approach considering the changes in
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the trend of inflation and in the sensitivity of inflation responses to traditional deter-
minants, especially since 1990s. Their country-centric approach assumes that inflation
is determined by excess demand, wage, exchange rate and import prices which captures
international effects whereas the globe-centric approach considers foreign prices, global
excess demand pressures and factor mobility. In their methodology, they use backward-
looking Phillips curve specification by extending it with a global measure of economic
slack where it is calculated as weighted average of international output gaps. The data
of this paper covers both industrial and emerging market countries over the sample pe-
riod of 1985-2005. The results suggest that global factors have become more important
relative to domestic ones; and in some countries, the explanatory powers of global fac-
tors have dominated that of domestic output gaps as one of the key determinants of
domestic inflation. The inclusion of import and oil prices, as traditional indicators of
external influences, are checked for robustness and their findings are not overturn.
Habermeier et al. (2009) analyzes the inflation pressures and monetary policy responses
to rising inflation due to the food and oil price shocks using several estimation meth-
ods varying from pooled OLS to GMM for 49 EMEs and developing countries covering
monthly data during January 2005-June 2008. As explanatory variables of inflation,
they consider inflation inertia, measures of aggregate demand pressure, such as GDP
growth, output gap, unemployment, wages, fiscal deficit; food inflation and oil inflation
as external factors and central bank credibility. Monetary policy tightening is found
to be related with a decrease in inflation while aggregate demand pressures and higher
commodity prices increase inflation. Observed surge in inflation is attributed to aggre-
gate demand pressures proxied by credit growth and rise in food and energy prices while
food inflation and oil inflation are found to be insignificant affecting inflation even con-
sidering their large share in CPI basket. A negative relationship between rise in inflation
and exchange rate appreciation is observed. Currency appreciations under more flexible
exchange rate regimes, greater degree of central bank independence and credibility are
found to be associated with lower inflation. Increasing capacity constraint, inflation
persistence and tighter labour markets are found to contribute to inflationary pressures
with second round effects.
Crowley (2010) reports an analysis on the factors determining the inflation in the Middle
East, North Africa, and Central Asia (MENACA) region16. In the MENACA region,
regional inflation had a downward trend from 1996 until 2000 which was reversed since
2000. This paper aims to understand the reasons behind this shift by considering the
16It is important to approach these conclusions with caution as Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United
Arab Emirates are also included in the sample. Yet, it is noted that regrouping the countries into
subgroups as major oil exporter, moderate oil exporter, and countries that export little or no oil does
not change the pattern of inflation in the region.
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factors that have been accounted for explaining inflation dynamics in the existing lit-
erature. Using annual data, this paper tests the importance of past inflation, nominal
exchange rate, commodity prices, import prices and GDP growth proxied for output gap
as the related data is mostly unavailable. Positive and significant correlation between
inflation and changes in non-fuel commodity prices is found. Inflation inertia is found
to be the most significant factor. The effects of the percent change in the exchange rate
and broad money supply are proven to be positive and significant. The strength of US
dollar is shown to be related to a lower inflation; with the level of the value of the dollar
being more important than the change. However, the effect of change in fuel prices, real
economic growth and import prices on inflation are suggested to be insignificant.
Age´nor and Bayraktar (2010) estimate contracting models of the Phillips curve for eight
middle-income developing countries, namely Chile, Colombia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. The analytic foundations of this type of models rest on
the fact that backward-looking Phillips curves put too much emphasis on inertia while
forward-looking Phillips curves have difficulties in explaining the persistence of inflation
and in responsiveness of inflation to monetary policy shocks; and New Keynesian models
are not plausible to account for open-economy considerations, such as trade openness’
affecting price setting behaviours of firms through marginal production costs. To solve
this problem, they specify many open-economy inflation specifications, with different
assumptions on the formation of expectations; and focus on the impact of openness, the
role of marginal production costs, the effect of borrowing costs and the role of factor
substitution between labor and imported inputs. In all specifications, they include the
real exchange rate, the relative price of imported intermediate goods in terms of wage
(i.e a measure for the degree of factor substitution), imported oil prices and lending
costs to account for the possibility that firms may need to borrow. Based on two-step
GMM techniques, their results indicate that one lagged and one lead inflation rates
are highly statistically significant and have a positive effect on the current inflation
in all countries with backward-looking behavior being a more important component
in explaining inflation. The lending rate and output gap appear to positively affect
inflation. World oil prices and relative input prices are found to have a limited impact
on inflation while bank borrowing costs are significant for Korea and Mexico.
Parker (2017) studies the relevance of global inflation on national inflation using the
dataset of 223 countries covering advanced, middle and low income countries over 1980-
2012. Along with global inflation, 9 country-specific characteristics, such as trade open-
ness, financial development, exchange rate regime and central bank independence, are
considered in the analysis as they intervene with the effect of global inflation on domes-
tic inflation to a greater or lesser extend. The results suggest that while global factors
can account for around 70 percent of the variance of inflation in advanced economies,
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in other words, for those with greater financial development, higher GDP per capita
and more central bank transparency, but not in middle and low income countries. It
is also indicated that the global inflation factors are more important in affecting the
national inflation rate in countries with fixed exchange rates. Finally, the impact of
global inflation on domestic inflation rates is found to be much lower for less developed
countries.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
This section presents the quantitative analyses regarding to the determinants of inflation
by utilizing two different dataset17. First, panel vector-autoregressive (VAR) model is
introduced together with data explanations, specification features and results in order
to understand the ’proximate’ drivers of inflation; next, to those of the socio-political
influences.
Panel VAR models have become increasingly popular especially among applied macroe-
conomists and policymakers as they permit to account for interdependencies in order to
capture global transmission mechanisms, treat the relationships across macroeconomic
units without imposing a priori constraint on these links, incorporate cross sectional
dynamic heterogeneities; and allow for heterogeneity in coefficients. These features of
Panel VARs enable them to become used to analyzing the dynamics of business cycles in
a region, to forecast some economic variables by taking into account cross unit spill-over
effects, to study the transmission of idiosyncratic shocks and so on.18
In this chapter, IRFs obtained from PVAR estimation are used in order to examine the
relative importance of the determinants of inflation in emerging and developing coun-
tries; and brief comments are given with reference to VDCs. As the determinants of
inflation, proximate drivers of inflation suggested by traditional approaches are consid-
ered.19 Specifically, annual data on 41 countries20 for the years from 1990 to 2015 are
gathered. Data on inflation rate, exchange rate, unemployment rate, money growth and
oil price are from the IMF International Financial Statistics while debt data is from His-
torical Public Debt Database of IMF. Inflation is the consumer price index calculated
as percentage change in corresponding period of the previous year. The exchange rate
is the national currency per U.S. dollar, end of period rate. The nominal exchange rate
is used in the analysis as the real exchange rates account of the inflation, that the aim
17The data are different as it is obligated by the availability of the choice of inflation determinants.
18See, Canova and Ciccarelli (2013) for a survey on PVAR models and their topics.
19Following one of the first papers on developing countries by Loungani and Swagel (2001), similar
variables are studied.
20See Table 3.15 in Appendix for the full list of countries.
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is to understand the underlying drivers of. From the data, year-on-year depreciations
and appreciations are calculated so that any effects on inflation will be attributed to
movements in the exchange rate. The unemployment rate is given in percentage units.
Money growth is the annual percentage change in broad money. The oil price is given
in the form of U.S. dollars per barrel as a rate. Since this is a world-wide price, it is the
same for each country. The debt data comprises of the gross government debt-to-GDP
ratios. As the fiscal imbalance data is limited for the countries under consideration,
government debt data is used instead. Table 3.1 provides the summary of the data,
according to which inflation and money growth vary widely across countries followed by
government debt-to-GDP ratio and oil price rate. According to Table 3.2, that provides
the pairwise correlations between the variables, the relationship suggested by the quan-
tity theory is supported by the strong and significant correlation between money growth
and inflation. Another strong correlation between money growth and debt points to the
use of seignorage by the government for financing its debt. Together with significant
correlation between inflation and government debt, the monetarist view becomes more
evident.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Proximate Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
oilp 1066 46.65077 32.30113 13.07 105.01
unemp 960 9.84392 6.514569 .1743948 37.3
debt 1004 54.50466 76.17525 1.02666 2092.92
money 1016 50.37192 348.7702 -85.00267 7677.834
cpi 1025 57.42178 428.2769 -7.113768 7485.492
excg 1043 .059948 .2373355 -.1485432 4.566732
Table 3.2: Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Proximate Variables
oilp unemp debt money cpi excg
oilp 1.0000
unemp -0.0900 1.0000
debt -0.1095* 0.0748 1.0000
money -0.0853 -0.0402 0.5994* 1.0000
cpi -0.1018 -0.0491 0.4811* 0.9121* 1.0000
excg -0.1572* -0.0974 0.2408* 0.5499* 0.6046* 1.0000
* demonstrates p < 0.001 significance.
The analysis starts by conducting several panel unit root tests. Having unbalanced
dataset due to unavailability of the data narrows down the number of alternative sta-
tionarity tests that can be applied. Cross-sectionally augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF)
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test is used, as suggested by Pesaran (2007), in order to take into account the cross-
sectional dependencies (CD). Alternatively, Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test of panel unit
root is utilized as it allows for heterogeneous panels, serially correlated errors and un-
balanced dataset. Model selection procedure is calculated by using first- to third-order
panel VARs and the first four lags of the interest variables under consideration as the
instruments suggests various results. According to the model selection criteria by An-
drews and Lu (2001), BIC is the best procedure except the case with the smallest sample
size. Considering that they use the sample size of 250 in their Monte Carlo simulation
and in this paper N = 41, the model fit, namely PVAR(1), offered by BIC is ruled
out. Following Abrigo and Love (2015), the preferred model of PVAR(3) by Hansen’s
J statistic is also dismissed as it does not correct for the degrees of freedom. On the
other hand, MAIC and MQIC are at their smallest values when the preferred model
is second-order panel VAR. Lag selection of the model also facilitates the selection of
serial correlation in individual variables by restraining the number of included lags for
the calculation of the unit root tests.
Table 3.3: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests for Proximate Variables, IPS
Variable Wout trend W trend
test stat. p-value test stat. p-value
oilp 1.9722 0.9757 1.7894 0.9632
unemp -3.4278 0.0003 -1.4937 0.0676
debt -4.6253 0.0000 -1.9531 0.0254
money -36.0851 0.0000 -16.5742 0.0000
cpi -2.10 0.0000 -2.30 0.0000
D.unemp -19.1637 0.0000 -14.6497 0.0000
D.oilp -16.7712 0.0000 -11.3996 0.0000
2 lags are used for level and 1 lag for first-difference variables.
In Table 3.3 and 3.4, the results of IPS and CADF unit root tests are presented. Follow-
ing the result of the model selection procedure, the decisions on the stationarity of the
variables are made according to the two-lag inclusion of variables for specifying the lag
structure for ADF regressions21. In the IPS stationarity test, there is no result regard-
ing the movements of the exchange rate due to the insufficient number of observations
per panel while there is no test result in CADF for the oil price as this is the world
price. Furthermore, having the same prices for all countries inevitably leads to cross-
dependence for each of the panels. Hence, the test results from IPS are relied on for the
oil price while for the changes in exchange rate, the decision is based on the results of the
CADF test. The presence of cross-section dependence causes a failure in the judgment
21The unit root tests of IPS and CADF are also conducted for the case where only 1 lag is included
to correct the serial correlation. The results point to the same conclusions.
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of the ’first generation’ panel unit root tests as they are likely to reject the null hypoth-
esis of nonstationarity excessively. CADF test eliminates CD by augmenting the ADF
regression with the lagged cross-sectional mean and its first differences of the individual
series to account for the CD. In this procedure, it is important to carefully determine
the number of lags to include as the results are affected by the lag length. Too many lags
to insert results in a loss of degrees of freedom leading to over-parameterization whereas
too few lags fail to capture the dynamics of the system causing omitted variable bias.
To overcome these problems, the tests for inclusion of 0- and 1-lag are also checked,
which suggest the same conclusions as 2-lag case. When trend is included, oil price and
unemployment are found to be I(1) in IPS whereas the rest of the variables are found
to be stationary. According to CADF test, unemployment and debt are I(1) for only
constant; and constant and trend cases while the null hypothesis of nonstationarity is
rejected for other variables. Hence, it is concluded to fit a second-order panel VAR with
oil price, unemployment and debt in first-difference and the rest in level.
Table 3.4: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests for Proximate Variables, CADF
Variable W constant W cons. & trend
test stat. p-value test stat. p-value
unemp -0.799 0.212 0.348 0.636
debt -0.126 0.45 1.548 0.939
money -5.28 0.000 -2.513 0.006
cpi -6.604 0.000 -4.333 0.000
excg -5.395 0.000 -2.044 0.02
D.unemp -8.33 0.000 -5.6 0.000
D.debt -8.458 0.000 -6.069 0.000
2 lags are used for level and 1 lag for first-difference variables.
In general, panel-data vector autoregression methodology incorporates the panel-data
approach, that allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity, with the traditional VAR
approach, which assumes all the variables in the system endogenous. A PVAR model
can be defined as follows:
Xi,t = Γ(L)Xi,t−1 + θi + i,t
where t denotes time and i indexes countries, Xi,t is the vector of endogenous stationary
variables, Γ(L) expresses the one-sided matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, θi is
the set of country-specific fixed effects and i,t indicates the vector of errors. Under the
presence of both lagged dependent variables and fixed effects, the least square estimates
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are biased. However, as suggested by Nickell (1981), the bias is inversely proportional
to the number of periods, (T). In this analysis, T = 26, so that the size of the bias
is expected to be small22. Methodologically, utilizing VAR procedure on panel data
imposes restrictions on the estimated coefficients of each cross-sectional country. The
augmentation of fixed-effects (FE) overcomes this assumption of the same structure for
each country and captures country-specific influences. Specifically, FEs, here, account
for individual heterogeneities on inflation due to the differences, such as in institutional
factors, which potentially drive the changes in inflation, yet the data is not available.
Since the FEs are correlated with the regressors due to the introduction of the lags of
dependent variable, FE estimator in VAR is inconsistent. Hence, the GMM is proposed
for the calculation of consistent estimates; and in order to remove the FEs, the Helmert
procedure is used, following Love and Zicchino (2006), which preserves the orthogonality
between lagged regressors and transformed variables, so that the lagged regressors can
be used as instruments and the coefficients can be estimated by system GMM.
The estimation procedure is, then, followed by the computation of IRFs and VDCs using
Cholesky decomposition. The orthogonalized IRFs simulate the response of one interest
variable to an orthogonal shock in another interest variable by holding other shocks
constant, rendering a better understanding of the isolated effects of individual drivers
of inflation. To achieve this orthogonality, ordering of the variables is important as the
variables that appear earlier in the ordering are assumed to be more exogenous than
the later ones. To this end, it is assumed that the oil price movements are exogenously
driven that cannot be affected by other factors contemporaneously. Considering the fact
that they are, in general, affected by OPEC-related supply shocks, changes in the oil
prices are ranked first. The rest of the variables are ordered accounting for the size of
the correlations between them and the causality analysis. Although Granger-causality
analysis yields two-way causation between the two, it is assumed that causation runs
from money growth to inflation, placing money growth in front of inflation. As there
is only a one-way causality from the exchange rate movements to inflation rate, the
feedback effect from inflation to exchange rate is ruled out, hence justifying to rank
inflation at the bottom as it is supposedly the most endogenous variable among all. The
large correlations between money and inflation; money and debt; and finally debt and
unemployment in a descending order together with two-way causality between the pairs
suggest to place debt and money together. The unemployment rate is a proxy that is
used by the literature for the output gap where a negative output gap is represented
by a rise in the unemployment rate. By distinguishing the real demand shock from the
22Yet, keep in mind that the simulations of Judson and Owen (1999) conclude that the bias is significant
when T = 30. Nickell (1981) argues that the estimates would be biased even with large N with the
presence of lagged dependent variables on the right-hand side of the system of equations. However,
there is no rule-of-thump value for T and N.
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nominal variables, thus, the unemployment rate is aligned before money, debt and the
exchange rate; leading to the following order: changes in oil price, unemployment rate,
government debt, money growth, exchange rate movements and the inflation rate23.24
Figure 3.1: Response of Inflation to Proximate Variable Shocks
Orthogonalized IRF with 95% confidence interval by dashed lines.
Figure 3.1 focuses on the response of inflation to each shock of the other variables
including itself.25 The solid lines in the figures show point estimates while the dashed
lines capture the 95% confidence interval. To estimate the confidence intervals of IRFs,
the Monte Carlo method with 1000 draws is computed. As shown, the positive oil price
innovations increase inflation in the short run and the impact becomes insignificant
in the long run. An increase in the unemployment rate, first, raises inflation; and
after one or two lags, it decreases inflation. This result seemingly contradicts with
the Phillips-curve approach. However, since the magnitude of impacts are modest and
borderline statistically significant, the response of inflation can be attributed to the case
where due to lower aggregate demand and higher unemployment, the revenues of the
government fall leading to a surge in fiscal deficit causing inflation. The response of
inflation to government debt innovations is hump-shaped, with the impact being small.
The possible explanation for this outcome is that the fiscal deficit exerts significant
inflationary pressures for countries that experience very high and hyperinflation, as also
23This is a similar order to that of Loungani and Swagel (2001).
24Alternative orderings of the variables are found to have no affect on the results.
25The responses of other variables to each shock are not presented as the main aim is to understand
the dynamics of inflation.
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suggested by the existing literature. Yet, there is no sub-sampling according to inflation
categories in this analysis. Expansionary policies, namely faster growth in money and
depreciation of exchange rate, lead to higher inflation immediately; and the response is
statistically significant. Finally, inflation inertia is statistically significant and accelerates
inflation. These results are robust to the changes in the ordering of the variables with
small changes in magnitudes, yet, no changes in significance and trend.
Table 3.5 shows the results of variance decomposition. The key finding is that inflation
is mainly driven by money growth and inflation persistence. Specifically, money growth
accounts for more than one-third of the variance of inflation both in the short and long
run. The inertial component of inflation explains over 40% of the variation in inflation.
The unemployment rate and the changes in oil price are the next important sources of
inflation with the government debt and the exchange rate movements playing a relatively
small role in explaining inflation. The results suggest that inflationary expectations and
indexations schemes in price and wage are the most critical determinants of inflation
dynamics in emerging markets and developing economies.
Table 3.5: Variance Decomposition of Inflation to Proximate Variable Shocks
Horizon Impulse Variables
oilp unemp debt money excg cpi
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .068 .017 .013 .4 .005 .497
2 .066 .073 .016 .385 .005 .456
3 .065 .071 .03 .378 .016 .44
4 .064 .071 .049 .372 .016 .43
5 .064 .074 .049 .368 .016 .43
10 .062 .084 .048 .363 .016 .427
The horizon is presented sequentially given that 4 lags are used as instruments in the estimation of PVAR. Next, the variances
for the mid and end of the horizon are displayed.
In order to investigate the determinants of inflation with a specific focus on an institu-
tional factor and socio-economical characteristics in emerging markets and developing
countries, three variables are considered, namely political structure index, income in-
equality and central bank independence index. Democracy and inflation are linked
because democratic systems are regarded as political infrastructures that are grounded
on organized labor who can translate their demands into wage-push inflation, making
deflationary policies inappropriate26. Democratic governments can finance itself through
taxation, debt and monetization, which, except the last, would make the governments
undesirable. On the other hand, a dictatorship does not follow the demands of the
working class as it is not confined by electoral concerns. However, this may still lead
26See Goldthorpe (1987).
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to money supply increase as in democracies, as well as excessive use of other means.
Inflation can also be a consequence of a political uncertainty. Alesina and Tabellini
(1990); and Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992) suggest that governments would
use seigniorage to finance its operations under political instability. Many autocracies are
prone to political instability and tend to use the redistribution of income as an instru-
ment to be supported by the median voter. Hence, inflation can occur in autocracies
to redistribute income. On the contrary, Roemer (1995) argues that a democracy im-
plicates political turnover, leading to uncertainty from the point of view of the voters
whereas a dictatorship rules out the political instability, indicating that inflation is in-
nate to democracy, which is the essence of partisan theories. In short, political theories
of inflation can be categorized into two. In particular, the populist approach suggests
that democratic governments use inflation to generate revenues as it is demanded by
the public for redistribution purposes while the state-capture approach argues that in-
cumbent parties and the elite benefit from money creation, causing price instability.
The former implies that features of democracy, such as the urge for being elected again,
increase pressures on the political parties to use inflation27 whereas the latter suggests
that democratic accountability promotes price stability. Since households differ in their
income sources, inflation affects these sources, thereby households heterogeneously, lead-
ing to transformed income distribution.
On the one hand, Albanesi (2007) demonstrates a strong positive correlation between
inflation and income inequality, where the rationale stems from the differences in trans-
action patterns between household types; specifically, low income households’s holding
more cash and hence being more vulnerable to inflation. However, in their paper, Coibion
et al. (2012) indicate that a permanent increase in the inflation target decreases income
inequality. Hence, it can be said that the relationship between inflation and income
inequality in terms of correlation and causation has been controversial. From the empir-
ical perspective, for instance, Bulir (2001) suggests that the reduction of inflation from
hyperinflationary levels reduces income inequality whereas Al-Marhubi (1997) finds that
income inequality is associated with higher inflation. Such contrary results have led to
rigorous analysis on this relationship by augmenting more complex interaction between
the two. For instance, Galli and Hoeven (2001) conclude a non-monotonic relationship
between income inequality and inflation where inequality decreases as inflation changes
from high to low rates; and increases as inflation is further reduced from low to lower
rates, similar to Bulir (2001). Alternatively, by combining all these variables, Desai,
Olofsgard and Yousef (2003) argue that democracy reduces inflation in low-inequality
countries; but raises it in high-inequality countries, suggesting that the relationship
between inflation and democracy is contingent on inequality.
27Dictatorial governments can avoid these pressures.
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In theory, countries with more independent central banks can achieve lower inflation as
suggested by Loungani and Sheets (1997) because such central banks as the institution
for monetary policy planners are able to take action without concerning the agenda of
the government when they are freed from the pressures of the government28. However,
Cukierman’s indicators claim that the established negative and statistically significant
relationship between de jure independence and inflation in developed countries is not
followed by developing countries.29 To shed light on these controversial results, annual
data for 31 countries30 covering the period 1980-2010 is obtained. Inflation is gathered
from Reinhart and Rogoff data. Although the data they archive has many resources, the
period this chapter covers is from WEO and IFS data in IMF; and refers to CPI annual
percentage change. Income inequality (i.e gini) is from Standardized World Income
Inequality Database (SWIID)31 that collects the data by the Luxembourg Income Study
fostering better cross-national research than the other resources as other data-set require
additional correction for cross-national comparison. The polity variable is gathered from
Polity IV Project where it has a range from -10 to 10 referring to a scale from strongly
autocratic to strongly democratic respectively, to measure the regime characteristics
of the countries. In the analysis, it is rescaled between 0 and 1 as suggested by many
papers. Central bank independence data is gathered from new dataset of Garriga (2016)
where she built it up on the Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) index of CBI. The
descriptive statistics of the variables in Table 3.6 indicate that inflation has the largest
variability followed by income inequality index. In pairwise correlation table, a positive
association between gini and inflation, and negative relationship between inflation and
democracy; and central bank independence are salient. Although these correlations are
small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, this has been encountered in empirical
analyses as well, as stated above.
Table 3.6: Summary Statistics for Socio-economical Variables
Table 3.6: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
inf 960 90.83126 933.1045 -9.497 24410.98
gini 812 43.67427 7.892907 19.52696 61.89418
cbi 938 .4752702 .2071159 .1345 .904
polity 961 .5871488 .3394293 .05 1
28Among many others, Mishkin (2007).
29Cukierman (1992).
30See Table 3.16 in Appendix for the full list of countries.
31Solt (2016).
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Table 3.7: Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Socio-economical Variables
inf gini cbi polity ginpol
inf 1.0000
gini 0.0804 1.0000
cbi -0.0372 0.0319 1.0000
polity -0.0392 0.1761* 0.2453* 1.0000
ginpol -0.0048 0.4611* 0.1445* 0.9396* 1.0000
* demonstrates p < 0.001 significance.
IPS stationarity tests could not be obtained for cbi and polity due to the insufficient
number of time periods in order to calculate the test statistics. Hence, for those vari-
ables, CADF test results are taken into account. According to the results of the non-
stationarity tests and lag length selection criteria, the model for the variables in their
individual form is fit for PVAR(2) where gini and cbi are estimated in level; and inf
and polity in first-differences. The ordering of the variables are chosen assuming that
polity, cbi, gini affect inf both contemporaneously and with a lag while inf affects the
others only with a lag so that the relative importance of these variables on; and the
relationships of these variables with inflation can be revealed. In line with the literature
on the presented insignificant relationship between cbi and inf for developing countries,
cbi is ranked first followed by polity and gini in order to employ IRFs.32
Table 3.8: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests for Socio-economical Variables, IPS
Variable Wout trend W trend
test stat. p-value test stat. p-value
inf -7.1851 0.0000 -6.8336 0.0000
gini -2.3297 0.0099 -2.5210 0.0059
ginpol -4.9089 0.0000 -5.5621 0.0000
2 lags are used for level and 1 lag for first-difference variables.
In Figure 3.2, the IRFs that are associated with individual impulses from CBI, Gini and
Polity are shown. The negative effects from innovation to CBI on inflation is dominated
by positive ones. While the initial effect is negative, the prominent effect that occurs with
lag is positive and persists in the long run. However, none of the shocks are statistically
significant. The response of inflation to democracy index innovations is volatile with a
dominant positive impact, supporting populist approach. Yet, this effect is insignificant.
The positive impact of income inequality on inflation is negligible and also insignificant.
On the other hand, inflation inertia is shown to be significant with an increasing effect
32Results are founded to be independent of the order of the interest variables.
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Table 3.9: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests for Socio-economical Variables, CADF
Variable W constant W cons. & trend
test stat. p-value test stat. p-value
inf -1.412 0.079 -0.831 0.203
gini 1.187 0.882 -3.437 0.000
cbi -3.650 0.000 -1.948 0.026
polity 0.995 0.840 3.372 1.000
ginpol -3.053 0.001 -0.342 0.366
D.inf -16.511 0.000 -14.554 0.000
D.gini -1.376 0.084 -0.872 0.192
D2.gini -16.177 0.000 -13.289 0.000
D.polity -6.947 0.000 -5.617 0.000
D.ginpol -5.986 0.000 -5.029 0.000
2 lags are used for level, 1 lag for first-difference and 0 lag for second-difference variables.
on contemporaneous inflation. The negative impact of inflation persistence that occurs
with lag is a similar result of, for instance, Desai, Olofsgard and Yousef (2003) where the
deeper lags of inflation are found to have negative coefficients. This is expected since it is
allowed to instrument all variables up to four lags in the estimation. It can be regarded
as the decelerating impact of past inflation on current inflation rather than a decreasing
effect as the deeper the lags get, the less information they carry on the current variable.
The insignificancy of individual impacts of social and political indicators on inflation
highlights the importance of inflation inertia. However, considering the fact that the
existing literature also agrees that augmenting the variables individually can lead to
insignificant or ’wrong’ sign results, such as in Desai, Olofsgard and Yousef (2005); and
the significance is dependent on the classification of inflation as high and very high as
in Aisen and Veiga (2005), the analysis is incorporated with an interaction term.
Following the literature, the interaction variable of ginpol that refers to gini x polity
is generated to account for the effect of democracy and inequality together. Since the
model selection criteria suggests first-order panel VAR and relying on the unit root test
results, a PVAR(1) is modelled with ginpol and gini in levels while polity and inf
in first-differences. Taking into account the strength of the correlations, the Cholesky
order is set for ginpol, polity, gini and inf33. IRFs in Figure 3.3 indicate that the
interaction term, inflation and gini affect inflation positively whereas the innovations of
democracy have a negative impact on inflation. The effect from the democracy index
is only significant when it leads to decrease in inflation, claiming that inflation is more
likely in autocratic systems than in democratic ones. The impact of income inequality is
also significant only when it is positive where the effect occurs in the short run. Hence,
33Alternative orderings of the variables are found to have no effect on the results.
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Figure 3.2: Response of Inflation to Socio-economical Variable Shocks
Orthogonalized IRF with 95% confidence interval by dashed lines.
it is evident that when the interaction term is included in the estimation, the individual
terms become significant. Furthermore, the negative effect from democracy together
with the positive effect of the interaction term on inflation supports the hypothesis that
as the inequality gap rises, greater democratization leads to inflation.
Finally, the impact of the central bank independence on inflation is investigated in which
the dataset is classified as democratic and non-democratic systems whereby the mean
value of the democracy index for the entire period of the analysis that is greater or
equal to 0.5 is defined as the democratic system34; and an estimation is run for these
two sub-samples. PVAR (2) is fit with all the variables, except gini which is in its
second-difference, are estimated in first-differences for non-democratic countries while
for democratic countries, all the variables are estimated in their levels except cbi, which
is included in its first-difference into the regression35. The Cholesky ordering of ginpol,
cbi, gini and inf yields the following IRFs depicted in Figure 3.4 where the top panel
illustrates the responses of inflation in non-democratic systems whereas the bottom panel
demonstrates those for democratic systems.
The response of inflation to interaction term is significant in its initial effect when no
sub-sampling is conducted whereas it loses its significance for all possible horizons in
34See, marked countries in Table 3.16 in Appendix.
35The results of the stationarity tests can be found in Table 3.17-20 in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.3: Interaction Term: Response of Inflation to Socio-economical Variable
Shocks
Orthogonalized IRF with 95% confidence interval by dashed lines.
both non-democratic and democratic countries. The innovations to gini immediately
influence inflation positively in democracies with the impact being borderline statistically
significant. The same effect is insignificant for non-democracies in line with the existing
literature. Specifically, Dolmas, Huffman and Wynne (2000) show that economies with
high income inequality are prone to have higher inflation which is evident in democracies.
Beetsma and van der Ploeg (1996) also find a positive relationship between inflation and
inequality for democratic systems, but not for non-democracies.
The effect of central bank independence on inflation is rarely significant where a negative
significant impact occurs with a lag in non-democracies while a positive influence occurs
immediately in democracies. The former result is in line with various papers such as
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992), Gutierrez (2003) and Arnone et al. (2007) when
de facto CBI index that based on the turnover of the central bank governors is used.
Their results highlight that turnover is negatively correlated with inflation in developing
countries but not significantly correlated in developed countries. However, the general
insignificance in this relationship has been encountered in the literature as well. The
in depth explanations in this regard are as follows: first, it is most likely that the rela-
tionship between the central bank and inflation is more complex than what one index
can achieve to refer to. In practice, there are several other mechanisms that directly or
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Figure 3.4: Sub-sample: Response of Inflation to Socio-economical Variable Shocks
(a) Non-democracies
(b) Democracies
Orthogonalized IRF with 95% confidence interval by dashed lines.
indirectly interact with CBI too36, that influence inflation but are not and may not be
covered in a simple regression analysis; thereby providing insignificant results. Secondly,
the strong negative relationship commonly found by other authors between CBI and in-
flation is valid for industrial countries where de jure measurement is used as an index
36Such as fiscal policy, trade barriers, regulation of financial markets and so on.
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for CBI while it is the de facto independence that is useful for investigating the relation
between inflation and CBI for developing and emerging countries as the aggregated in-
dex value relies on the actual institutional norms and practices of central banks instead
of written laws of central banks.37 It may also be ascribed to the fact that institutional
changes require long periods of time; and hence the representation of this change in
the data and the impact of this change can be observed from a historical dataset. Fur-
thermore, the loss of significance in all variables might be due in part to the reduction
in sample size as the sub-sampling divides the dataset into 11 non-democracies and 20
democracies. In short, these results support the positive relationship between inequality
and inflation for democratically chosen governments; and the insignificant impact of de
jure central bank independence on inflation in emerging markets and developing coun-
tries. Finally, the significant responses of inflation to innovations in inflation persistence
in each specification suggest a more critical role for past inflation than institutional
arrangements and socio-political drivers for explaining inflation dynamics.
The analysis so far considers the variables in untransformed form. With this approach, it
is aimed to feed the system with as many observations as possible. Since there are either
negative or around 0 observations as demonstrated in Table 3.1, log-transformation
causes a loss from the information contained in these observations. Natural logarithm of
the variables is generally taken in quantitative analyses in order to stabilize the variance
of the series. This transformation is also used to linearize the time trend in time series
variables and to measure the elasticities among left-hand side variable and right-hand
side variables. Below, the analysis is repeated with the series in log-transformed form
on the cost of widening the gap in the panel data.
Table 3.10 gives the summary statistics of the transformed variables. The comparison
with Table 3.1 shows one of the advantages of this approach with smoothed variances.
As illustrated in Table 3.11 and Table 3.2, the loss of the significant correlation between
money, cpi and excg with debt suggest that outliers on the right-skew dominate their
relationships. The appearance of statistically significant correlations originates from
the low standard deviations of the variables. The correlation between money growth
and inflation is still the largest one among the series supporting the quantity theory of
money.
To save space, unit root tests are not given this time. Yet, with the same approach
adopted in untransformed model, PVAR(1) where oil price and money growth in first-
differences and the rest in levels is estimated. The order for the IRF is as follows:
oilp, debt, unemp, money, excg and cpi. However, the results are robust to a change
37See, Acemoglu et al. (2008); and Arnoane, Laurens and Segalotto (2009) for the discussion. More-
over, a great number of papers uses turnover of central bank governors data instead of CBI as it refers
to actual changes in the central banks.
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Table 3.10: Transformed: Summary Statistics for Proximate Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
oilp 1066 3.598756 .6999968 2.570319 4.654056
unemp 960 2.05539 .7428962 -1.746433 3.618993
debt 1004 3.763944 .6548476 .0263108 7.646316
money 989 2.813472 1.036439 -1.933768 8.946093
cpi 998 1.988447 1.366202 -2.99537 8.920722
excg 663 -3.401368 1.584431 -12.1323 1.518798
Table 3.11: Transformed: Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Proximate Variables
oilp unemp debt money cpi excg
oilp 1.0000
unemp -0.0640 1.0000
debt -0.1382* 0.2565* 1.0000
money -0.2956* -0.1098* -0.0284 1.0000
cpi -0.2810* -0.0873 0.0312 0.6652* 1.0000
excg -0.2189* -0.0228 0.0724 0.4258* 0.5079* 1.0000
* demonstrates p < 0.001 significance.
assumed in the untransformed model. According to the IRF, one standard deviation
innovations to oil price increases inflation, but the impact is insignificant from medium-
term onward. The negative yet insignificant effect of unemployment to inflation can
be explained by Phillips-curve. The significant positive response of inflation to the
government debt shock in the short- to medium-run indicates inflationary pressures of
the debt financing actions by the government. Faster money growth, depreciation of
the currency and inflation inertia increase inflation with the latter having the strongest
and longest-lasting effect. Finally, variance decomposition in Table 3.12 suggests that
the main sources of inflation are inflation persistence and money growth in which the
former accounts for 64% of the variation in inflation.
In the analysis with respect to institutional factors and socio-economical characteristics,
only inflation is transformed by taking natural logarithm as the rest of the series are
either transformed otherwise or an index. Since only inf variable is changed, variation
is occurred only in the first column of the correlation matrix in which there is a small
but significant negative correlation between inflation and central bank independence.
Due to the expected insignificant results from the fit of the model without interac-
tion term (i.e with polity, cbi, gini and inf), the model with interaction term is pre-
sented. The model selection criteria suggests PVAR(1) and unit root tests necessitate
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Figure 3.5: Transformed: Response of Inflation to Proximate Variable Shocks
Orthogonalized IRF with 95% confidence interval by dashed lines.
Table 3.12: Transformed: Variance Decomposition of Inflation to Proximate Variable
Shocks
Horizon Impulse Variables
oilp debt unemp money excg cpi
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 .116 .013 .017 .131 .085 .638
2 .068 .153 .01 .142 .061 .566
3 .065 .158 .016 .12 .072 .569
4 .061 .156 .022 .111 .077 .573
5 .058 .161 .029 .106 .076 .57
10 .056 .159 .054 .102 .075 .555
The horizon is presented sequentially given that 3 lags are used as instruments in the estimation of PVAR. Next, the variances
for the mid and end of the horizon are displayed.
that democracy and income inequality are fit in first-differences while inflation and
ginpol are in levels. The same ordering in the untransformed model38 is assumed. IRFs
in Figure 3.6 indicate that shocks to ginpol and inflation persistence affect inflation
positively and those of income inequality and democracy indices influence negatively.
While the effects from interaction term and gini are borderline significant on impact,
38Other variations of the ordering do not change the result.
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Table 3.13: Transformed: Summary Statistics for Socio-economical Variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
inf 939 2.426414 1.35924 -1.857899 10.10279
gini 812 43.67427 7.892907 19.52696 61.89418
cbi 938 .4752702 .2071159 .1345 .904
polity 961 .5871488 .3394293 .05 1
Table 3.14: Transformed: Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Socio-economical Variables
inf gini cbi polity ginpol
inf 1.0000
gini 0.0915 1.0000
cbi -0.1236* 0.0319 1.0000
polity 0.0039 0.1761* 0.2453* 1.0000
ginpol 0.0585 0.4611* 0.1445* 0.9396* 1.0000
* demonstrates p < 0.001 significance.
the effect of inflation inertia is significant in the medium-run as well. These findings are
in line with the untransformed estimation.
Figure 3.6: Transformed & Interaction Term: Response of Inflation to Socio-
economical Variables Shocks
Orthogonalized IRF with 95% confidence interval by dashed lines.
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The impact of central bank independence is evaluated again in two sub-samples. PVAR(1)
is fit in which cbi and gini in first-differences and the rest in levels are estimated for
democratic countries while ginpol, cbi and inf in first- and gini in second-difference are
estimated for non-democratic countries. One of the different results in log-transformed
estimation from the untransformed one is the significant positive effect of gini in non-
democratic systems. Although the response of inflation to income inequality is small
and significant only as an initial effect, it can be related to the claim that political in-
stabilities in non-democratic countries are prone to income redistribution. The other
distinctive result occurs with the loss of small significant initial effect by central bank
independence index in democratic systems. Otherwise, the responses of inflation to
one percent innovation by these determinants are compatible with the untransformed
estimation.
When shocks with Choleski39 ordering are used, transforming the variable does not in-
fluence the interpretation of the shock, rather, it changes that of the response as it
is in terms of rescaled data after the transformation. This can be observed from the
comparison of the horizontal axes. The insignificant results or differences, however, can
be attributed to the following aspects. First, during the sample period, these countries
experience mostly hyperinflation or high inflation periods with some relatively low and
negative rates as indicated by right-skewness. By taking natural logarithm, hyperinfla-
tion periods are smoothed out indicating a small increase rather than a radical spike;
and deflation periods are totally removed from the sample, indicating loss of informa-
tion on those periods. Secondly, when the sample size shrinks, it is more likely to be
trapped by over-parametrization problem. Specific to the socio-economic and political
analysis, it might be the case that disentangling the effects of left-hand side variables
on inflation is harder in semi-logarithm form. Furthermore, when the sample is divided
into two groups, the corresponding results of the lost data is less negligible compared
to the whole sample; hence creating some shifts with statistical insignificance. Never-
theless, log-transformed estimation conforms to the main results of the untransformed
estimation so that it can be regarded as a robustness check.
39Alternatively, any other covariance matrix factorization would also suffice.
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Figure 3.7: Transformed & Sub-sample: Response of Inflation to Socio-economical
Variable Shocks
(a) Non-democracies
(b) Democracies
Orthogonalized IRF with 95% confidence interval by dashed lines.
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3.4 Conclusion
The empirical strategies for examining the determinants of inflation can be divided into
two. First, the pattern of inflation in a single country over a long horizon can be studied.
Second, the experiences of inflation in several different countries over a shorter time span
can be compared as the differences in economical and political drivers among countries
serve for understanding the inflation dynamics. The empirical analysis in this chapter
follows the second strategy by utilizing PVAR estimation.
The analysis regarding the proximate determinants of inflation suggests that inflation
is mainly driven by money growth and inflation persistence whereas the analysis con-
centrating on the socio-economical and political determinants of inflation argues that
the relationship between inflation and income inequality is contingent on the political
structure where the positive relationship prevails in democracies; and de jure central
bank independence has no explanatory power on inflation. Finally, the positive impact
of the inflation inertia on inflation, in terms of both magnitude and significance, in each
specification regardless of the focus for the determinants of interest suggest that infla-
tionary expectations and indexations schemes in price and wage are the most critical
determinants of inflation dynamics in emerging market and developing economies.
The results of this positive analysis give rise to the following suggestions. If the dom-
inance of inflation inertia is claimed to be backward-looking wage settlements, wage
negotiations should be arranged on productivity instead of past realizations of inflation
in the future. Since the first round effects of adverse supply shocks could be amplified
in a volatile environment affecting inflation expectations and credibility of the mone-
tary authorities in applying policy regime, structural reforms should be considered. If
the inertia is proven to arise from inflationary expectations with slow adjustment, price
controls, such as controlled levels of exchange rate, wage and prices, may accelerate
the adjustment of the expectations breaking the inflation inertia.40 Inflationary inertia
can also be broken when the monetary authority would be forward-looking and more
responsive to the deviations of expected inflation from the inflation target. It tends to
be reduced with credible disinflationary policies and plans. To maintain the downward
pressure on prices when considering that inflation persistence is due to the staggering of
price-setting and price-indexation especially accompanied by high public sector deficit,
control over the price of consumer goods and public services; and cuts in subsidies can
also be utilized.
40It is important to note that these choices may lead to unemployment, shortages and speculative
effects on exchange rate.
Chapter 4
Foreign Aid: Lurking or Spilling
Over?
4.1 Introduction
What is the main instrument of a central bank? Which rule should a central bank follow
as a function of macroeconomic conditions? As observed, inflation targeting, output gap
targeting, exchange rate and money targeting are among the policies adopted by the
central banks in strict or flexible forms according to the main concerns of the countries.
Although there is an extensive research in response to these questions, the resulting
disagreement gives a way for further studies in designing optimal monetary policy. The
novelty of the current analysis, however, arises from the question regarding what the
best response of the monetary policy authority is specifically in foreign aid recipient
developing countries.
The Millennium Development Goals (MDG)1 together with escalating resource trans-
fers have entailed numerous studies on the effects of foreign aid. Despite the number
of papers, most of the contributions in the literature are predominantly empirical; and
concentrate on the growth effect of foreign aid2, leaving a scope for a theoretical analy-
sis that focuses on the optimal targeting rule of the monetary authority in aid-receiving
countries. Furthermore, considering the fact that foreign aid in some less developed
countries is quite substantial3, its positive (negative) effects can be amplified (lessened)
1MDGs emerged from the September 2000 Millennium Declaration at the United Nations and include
measurable targets for halving world poverty between 1990 and 2015.
2See, such as, Arndt et al. (2011), Burnside and Dollar (2000), Easterly et al. (2004), De Haan
(2009) and Rajan and Subramanian (2005) for positive, negative or insignificant results.
3In 2015, Tuvalu has received %89.2, Liberia %62.4 and Central African Republic %30.6 net official
development assistance (ODA) of their GNI.
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with respect to the size of the incoming resources via the conduct of optimal monetary
policy. In fact, there are many theories that illustrate the relationship between the
incoming foreign aid and the corresponding changes in macroeconomic indicators with
the intervention of monetary policy. For instance, Berg et al. (2010) note that foreign
aid that is used in financing government spending affects the economy as if it were a
domestically-financed fiscal expansion which causes an increase in money supply leading
to inflationary pressures. Alternatively, due to the fear of inflationary pressures, mone-
tary policymakers may raise the interest rate in order to secure the aid which result in a
crowding-out of the private investment inducing a reallocation of the resources towards
public sector4. Hence, monetary authorities should not neglect these inflows in setting
their monetary policies because the policy regime they follow has an impact on not only
prices but also the allocation of resources.
In this vein, a New Keynesian model with sticky prices and capital accumulation that
features a capital adjustment cost is proposed. The analysis roots in the evaluation
of the Taylor rule based on a welfare assessment under alternative stochastic processes
when the monetary authority accounts for the incoming foreign aid. In particular, given
the calibrated values of the structural parameters of the model, policy parameters of
the Taylor rule, namely interest rate smoothing, inflation targeting and output growth
targeting, are optimized in order to maximize unconditional welfare under three cases:
(i) only cost-push shock (CP ), (ii) only foreign aid shock (FA); and (iii) cost-push and
foreign aid shocks (CP +FA) in which total factor productivity shock is always muted.
The theoretical framework for foreign aid is distinct from the most of the previous studies
in two ways. First, foreign aid is modelled in the form of untied transfers. Secondly,
both temporary and permanent changes of it are considered5. Initially, a theoretical
model where the government receives the foreign aid and directs it to the representative
household as a lump-sum monetary transfer is constructed. Next, foreign aid is designed
to be entirely spent on consumption goods that the household has no control over the
decision on; yet, still derives utility from.
Despite the conflicting results on the effects of foreign aid on macroeconomic conditions,
conventional wisdom among the development economists follows that an effective redis-
tribution of resources from rich industrialized countries to poor developing countries is
necessary in order for the latter to catch the former. However, models that allow for
intertemporal optimization by the agents would point out that in response to an increase
in the available resources, agents would marginally reallocate those resources to current
4As suggested by Hussain et al. (2009)
5For instance, Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007) and Agenor, Bayraktar and Aynaoui (2008) study
only the permanent changes of aid while Arellano et al. (2005) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2005)
analyze the effects of temporary changes of it.
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and future consumption together with those of investment. Hence, these additional re-
sources in the form of foreign aid could be lurking towards an inefficient reallocation or
have positive spillover effects in the economy. The results from the welfare-optimized
Taylor rules in this chapter indicate that the presence of foreign aid shocks serves to
the monetary authority in anchoring output growth, suggesting that the foreign aid
is not merely a shock that creates reallocation in this setting, but it can become an
unconventional policy tool as well.
To identify how the foreign aid is spent creates a misallocation or not, the same model
is modified such that foreign aid shock directs to the household via a consumption
transfer resulting in a reallocated consumption bundle instead of a monetary transfer.
Specifically, after receiving the foreign aid, government devotes the entire foreign aid on
consumption that the representative household has no control over yet still derives utility
from it. The results show that monetary authority adopts the similar optimal monetary
policy regimes with monetary transfer setting indicating that the way foreign aid spent
with or without the intermediacy of government does not affect the optimal monetary
policy response of the central banks as long as foreign aid shocks are transferred to the
household in such a way that the additional resources are absorbed in her bundles of
choice.
Theoretical models investigating the monetary policy response in favor of the effective-
ness of the foreign aid generally center their analysis on an open economy model in order
to account for Dutch Disease mechanism6. For instance, Prati and Tressel (2006) propose
a two-period open economy model with tradable and non-tradable goods where aid af-
fects them via their productivity parameters. An expansionary monetary policy is found
to be welfare-improving by offsetting the undesirable consequences of foreign aid. Berg
et al. (2010) offer a small open economy model with tradable and non-tradable goods
where the former has learning-by-doing effects that incur cost to this sector through its
productivity. They find that accumulating aid in reserves as a form of partial absorption
policy can hinder the effects of Dutch Disease. Mwabutwa, Bittencourt and Viegi (2013)
assess the existence of Dutch Disease in Malawi and identify the response of the Reserve
Bank of Malawi in the form of policy rule. The Bayesian Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium model in their paper suggests that Dutch Disease mechanism is not present
in Malawi and the response of the central bank to the incoming aid follows a Taylor rule.
In short, the limited number of theoretical papers that combines monetary policy and
6See, Michaely (1981) and Van Wijnbergen (1986). According to this mechanism, the effect of foreign
aid on demand worsens the external competitiveness of the traded sector while strengthening the internal
competitiveness of non-traded production against the former when aid results in an increase in demand
for non-traded goods leading to an increase in domestic price. Hence, the downturn in trade performance
caused by real exchange rate overvaluation damages export industries and productivity growth as the
traded sector is crucial to the productivity growth.
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foreign aid concentrates either on the role of monetary policy in limiting (boosting) the
negative (potential positive) impacts of foreign aid ignoring the Keynesian ingredients
or in a positive analysis. However, this chapter aims to fulfill the normative analysis
gap on this topic by comparing the optimal monetary policy responses.
The New Keynesian approach has been prevalently used among central banks for mon-
etary policy analysis in recent years as it synthesizes the framework of Real Business
Cycle with Keynesian theory allowing for explicit theoretical microfoundations together
with well-captured real world data. In a New Keynesian model with an efficient steady
state without real rigidities, the optimal monetary policy rule prefers zero inflation and
zero output gap in all periods by responding aggressively to any price change in order
to keep zero inflation. In doing so, output would be equal to its natural level, which
is also the efficient level. Under this setting, thus, the central bank does not face a
policy trade-off; and strict inflation targeting is dictated as the optimal policy within
the model. Hence, in a simple benchmark New Keynesian model with only nominal
price rigidities, the first best7 can be restored as replicating the flexible price equilib-
rium which translates into stabilizing the output gap. In other words, as Blanchard and
Gali (2007) call it, when only prices are sticky, the “Divine Coincidence” emerges be-
cause stabilizing inflation also stabilizes the output gap. However, the setting with cost
push shocks8 constitutes a short run trade-off between zero inflation and zero output
gap as stabilizing one comes at the cost of more volatility in the other due to the fact
that they move in opposite directions with respect to cost-push shock. In this case, the
central bank prefers to allow for only partial accommodation of inflationary pressures
in order to avoid large instability of output, leaving the inflation targeting still as the
easily implementable and desirable policy rule9. The results demonstrate that aid recip-
ient developing countries also face a trade-off between stabilizing the inflation rate and
output growth in the presence of cost push shock. The reason behind this finding is that
the cost push shocks directly affect prices whereas foreign aid has no direct impact on
prices, yet influences the allocations through which affecting prices. Hence, the trade-off
between two monetary targets does not vanish, making the inflation targeting still more
desirable compared to the output growth targeting in these countries.
In this line of research, many studies assume that interest rates are appointed as a
function of inflation and the output gap, resting on the justification that it is the output
gap that affects welfare instead of output. Nominal GDP targeting has also gained
attention among policy planners as it enables the monetary authority to simultaneously
target both nominal and real variables. This chapter, however, considers a Taylor-type
7Woodford (2001).
8Another case where the Divine Coincidence does not hold is a model with both price and nominal
wage stickiness as in Erceg et al. (2000).
9Garin, Lester and Sims (2015).
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rule that allows for inflation and output growth targeting. The justification for this type
of specification is that the output growth is easily observable in real time compared to
the output gap which relies on a hypothetical flexible wage and price level of output (i.e
natural level of output). While this type of specification is common in the literature10,
it can be also treated as an extreme case of nominal GDP targeting where zero inflation
targeting is assumed.
The studies on the optimal monetary policy in the form of Taylor rule agree that while
price stability is the main concern, output should be fixed to its flexible price level. For
instance, Fisher (1994) and Svensson (1998) summarize the optimal monetary policy in
a New Keynesian theory by having price stability as the primary concern compared to
output stability. The results in this chapter suggest that the optimized rule features a
high amount of inertia, a strong response to inflation and a moderate response to output
growth, supporting both the findings of the previous studies even when foreign aid is
considered; and the switch in monetary policy that has been experienced in developing
countries. In fact, many industrial countries (e.g., Australia, Canada, Great Britain
and Sweden) adopted inflation targeting in the 1990s. In return, they have experienced
stable and low inflation rates, without a sacrifice in the growth of the economy. Af-
ter the success of this regime, inflation targeting gained attention among developing
countries as well. In essence, following this policy by developing countries has emerged
in protest to the difficulties in conducting monetary policy via the exchange rate peg
or money supply target. Adopting inflation targeting provides, first and foremost, in-
creased accountability of the monetary authority and transparency of the procedures
which enhance the credibility of the monetary authority and the policy. It facilitates the
clear communication of the overriding objective of the monetary policy enabling a bet-
ter anchor for inflation expectations, price and wage setting. Hence, inflation targeting
became not only a monetary policy strategy for developed countries but also for devel-
oping countries11. The findings also indicate that central banks exhibit non-desirability
of responding to the output growth in the presence of foreign aid shock. The qualitative
effects of a foreign aid shock are very similar to those of a positive productivity shock
and preference shock in the wealth transfer setting and the consumption transfer setting
respectively. By increasing output and consumption in the former and latter settings
respectively, the foreign aid shock reduces the distortion introduced by cost-push shock,
hence, facilitating the stabilization of the output growth. In other words, as an extra
income or consumption, foreign aid supports the monetary policymakers by eliminating
10See, among others, Ireland (2004), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Fernandez-Villaverde
(2010).
11For instance, for Brazil, Chile, South Africa and Thailand. See, also, Gonc¸alvez and Salles (2008)
as the advocates of inflation targeting regime following their empirical analysis in developing countries.
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the trade-off that they are facing by mitigating the effects of the nominal rigidity in the
economy.
This chapter studies a closed economy model in order to find the optimal monetary policy
response in aid receiving countries. On the other hand, open economy models account
for the effects of the real exchange rate on inflation on the ground that the exchange
rate influences, first, the price of imported goods and, in return, the inflation rate; and
second, the competitiveness of domestic goods and, in return, aggregate demand which
will also affect inflation rate through Phillips curve. In return, extensions of Taylor rule
incorporating exchange rates have been considered12. In this case, central banks can
achieve their inflation targets by frequently adjusting their exchange rates. However,
these adjustments cause output responses producing instability in unemployment and
growth. Accounting for these problems, a great deal of discussions has been made in
the literature on whether to use open economy models, to incorporate the exchange
rate into the Taylor rule especially in inflation targeting less developed countries. Ball
(1999) and Svensson (2000) argue that monetary authorities in open economies should
target a long-run inflation rate removing the temporary effects of exchange rate. Laxton
and Pesenti (2003), Cespedes et al. (2004), Cavoli and Rajan (2006), and Batini et
al. (2007) conclude that the coefficient on the exchange rate target should be small
or zero. According to Taylor (2001) and Clarida et al. (2001) augmenting the Taylor
rule with exchange rate creates a confusion in the minds of the public about the main
objective of the central bank. Benes et al. (2013) and Ostry et al. (2012) argue that
the main instrument for managing the exchange rate is sterilized sales and purchases
of foreign exchange. Taking into account these findings and keeping in mind that the
developing countries are generally small open economies, exchange rate is removed from
the Taylor rule by considering a closed economy model; and a steady state inflation
target is imposed as a long-run target. However, the consumption transfer setting can
be thought of as a model where trade openness is acknowledged. In particular, foreign
aid financed consumption goods can be regarded as imported goods in which the Law of
One Price holds for the entire non-durable consumption (i.e both private and imported
goods consumption) in the inflation basket.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the New
Keynesian model where the foreign aid is in the form of wealth transfers. Section
4.3 describes the calibration and solution strategy; computes and analyzes the optimal
policy. Section 4.4 introduces the same model with foreign aid as consumption good
transfers. Section 4.5 concludes with a discussion.
12Ball (1999) and Svensson (2000).
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4.2 Model: Wealth Transfer
A New Keynesian model that features sticky prices, capital accumulation and foreign aid
in discrete time is constructed. The economy consists of a representative household, a
continuum of intermediate goods producing firms, a representative final goods producing
firm, a government and a monetary authority.
The infinitely lived representative household has preference over consumption and la-
bor supply; and is endowed with money, M , bonds, B, and physical capital, K. The
household has the following sources of nominal income: nominal wage income, previous
period money holdings, previous period bond holding together with nominal interest,
rent net of depreciation from capital and lump-sum transfers from the government, V ,
that is originated from seignorage revenue and foreign aid. Since there is no tax, the
household can spend this disposable income on purchasing more goods, holding more
bonds, more money and accumulating capital. Thus, the household chooses the sequence
for consumption ct, working time nt, bond holdings bt, capital kt+1 and cash mt in order
to maximize the expected utility function
max
{ct,nt,bt,kt+1,mt}
E
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
c1−φt
1− φ − ν
n1+σt
1 + σ
)
subject to the budget and cash in advance constraints in real terms
ct + kt+1 + bt +mt ≤ wtnt + rtkt + (1− δ)kt + (1+it−1)bt−1pit +
mt−1
pit
+ vt
ct ≤ mt + vt
where bt−1 =
Bt−1
Pt
and mt−1 =
Mt−1
Pt
represent real bond and money holdings held
between period t−1 and t respectively, with it−1 being the nominal interest rate on real
bond holdings. wt denotes the real wage earned from supplying labor to the intermediate
goods producing firms, rt is the real rental rate earned from the intermediate goods
producing firms; and inflation is defined as a gross rate, i.e. pit =
Pt
Pt−1 . The utility is
assumed to be well-behaved with a rate of time discount satisfying 0 < β < 1 and ν is
the disutility weight on labor supply. According to the cash-in-advance constraint, the
household must have enough cash or transfer payments to afford the current consumption
expenditures.
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The characterization of the household’s problem implies
c−φt = λt + µt (4.1)
νnσt = λtwt (4.2)
λt = βEtλt+1
1 + it
pit+1
(4.3)
λt = βEtλt+1[rt+1 + (1− δ)] (4.4)
λt = βEt
λt+1
pit+1
+ µt (4.5)
where λt and µt denotes the Lagrange multipliers associated with budget and cash-in-
advance constraints respectively. The first order condition on consumption (4.1) reveals
that the binding cash in advance constraint (i.e it1+it > 0)
13 drives a wedge between
the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of wealth. The first order
condition on labor (4.2) indicates the optimality condition between the marginal utility
of leisure14 and its price. The first order conditions with respect to bonds (4.3) and
capital (4.4) equate the profits and costs associated with investing one marginal unit of
wealth in bonds and capital respectively. The first order condition on real balances (4.5)
denotes the equation for pricing money that is defined in terms of the liquidity services
it offers.
The role of the government is to receive foreign aid, FA, which it transfers to the
representative household in a lump-sum fashion and print money. Hence, the budget
constraint of the government is
mt − mt−1
pit
+ fat = vt
The perfectly competitive final goods firm uses a continuum of differentiated interme-
diate goods, yi,t, indexed on the interval i ∈ [0, 1] in each period t = 0, 1, 2,... to
produce a final good, yt. The final output is assembled from the individual goods with
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) technology
yt =
(∫ 1
0
y
−1

i,t di
) 
−1
13Combining first order conditions with respect to money, bond and labor yields an equation for the
marginal utility from real balances and transfers: µt =
(
it
1+it
)(
νnσt
wt
)
.
14Keep in mind that nt + lt = 1 where l denotes leisure.
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where  measures the elasticity of demand for each of intermediate goods. The final
goods producing firm maximizes its profit by choosing
yi,t =
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−
yt
for all i ∈ [0, 1] and t = 0, 1, 2,.... This equation gives the corresponding demand for
each of the intermediate good i in which Pi,t is the price of the intermediate goods that
is taken as given by the final goods sector; and Pt is the price of the final goods. In
equilibrium, zero profit of the perfectly competitive final goods sector determines the Pt
as
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−i,t di
) 1
1−
for all t = 0, 1, 2,....
The intermediate goods producer i hires labor and rents capital from the household to
produce yi,t according to the following technology
yi,t = e
ztkαi,tn
1−α
i,t
with the share of capital income satisfying 0 < α < 1. The technology shock follows an
AR(1) process
zt = ρzzt−1 + ezt
with where ezt is the independent, serially uncorrelated innovation and normally dis-
tributed with zero-mean and standard deviation σz.
The cost minimization problem of the intermediate firm implies the following first order
conditions for its input prices
rt = αmci,t
yi,t
ki,t
(4.6)
wt = (1− α)mci,t yi,t
ni,t
(4.7)
where mci,t is the marginal cost of production. The intermediate good sector is monop-
olistically competitive and the intermediate goods producer, hence, has market power.
It faces a quadratic cost of nominal price adjustment, measured in terms of the final
Chapter 4: Foreign Aid: Lurking or Spilling Over? 89
goods and given by
χ
2
(
Pi,t
Pi,t−1
− 1
)2
yt
where χ > 0 determines the degree of nominal price rigidity as it governs the magni-
tude of the price adjustment cost. The higher is χ, the more sluggish is the adjustment
of nominal prices; and when χ = 0, prices are fully flexible. This price adjustment
mechanism is, first, proposed by Rotemberg (1982) allowing the intermediate goods
producing firms to have a dynamic problem in setting the price Pi,t of their output. The
literature on the characterization regarding to the price setting mechanisms, namely
time-dependent, such as Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983); or state-dependent, such as
Rotemberg (1982), Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) and Golosov and Lucas (2007), of
countries has been concentrating on the industrialized countries. While developed coun-
tries are found to have time-dependent or a combination of time- and state-dependent
price setting behaviors, recent studies15 identify the developing and emerging market
countries as having state-dependent price setting mechanism. In time-dependent mod-
els, the decision of changing prices is exogenous. In other words, prices change according
to a stochastic or deterministic rule regardless of the state of the economy. In contrast
to the time-dependent models, the decision of changing prices is endogenous in state-
dependent models, allowing the agents to decide whether or not to change their prices.
Due to the differences in the nature of the price changes in these models, the implica-
tions of the macro models based on them can also differ. Hence, following the evidences
in developing and emerging market countries and the criticism by Caplin and Leahy
(1991), arguing that the exogenous price adjustments in time-dependent models com-
plicate to know whether the effects of money are the consequences of the type of the
price adjustment mechanism or of the nominal rigidities per se; the model utilizes a
state-dependent price adjustment.
The intermediate goods producer i sets its prices to maximize
max
{Pi,t}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
j=0
∆t,t+j
[(
(1 + τ s)
Pi,t+j
Pt+j
−mci,t+j
)
yi,t+j − χ
2
(
Pi,t+j
Pi,t+j−1
− 1
)2
yt+j
]
subject to yi,t+j =
(
Pi,t+j
Pt+j
)−
yt+j
where ∆t,t+j = β
j
(
Un(t+j)
w(t+j)
Un(t)
w(t)
)
is the stochastic discount factor. Firms are assumed to
15Such as, Kovanen (2006), Gagnon (2009), Ga´briel and Reiff (2010), Cavallo (2012), Feltrin and
Guimaraes (2014) and Choudhary et al. (2016).
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receive a sale subsidy, τ s, in order to remove the distortions associated with monopolistic
competition, leading to a simplification at the steady state analysis. Since all the firms
face the same maximization problem, they will choose the same price, producing the
same quantity. Thus, symmetric equilibrium implies Pi,t = Pt, yi,t = yt, ni,t = nt,
ki,t = kt and mci,t = mct ∀i leading to the following first-order-condition16
Pt =
1
(−1)(1+τs)
 +
χ

[
(pit − 1)pit − βEt
(
(nt+1)
σ
wt+1
(nt)
σ
wt
)(
(pit+1 − 1)pit+1 yt+1yt
)]Wtnt
kt
(
1
1− α
)
= ηtWt
nt
kt
(
1
1− α
)
implying that the intermediate goods producing firms set their price as a mark-up, ηt,
over the marginal cost. The New Keynesian Phillips curve with cost-push shock is
(pit − 1)pit = βEt
( (nt+1)σ
wt+1
(nt)σ
wt
)(
(pit+1 − 1)pit+1 yt+1
yt
)
+

χ
(
mct − (1 + τ
s)(− 1)

)
+ ept(4.8)
where ept is a cost-push shock as a deterministic shock impulse. Instead of appearing
in the firm’s maximization problem, it is contemplated as a reduced-form cost-push
shock following Sims (2013). The cost-push shocks can have different interpretations
and representations. As in Smets and Wouters (2002)17 and Steinsson (2002), the time-
varying elasticity of demand for each of the intermediate goods, i.e. t instead of ,
shows up as a cost-push shock in the Phillips curve associating the more elastic demand
and correspondingly reduced desired markup with the mitigated inflationary pressures.
Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) generate the cost-push shocks as the endogenous
fluctuations in wage markups caused by the sluggish adjustment of nominal wages.
Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000) consider the rises in oil price as cost-push shock.
Instead, Leith and Liu (2016) model the fluctuations of the revenue tax rate as cost-
push shock due to the fact that the time-varying elasticity of demand in nonlinear models
influences the measure of the price dispersion in such a way that is not regarded to be
ingrained in cost-push shock models. Other alternative interpretations in the literature
are any effects that cause a time-varying wedge between the flexible price and the efficient
levels of output, such as net worth shocks proposed by Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) and
Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2010); or housing productivity and housing demand
shocks by Adam and Woodford (2013).
16In order to get this expression, use equation (4.7) to replace mct, together with nominal represen-
tation of wage, i.e. Wt = wtPt.
17They also regard the shocks to the markup in the labor market and in the required risk premium
on capital as cost-push shocks.
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The above equation forms a non-linear forward-looking New-Keynesian Phillips curve,
where the deviations of the real marginal cost from its desired steady-state value, i.e.
desired markup, are the driving force of inflation together with cost-push shocks. Notice
that, in the absence of the cost-push shock, when there is no price stickiness, χ = 0,
and 1 + τ s = −1 , mc = 1 at the steady state, implying Pareto optimality at the steady
state.
The law of motion for capital is given by
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + It
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital and It is the investment.
Foreign aid evolves following a stochastic component
fat = xtyt
where the law of motion for the stochastic component is
xt = x¯+ ρx(xt−1 − x¯) + ext (4.9)
so that x¯ represents the steady state foreign aid level, ρx denotes the degree of persistence
and ext is an iid shock.
The equilibrium in the final goods market necessitates that the all available final goods
are allocated to consumption, investment and costs that results from the price adjust-
ment
fat + yt = ct + It +
χ
2
(pit − 1)2yt
The aggregate resource constraint reveals that the foreign aid operates as a wealth trans-
fer18. Foreign aid may also be modelled such that it has productivity enhancing effects
or learning-by-doing effects by appearing in total factor productivity in the production
function as in Dutch disease literature. Alternatively, it can be tied to particular ac-
tivities, such as health, infrastructure19, education or provision of some public goods20;
or given in specific forms such that it leads to the transfer of knowledge as in technical
assistance21 allowing for improvement in the level of skills and technical know-how in the
recipient country. Note that, for the model to be well-defined, the aggregate resource
18For similar treatment of foreign aid, see, Annen and Kosempel (2012) and Annen, Batu and Kosem-
pel (2016).
19See, Adam and Bevan (2003).
20For instance, Chatterjee et al. (2012).
21See, Annen and Kosempel (2009).
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constraint implicitly necessitates the following condition 0.817 < pi < 1.182 at the steady
state.22
Following Taylor (1993), a simple inflation targeting rule implies that the central bank
manages the short-run nominal interest rate in response to the fluctuations in inflation
and output growth
ln
(
1 + it
1 + i¯
)
= ρi ln
(
1 + it−1
1 + i¯
)
+ (1− ρi)
{
ρpi ln
(
1 + pit
1 + pi
)
+ ρy ln
(
GRIt
RI
)}
Here i¯, pi and RI correspond to the steady state values of nominal interest rate, inflation
rate and total available growth rate of income respectively, where the latter is defined
as GRIt =
(1+xt)yt
(1+xt−1)yt−1 . ρi ∈ [0, 1) is a smoothing parameter; and ρpi ∈ [0, 10] and
ρy ∈ [0, 10] are the weights assigned by the central bank to the deviations of inflation and
output from their steady states. As in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), the monetary
policy is, here, modelled such that the central bank sets the short-run nominal interest
rate in response to observable variables only. This is why output growth in deviations
from steady state is included in the targeting rule rather than output gap, allowing to
gauge the effects of monetary policy when changes in the foreign aid is also accounted
for. This Taylor rule can be mapped into targeting rules as well. Specifically, strict
inflation targeting rule requires ρy = ρi = 0 and 0 < ρpi ≤ 10 while flexible inflation
targeting rule allows for 0 < ρpi,ρy ≤ 10 and ρi ∈ [0, 1).
4.3 Optimizing Monetary Policy
The critical feature of this analysis roots in the evaluation of the Taylor rule based on a
welfare assessment under alternative stochastic processes when the monetary authority
accounts for the incoming foreign aid. In particular, given the calibrated values of the
structural parameters of the model, three coefficients of the Taylor rule are optimized
in order to maximize unconditional welfare under three cases: (i) only cost-push shock
(CP ), (ii) only foreign aid shock (FA); and (iii) cost-push and foreign aid shocks
(CP + FA) in which total factor productivity shock is always muted23. The novelty of
this analysis arises from the question regarding what the best response of the monetary
policy authority is in aid recipient developing countries.
22The goods market equilibrium can be written as yt =
ct+It
1+xt−χ2 (pit−1)2
.
23By doing so, the interpretation of how to treat the incoming foreign aid is facilitated. Furthermore,
for the comparison of only foreign aid shock and only technology shock, see Figure 1 and Figure 2.
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4.3.1 Calibration and Solution Strategy
The selection of parameter values for developing countries is challenging as the litera-
ture has been investigating mostly the micro data from developed countries. The value
for the discount factor in developing countries varies from 0.95 to 0.99. For instance
Arellano et al. (2005) assumes 0.95 for general calibration of developing countries, An-
nen and Kosempel (2012) and Bhattacharya and Ila Patnaik (2016) use approximately
0.97 while Berg, Portillo and Zanna (2014) calibrate it to be 0.99 for Uganda. Here, a
more conventional value β = 0.98 is adopted.24 The inverse of intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is set to 2 as the most widespread value in the literature for developing
economies25. The value for the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply is quite con-
troversial ranging from 0.2 to 10.26 Yet, the estimates for Frisch elasticity is in general
1
σ ∈ [0.25, 1]. Following the suggestion by Prasad and Zhang (2015) pointing to the high
informality of the labor market in developing countries, σ is set to a slightly higher value
than its developed country counterparts. The weight on the disutility of supplying labor,
ν, is calibrated from the first best choice of the economy such that the steady state labor
supply is equal to 0.3. The value assigned to the rate of capital depreciation, δ, implies
an average investment ratio of 27 percent. This value is attained from low&middle in-
come countries data of capital formation percentage of GDP between 1960 and 2015 in
World Bank data. While Prescott (1986) estimated the capital share of income in the
U.S 36%, Kraay and Raddatz (2006) argue that the values ranging between 0.5 and 0.6
are more appropriate for poor countries. On the other hand, Gollin (2002) and Caselli
and Feyrer (2007) identify sizeable cross-country variation in capital share. Following
the standard value in macroeconomics, α is assumed to be 13
27.
The elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods is set to 1128. Sale subsidy is
calculated so as to remove the monopolistic power at the steady state, i.e τ s = 1−1 . The
probability that a price does not adjust in a given period, i.e Calvo probability, is set to
0.66 following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Since the standard way of calculating
the degree of nominal price rigidity, χ, is to equate the slope coefficients of Calvo and
Rotemberg Phillips curves, this value is required. It follows that χ = (−1)(1+τ
s)0.66
(1−0.66)(1−0.66β) .
24For the papers which use similar or same value for this parameter, see, for instance, Aoki, Benigno
and Kiyotaki (2016); Shen, Yang and Zanna (2015).
25Agenor and Montiel (1999); Devereux et al. (2006); Aguiar and Gopinath (2007); Garc´ıa-Cicco et
al. (2010).
26 Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2016) uses 0.2, Berg et al. (2012) uses 10 for CEMAC region, Prasad
and Zhang (2015) set it into 1.5.
27This value is in line with the following papers spesifically Arellano et al. (2005) and Garc´ıa-Cicco,
Pancrazi Uribe (2010).
28Many papers use θ = 9 , 11 or 12. Here, Anand et al. (2015); Prasad and Zhang (2015); and Clarida,
Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) are followed.
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The stochastic process for aid is calibrated from the Official Development Assistance
(ODA) data of World Bank. The available data of net ODA constant prices for low&middle
income countries is normalized by GDP constant prices for the period of 1960-2015. This
standard measure in the literature yields the following persistence and long-run values
respectively, ρx = 0.92 and x¯ = 0.01
29. The parameter values for technology process are
set such that they match the output volatility in the data that is used for normalization
of foreign aid data. The autocorrelation coefficient is ρz = 0.93 per annum and σz = 0.02
which are values in line with the literature.30 Since the cost-push shock is introduced in
reduced-form, 1% standard deviation is assumed for its volatility. The monetary policy
parameters follows the values from Gali et al. (2004) and Mohanty and Klau (2005).
Calculating these values from the long-run responses suggests ρi = 0.7, ρpi = 2.05
31
and ρy = 0.125. Finally, zero inflation and real output growth are targeted. Table 4.1
presents the quick overview of the parameter values.
The approach, here, consists of finding the policy specification {ρi, ρpi, ρy} that maxi-
mizes the welfare of the households. More formally, the policy parameters that maximize
E[Vt] are analyzed:
max
{ρi,ρpi ,ρy}
Vt ≡ E
∞∑
k=0
βk
(
c1−φt+k
1− φ − ν
n1+σt+k
1 + σ
)
(4.10)
where E represents the unconditional expectations operator. The first-order approxi-
mations of the equilibrium conditions are independent of the monetary policy since the
expected value of a variable is equal to its non-stochastic steady state. Hence, the first-
order approximation of all policies coincide with the same level of welfare32. To avoid
this problem, the second-order approximation of the welfare is computed for a recursive
representation of the problem in equation (4.10)
Vt ≡
(
c1−φt
1− φ − ν
n1+σt
1 + σ
)
+ βt EVt+1
4.3.2 Comparing Monetary Policy Rules
The comparison of the rules, first, involves policy evaluations of the three stochastic cases
of the model economy on the condition that each stochastic process has a volatility of
29This value is low compared to highly foreign aid dependent countries as in Arellano (2005). However,
Buffie et al. (2004) summarize similar values for some selected countries from Africa.
30See, for instance, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), Anand (2015), Prasad and Zhang (2015), Annen
(2016)and Aoki et al. (2016).
31Although for an active monetary policy, the literature often uses ρpi = 1.5 or ρpi = 2, the weight for
inflation targeting is required to be equated to 2.05 in order to ensure the Blanchard-Khan determinacy.
Yet, these values are only necessary for the start of the guess.
32For a discussion, see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) and Kim and Kim (2003).
Chapter 4: Foreign Aid: Lurking or Spilling Over? 95
Table 4.1: Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
Households
β discount rate 0.98
φ inverse IES 2
σ inverse Frisch elasticity of labor 1.5
ν weight of disutility from working 44.69
Firms
δ depretiation rate 0.08
α capital share 0.33
θ elasticity of substitution btw goods 11
τ s sale subsidy 0.1
probability Calvo probability 0.66
χ adjustment cost 60.46
ρz AR(1) for technology 0.93
σz st. dev. of technology 0.02
Foreign Aid
ρx AR(1) for foreign aid 0.92
x¯ steady state foreign aid 0.01
σx st. dev. of foreign aid shock 0.003
Monetary Policy
σe st. dev. of cost-push shock 0.01
ρi smoothing parameter of interest rate 0.7
ρpi coefficient of inflation targeting 2.05
ρy coefficient of output growth targeting 0.125
γpi inflation target 1
γy output growth target 1
1% standard deviation. Next, the volatilities from the baseline calibration is used for
the same analysis. Following this kind of procedure enables to get clear results and
simplifies the interpretations of these results.
For only cost-push shock case, cost-push shock follows from equation (4.8) while foreign
aid is considered to be a deterministic process:
xt = x¯ (4.11)
instead of equation (4.9). On the other hand, only foreign aid shock case necessitates
the equation (4.9) for foreign aid; and equation (4.8) without reduced-form cost-push
term:
(pit − 1)pit = βEt
( (nt+1)σ
wt+1
(nt)σ
wt
)(
(pit+1 − 1)pit+1 yt+1
yt
)
+

χ
(
mct − (1 + τ
s)(− 1)

)
(4.12)
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Finally, the baseline economy without any variation is followed for both shocks case.
Table 4.2 reports the parameter configuration that characterizes the each shock case
when σe = σx = 0.01.
Table 4.2: Wealth Transfer: Parameter Values of the Taylor Rules when σe = σx =
0.01
Shock Rule
ρi ρpi ρy
CP 0.7 10 0.7842
FA 0.7 10 0
CP + FA 0.7 10 0.4831
When the economy is hit only by cost-push shock, all the parameter values are positive,
indicating that the cost-push shock generates a trade-off between stabilizing the inflation
rate and output growth as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2001) and Gali
(2002)33. However, when there is only foreign aid shock, central banks face no short-run
trade-off and strict inflation targeting emerges as the sole aim of the monetary policy. In
the presence of both cost-push and foreign aid shocks, monetary policymakers, instead,
are required to balance the targeting objectives. The comparison of coefficient of output
growth targeting in CP and CP + FA shocks indicates that the presence of foreign aid
shock in addition to cost-push shock reduces the need to stabilise the output growth. The
less desirability of output growth stabilization is originated from the nature of the foreign
aid since it acts as a wealth transfer. In other words, foreign aid shock alleviates the
distortion that stems from the cost-push shock. As observed in all cases, the coefficient
of inertial adjustment of the interest rate is always positive, supporting the claim by
Mohanty and Klau (2005) stating that the developing countries put substantial weight
on interest rate smoothing. Moreover, it also indicates that the monetary policymaker is
backward-looking and fights inflation deviations from the steady state more aggressively
in the long-run compared to the short-run34.
When the magnitudes of the shocks differ, similar monetary policy approaches are de-
rived from the welfare optimization as in Table 4.3. In particular, in the presence of
cost-push shock, central banks find it optimal to follow a flexible inflation targeting
where they act more in favor of the inflation stabilization compared to that of out-
put growth. When the economy is subject to foreign aid shock, the trade-off between
stabilization rules disappears and monetary policymakers strictly fight against inflation
deviations from the target rate. However, when the economy features both sources of
33The trade-off is between inflation rate and output gap in these papers.
34See, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007).
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Table 4.3: Wealth Transfer: Parameter Values of the Taylor Rules when σe = 0.01
and σx = 0.003
Shock Rule
ρi ρpi ρy
CP 0.7 10 0.7842
FA 0.7 10 0
CP + FA 0.7 10 0.7459
shocks, monetary policymakers depart from strict inflation targeting by choosing a miti-
gated response parameter to output growth targeting compared to only cost-push shock
case. Note that, when both shocks are present, the weight given to the output growth
targeting is higher compared to the same case in equal shocks. In other words, the
decrease in ρy from CP case to CP +FA case when σe = 0.01 and σx = 0.003 is smaller
compared to the one when σe = σx = 0.01. Intuitively, when the shock to foreign aid
is larger, i.e equal shocks, this “helicopter-drop” income is slightly more successful in
stabilizing output growth. Although this may sound counter-intuitive, it stresses the
importance by the effect of temporary changes in foreign aid rather than the permanent
changes35. Furthermore, note that output growth stabilization translates into taking
actions with respect to foreign aid as well. While this could be viewed as a signal for
the rather small importance of the volatility in foreign aid, yet, it hardly matters for the
efficient conduct of the monetary policy in total.
The conventional measure of foreign aid percentage of GDP is sometimes criticized on
the claim that it tends to be procyclical36. Hence, as an alternative measure, ODA per
capita is proposed. Furthermore, some of the emerging market and developing countries
are characterized as heavily aid dependent37. In order to account for these observations
and as a robustness check, the same welfare-based optimal monetary policy is solved
with a higher mean value of this foreign aid measure; and the results are found to be
qualitatively invariant to these changes.
To understand the intuition for why the welfare-optimizing policy rule features no re-
sponse to output growth, it is important to identify the nature of the foreign aid shock.
Is it a further source of inefficiency or an instrument that may benefit the monetary
policymakers in reducing the distortions which already exist in the economy? To this
end, Figure 4.1 and 4.2 display the Impulse Response Functions (IRF) of the optimal
monetary policies with respect to only technology shock with equations (4.11) and (4.12)
35This result in line with the conclusion by for instance Annen and Kosempel (2012).
36Pallage and Robe (2003) find that aid is procyclical in 60% of the recipient countries.
37For instance, see Arellano et al. (2005).
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and only foreign aid shock with equation (4.12) respectively. Following a positive tech-
nology shock, output, consumption and capital rise while labor supply and inflation
fall. The qualitative effects of a foreign aid shock are very similar to those of a positive
productivity shock. Since the foreign aid enters into the economy as wealth transfer,
richer households consume more and supply less labor on impact38. This imitation of
technology shock by foreign aid suggests that the foreign aid shock can be treated as
a productivity shock that generates income effects. In Rotemberg models, the cost of
nominal rigidities, i.e., the adjustment cost, causes a wedge between consumption and
output as some of the output is devoted to the price adjustment cost. However, at the
steady state, assuming zero inflation target discards this rigidity. Therefore, by increas-
ing output, the foreign aid shock reduces the only distortion left in the economy due
to the cost-push shock; hence, facilitating the stabilization of the output growth. In
other words, as an extra income, foreign aid supports the monetary policymakers by
eliminating the trade-off that they are facing by mitigating the effects of the nominal
rigidity exists in the economy.
Figure 4.1: Impulse Response Function of Optimal Monetary Policy w.r.t. Technology
Having established how the foreign aid acts in the setting, the impacts of cost-push shock
can be easily elaborated. Cost-push shocks introduce real imperfections into the New
Keynesian model via the variations in desired price markups. In two-shock case, this real
imperfection forces the central bank to respond to the output growth as well, contrary
to the only foreign aid shock case. This gives rise to the explanation that although
foreign aid shock helps to mitigate the nominal rigidity, its effect is not strong enough
to cancel out the real imperfection, leading to a shift in the non-desirability of response
38Similar results in Asem and Gupta (1999).
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Figure 4.2: Impulse Response Function of Optimal Monetary Policy w.r.t. FA
to output growth which is the optimal reaction in only foreign aid shock case. Figure
4.3 depicts the IRF of the interest variables to one percent cost-push shock to better
gauge the effects of this shock. The comparison of the changes in output with respect
to only cost-push shock and only foreign aid shock reveals that the volatility in output
is greater in the former. While both shocks result in alteration of household decisions,
only cost-push shock directly affects relative prices. Furthermore, remember that the
Phillips curve relates the current inflation to current output growth and expected future
inflation. In such a framework, the foreign aid shock allows for a preferred alignment of
expected future inflation to current inflation with a policy better anchoring the output
growth. Hence, in both-shock case ρy > 0; yet, it is still smaller than the only cost-push
shock economy.
4.4 Model: Consumption Transfer
The model in Section 4.2 claims that foreign aid is efficiently used in a lump-sum way so
that there is no reason to stabilize output fluctuations induced by foreign aid shocks. In
particular, foreign aid enters into the budget constraint of the representative household
via monetary transfers from the aid-receiving government. These additional resources
are, then, available for more consumption spending, capital, bond and money holdings.
Alternatively, after the intake of foreign aid, the government may decide how the ad-
ditional resources are spent in the economy. Specifically, the government devotes the
entire foreign aid on consumption instead of having the household choice over capital
and so on. Hence, in this setting, the household does not receive lump-sum transfers of
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Figure 4.3: Impulse Response Function of Optimal Monetary Policy w.r.t. CP
aid; and the resource constraint is not affected by the incoming foreign aid. However,
composite consumption that contains non-durable consumption goods implies that the
representative household derives utility from both private and foreign aid induced con-
sumption goods rather than only private consumption as in the wealth transfer setting.
The reason behind this variation is to analyze this type of setting is to identify whether
how the foreign aid is spent creates a misallocation or not; and, in return, check the
robustness of the results obtained in the previous framework.
The model has the following different features. The representative household chooses
the sequence for private consumption ct, working time nt, bond holdings bt, capital kt+1
and cash mt
max
{ct,nt,bt,kt+1,mt}
E
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
cˆt
1−φ
1− φ − ν
n1+σt
1 + σ
)
with cˆt representing composite consumption good (i.e non-durable consumption) and
ct indicating private consumption on home produced goods. cˆt = ct + θcfa where cfat
denotes the consumption goods purchased by foreign aid. Among perfect substitute
goods, θ = 1 is assumed for simplicity of calculation. The household maximizes the
expected utility function subject to the following budget and cash in advance constraints
in real terms
ct + kt+1 + bt +mt ≤ wtnt + rtkt + (1− δ)kt + (1+it−1)bt−1pit +
mt−1
pit
+ vt
ct ≤ mt + vt
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The government receives foreign aid and issues money. It spends these resources on
foreign aid induced consumption goods and transfers the rest of the resources back to
the household.
mt − mt−1
pit
+ fat = cfat + vt
where cfa is financed entirely by foreign aid transfers
fat = cfat
In other words, foreign aid can also be regarded as a special form of government spending.
Correspondingly, the resource constraint is
fat + yt = ct + cfat + It +
χ
2
(pit − 1)2yt
The rest of the model follows the previous setting.39 Parameter values in Table 4.1 are
also carried over for the optimization of policy parameters except the standard deviation
of the shocks. The shocks are assumed to be equal to 0.001 in order to avoid explosive
simulations in second order approximations. Finally, the same magnitude of shocks are
analyzed.
Table 4.4: Consumption Transfer: Parameter Values of the Taylor Rules when σe =
σx = 0.001
Shock Rule
ρi ρpi ρy
CP 0.7 10 0.7833
FA 0.7 10 0
CP + FA 0.7 10 0.4791
As Table 4.4 illustrates, in the presence of cost-push shock, central banks find it optimal
to follow a flexible inflation targeting with a more aggressive response to deviations of
inflation from desired levels than those of output growth. However, when the economy is
hit by foreign aid shock, monetary policy authorities strictly adopt an inflation targeting
regime. When both shocks are present, central banks face a trade off between stabilizing
inflation and output growth. Their reaction to inflation targeting is still more aggressive
than output growth targeting. Yet, the response to output growth in this case is smaller
than only cost-push shock case.
39For equilibrium conditions, see Appendix for Chapter 4.
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Although it is not possible to compare the optimal rules in terms of weights given to
the policy regimes in this and previous settings due to the differences in the magnitudes
of the shocks, the results in terms of which regime to adopt are similar to the ones
obtained in the wealth transfer setting. In the latter setting where the foreign aid is
directed to the household, the household optimally allocates these resources according
to her ranking of marginal utilities in those choices. However, here, the representative
household is not allowed to choose how to spend the foreign aid. Instead, the household
is forced to have more of the consumption goods financed by incoming foreign aid that
is purchased by the government. In other words, foreign aid shocks act like preference
shocks in consumption transfer setting where the household has no control over; yet
enjoys it. Intuitively, although the allocation of foreign aid and how it reaches the
household differs, the additional resources are still devoted to the household by affecting
the optimal consumption bundles. Since foreign aid is entirely spent for consumption,
this type of foreign aid spending does not cause distortions creating any misallocation of
the additional resources. As a consequence, this fact suggests the way foreign aid is spent
with or without the intermediacy of government does not affect the optimal monetary
policy response of the central banks as long as foreign aid shocks are transferred to the
household in such a way that the additional resources are absorbed in its bundles of
choice.
4.5 Conclusion
A New Keynesian model that features sticky prices, capital accumulation and foreign
aid in a discrete time is constructed to study the optimal monetary policy in the form
of targeting rules in foreign aid-receiving countries. In particular, given the calibrated
values of the structural parameters of the model, policy parameters of the Taylor rule,
namely interest rate smoothing, inflation targeting and output growth targeting, are
optimized in order to maximize unconditional welfare under three cases: (i) only cost-
push shock (CP ), (ii) only foreign aid shock (FA); and (iii) cost-push and foreign aid
shocks (CP + FA).
The results demonstrate that when the economy is hit only by cost-push shock, mone-
tary authority should react both to inflation and output growth with a more aggressive
response to inflation as inflation and output tend to move in opposite directions condi-
tional on the cost-push shock. However, when there is only foreign aid shock, monetary
authority recovers from the short-run trade-off and strict inflation targeting emerges as
the particular purpose of the monetary policy. In the presence of both cost-push and
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foreign aid shocks, monetary policymakers, instead, are required to balance the tar-
geting objectives. When the magnitudes of the shocks differ, similar monetary policy
approaches are derived with a distinction of the policy coefficient on output growth be-
ing higher compared to the equal shocks case. This, in turn, means that when the shock
to foreign aid is larger, i.e equal shocks, this “helicopter-drop” income is slightly more
successful in stabilizing output growth. Since the foreign aid enters into the economy as
wealth transfer, as an extra income, foreign aid supports the monetary policymakers by
eliminating the trade-off that they are facing by mitigating the effects of the nominal
rigidity exists in the economy. Yet, the diminished output growth response in the pres-
ence of both shocks illustrates that the effect of foreign aid shock is not strong enough
to cancel out the real imperfection in the form of cost-push shock. Nevertheless, its
presence serves to the monetary authority in anchoring output growth. This suggests
that the foreign aid is not merely a shock that creates reallocation in this setting, but
it can become an unconventional policy tool as well.
The findings of this chapter suggest that foreign aid resolves the need for the stabilization
of income. In other words, foreign aid reduces the trade off between inflation and
output stabilization faced by the monetary authority, leading to the idea that foreign
aid recipient developing countries should act in favor of the inflation targeting as in
industrialized countries.
Robustness check via the change of intermediacy of government shows that the results in
terms of which regime to adopt from the setting of foreign aid in the form of non-durable
consumption transfers are similar to the ones obtained in the wealth transfer setting.
The findings show that whether the government transfers the foreign aid directly to the
household as monetary transfers or directs it to the household via specific goods does
not affect the optimal choice of monetary regime adopted by central banks as long as
foreign aid shocks are transferred to the household in such a way that the additional
resources are absorbed in its bundles of choice.
A caution on the interpretation of the results is still needed. This chapter should not
be regarded as providing particular quantitative prescriptions to the optimal values of
policy coefficients in the Taylor rule. Rather, their implications should be evaluated on
a qualitative perspective as the responses are obtained from numerically optimized rules
that are calculated in a finite interval.
Appendices
Appendix for Chapter 3
Table 3.15: List of Countries for Proximate Variables
Albania Costa Rica Malaysia Romania
Algeria Dominican Republic Mauritius South Africa
Argentina Egypt Mexico Sri Lanka
Republic of Armenia El Salvador Moldova Thailand
Belarus Georgia Morocco Tunisia
Belize Hungary Nicaragua Turkey
Bolivia Jamaica Pakistan Ukraine
Brazil Kazakhstan Panama Venezuela
Bulgaria Republic of Korea Paraguay
China Kyrgyz Republic Peru
Colombia Macedonia Philippines
Table 3.16: List of Countries for Soci-economical Variables
Argentina* Egypt* Kenya* South Africa
Bolivia* El Salvador Malaysia Sri Lanka
Brazil Ghana Morocco* Thailand
Central African* Republic Guatemala Nigeria Tunisia*
China* Honduras Paraguay Turkey
Colombia Hungary Peru Zambia*
Costa Rica India Philippines Zimbabwe*
Ecuador Indonesia* Romania
* denotes the countries that are categorized as non-democratic.
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Table 3.17: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests for Non-democracies, IPS
Variable Wout trend W trend
test stat. p-value test stat. p-value
inf -3.4519 0.0003 -2.6293 0.0043
gini -1.2997 0.0969 0.8651 0.8065
ginpol -0.1155 0.4540 -0.8662 0.1932
D.gini -0.1224 0.4513 -1.9607 0.0250
D2.gini -11.7303 0.0000 -9.5640 0.0000
D.ginpol -9.1571 0.0000 -10.4386 0.0000
2 lags are used for level and 1 lag for first-difference variables.
Table 3.18: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests for Non-democracies, CADF
Variable Wout trend W trend
test stat. p-value test stat. p-value
inf -0.352 0.363 0.592 0.723
gini 2.049 0.980 3.022 0.999
cbi 0.093 0.537 1.012 0.844
ginpol -0.539 0.295 0.879 0.810
D.inf -9.423 0.000 -8.429 0.000
D.gini 0.109 0.543 -0.911 0.181
D2.gini -8.686 0.000 -6.806 0.000
D.cbi -3.967 0.000 -2.538 0.006
D.ginpol -2.100 0.018 -2.455 0.007
2 lags are used for level, 1 lag for first-difference and 0 lag for second-difference variables.
Table 3.19: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests for Democracies, IPS
Variable Wout trend W trend
test stat. p-value test stat. p-value
inf -6.3965 0.0000 -6.5711 0.0000
gini -1.9372 0.0264 -3.8127 0.0001
ginpol -6.0378 0.0000 -6.3001 0.0000
2 lags are used for level variables.
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Table 3.20: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests for Democracies, CADF
Variable Wout trend W trend
test stat. p-value test stat. p-value
inf -4.379 0.000 -4.213 0.000
gini 1.151 0.875 -4.929 0.000
cbi -1.159 0.123 0.800 0.788
ginpol -4.445 0.000 -0.903 0.183
D.gini -2.245 0.012 -0.098 0.461
D.cbi -6.928 0.000 -4.980 0.000
D.ginpol -6.114 0.000 -4.876 0.000
2 lags are used for level and 1 lag for first-difference variables.
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Equilibrium conditions for wealth transfer setting: {ct, λt, µt,mt, vt, nt, It, fat, yt, kt, it, wt,
rt,mct, pit, zt, xt, GRIt, ut,Wt}
c−φt = λt + µt (13)
νnσt = λtwt (14)
λt = βEtλt+1
1 + it
pit+1
(15)
λt = βEtλt+1[rt+1 + (1− δ)] (16)
λt = βEt
λt+1
pit+1
+ µt (17)
yt = e
ztkαt n
1−α
t (18)
zt = ρzzt−1 + ezt (19)
rt = αmct
yt
kt
(20)
wt = (1− α)mct yt
nt
(21)
mt − mt−1
pit
+ fat = vt (22)
ct = mt + vt (23)
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + It (24)
fat + yt = ct + It +
χ
2
(pit − 1)2yt (25)
fat = xtyt (26)
xt = x¯+ ρx(xt−1 − x¯) + ext (27)
ln
(
1 + it
1 + i¯
)
= ρi ln
(
1 + it−1
1 + i¯
)
+ (1− ρi)
{
ρpi ln
(
1 + pit
1 + pi
)
+ ρy ln
(
GRIt
RI
)}
(28)
GRIt =
(1 + xt)yt
(1 + xt−1)yt−1
(29)
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(pit − 1)pit = βEt
( (nt+1)σ
wt+1
(nt)σ
wt
)(
(pit+1 − 1)pit+1 yt+1
yt
)
+

χ
(
mct − (1 + τ
s)(− 1)

)
+ ept
(30)
c1−φt
1− φ − ν
n1+σt
1 + σ
(31)
Wt = ut + βWt+1 (32)
Equilibrium conditions for consumption transfer setting: {cˆt, ct, cfat, λt, µt,mt, vt, nt, It, fat,
yt, kt, it, wt, rt,mct, pit, zt, xt, GRIt, ut,Wt, bt}
cˆt
−φθcθ−1t cfa
1−θ
t = λt + µt (33)
νnσt = λtwt (34)
λt = βEtλt+1
1 + it
pit+1
(35)
λt = βEtλt+1[rt+1 + (1− δ)] (36)
λt = βEt
λt+1
pit+1
+ µt (37)
yt = e
ztkαt n
1−α
t (38)
zt = ρzzt−1 + ezt (39)
cˆt = c
θ
t cfa
1−θ
t (40)
rt = αmct
yt
kt
(41)
wt = (1− α)mct yt
nt
(42)
mt − mt−1
pit
+ fat = cfat + vt (43)
ct = mt + vt (44)
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + It (45)
fat + yt = ct + cfat + It +
χ
2
(pit − 1)2yt (46)
fat = cfat (47)
fat = xtyt (48)
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xt = x¯+ ρx(xt−1 − x¯) + ext (49)
ln
(
1 + it
1 + i¯
)
= ρi ln
(
1 + it−1
1 + i¯
)
+ (1− ρi)
{
ρpi ln
(
1 + pit
1 + pi
)
+ ρy ln
(
GRIt
RI
)}
(50)
GRIt =
(1 + xt)yt
(1 + xt−1)yt−1
(51)
(pit − 1)pit = βEt
( (nt+1)σ
wt+1
(nt)σ
wt
)(
(pit+1 − 1)pit+1 yt+1
yt
)
+

χ
(
mct − (1 + τ
s)(− 1)

)
+ ept
(52)
ut =
cˆt
1−φ
1− φ − ν
n1+σt
1 + σ
(53)
Wt = ut + βWt+1 (54)
bt = 0 (55)
The difference between the two sets of equilibrium conditions roots in the inclusion of
bt = 0 in equilibrium conditions. Yet, with or without this condition, the results do
not change. Because the market clearing conditions for the other markets except the
bond market, by Walras’s Law, indicate that the bond market has to clear as well.
Hence, Walras’s Law permits not to explicitly consider the bond market. On the other
hand, although the bond market is taken into account by including FOC with respect
to bond holdings, this approach does not allow to detect the equilibrium level of real
bond holding of the household. Hence, exact conditions in wealth transfer setting do
not include the last equation and the last variable in the list of the consumption transfer
setting. Nevertheless, in both settings it is required that the sum of the bond holdings
over households must be equal to zero. Since this is a representative agent problem40
the condition for bond holding reduces to zero bond holding, which is the last condition
in consumption transfer setting. In other words, presence of bonds in the economy
facilitates providing the Fisher relationship to feed the economy as the nominal interest
rate matters for calculations contrary to the level of bond holdings.
40Even if there were to be a continuum of households, they would be ex-ante and post identical as
there is no aggregate risk or no heterogeneity among them.
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